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ABSTRACT 
 
The research presented was initiated to understand the gaps in strategic planning 
decision making on transport infrastructure which affect the resilience of 
communities during a disaster. A comprehensive literature review not only captured 
the outcomes of published work on this topic but also the government publications 
and other documents which capture the planning processes as well as transport 
corridor planning and traffic management. A critical analysis of literature identified 
major gaps in the planning process reported by researchers as well as practitioners. 
The list of gaps were categorized in to four key areas as land use planning, transport 
corridor planning, road design and other areas. Out of these land use planning and 
transport corridor planning were identified as major areas and were focused on for 
further analysis. 
 
Analysis of the gaps in decision making associated with land use planning and 
development was conducted through a detailed analysis of two case studies and a 
questionnaire to capture expert opinion of local government officials operating in 
disaster-prone areas. Outcome of these was identification of two major areas where 
erroneous decisions are made as land use rezoning approvals and land use approvals 
in high-risk areas. The list of gaps were validated using triangulation of data from the 
four case studies (two from literature and two sourced from Victorian local 
government sources) and the expert opinion. 
 
Analysis of the transport corridor planning and traffic management was conducted by 
the analysis of a case study area in Geelong city council using intersection analysis, 
traffic flow analysis using SIDRA software under normal operating conditions and 
also emergency evacuation conditions. Outcome of this study was consolidation of 
gaps in transport corridor planning which affect the disaster resilience of 
communities. 
 
iv 
After consolidating the gaps in decision-making practices in the two selected areas of 
governance, possible decision-making frameworks were analysed to understand 
prioritisation of the gaps. It was observed that due to the complexity of the 
information required, a three tiered approach is the best where you can use a 
qualitative risk ranking approach, a quantitative risk ranking method or expert 
opinion to prioritise the gaps identified for action. 
 
The list of validated gaps identified in this research will provide the gap between 
ideal case and existing case and will be a starting point to identify actions required to 
enhance disaster resilience of communities through enhanced transport planning. 
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Land use development planning and traffic management are key elements in strategic 
transport planning, which ensures resilience of transport infrastructure and transport 
networks and provides for community resilience during extreme events. Failure of 
transport infrastructure is often linked to many parameters that relate to decisions 
taken at the strategic planning level. 
 
Transport networks, transport infrastructure and transport planning are important to a 
country’s economic growth. The Federal Highway Administration and Federal 
Transit Administration (2007) report stated that ‘Transportation planning plays a 
fundamental role in the state, region or community’s vision for its future’. Transport 
networks provide a more direct connection between the movement of people and 
goods and state-level significant economic activity. These transport networks include 
roadways, waterways, railways and airports (Carr, Dixon & Meyer 2010). Transport 
network systems support economic growth, help sustain Gross Domestic Product and 
reduce poverty in developing countries. The road transportation system is one of our 
most important lifelines (Berdica 2002). 
 
Transport planning and coordination should be considered at all levels of government 
(national, state and local) and at the international level. Bjornland (1994) stated that 
‘Transport management and transport infrastructure planning require skill, and 
transport flow modelling has rapidly increased in complexity’. Transportation 
networks are key components of transport infrastructure. Priemus and Zonneveld 
(2003) stated that corridors are considered ‘bundles of infrastructure that link two or 
more urban areas’. Transport network management and transport infrastructure 
planning are complex exercises. A report by Cox (1997) stated that the road system 
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has been managed predominantly for political purposes throughout Australia's 
history. The main Commonwealth objectives have been to open up rural areas, 
provide for the defence of remote areas and achieve national integration through the 
linking of capital cities. In Australia, the main state objectives have been related to 
regional development and have focussed on economic activity in the state’s major 
capital cities and ports. Funding for transport infrastructure has long been a 
contentious issue when it comes to who is responsible for paying for it. Transport 
planners and designers consider the alignment of the transport network, spacing of 
network connections, access to properties and number of travel lanes, what types of 
transport will be catered for and travel speeds. However there is more to the process 
than that, as identified by Bjornland (1994), who stated ‘Transport management and 
transport infrastructure planning require skill, and transport flow modelling has 
rapidly increased in complexity’. 
 
The true nature of effectiveness of the road network must be measured with respect to 
the surrounding environment. The research presented here provides additional 
insights into strategic transport decision making and ways to understand real 
situations prior to any disaster. This study will formulate effective decision-making 
guidelines to improve safety for the public and improve the efficiency of critical 
infrastructure located within transport networks. Dora and Phillips (2000) stated that 
‘the risk of accidents varies, depending on the type of road, the traffic mix, the time 
of day and climatic conditions, and the speed and mass of vehicles involved’. 
 
Transport system upgrades or additional network improvements are needed to 
provide for urban and rural expansion. It is essential that transport network planning 
and transport infrastructure coordination should be considered at all levels of 
government (national, state and local) and at the international level. Strategic 
planning will improve connectivity between these levels of transport system networks 
and reduce its own complexities. Governments and countries rely on their transport 
networks for promoting goods and services, for economic gains. It is recognised that 
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it is important to understand the total dynamics of transport networks, connections 
and transport infrastructure before any decisions are taken to approve major 
developments, which will alter travel patterns and affect the entire network. Decision 
makers should be equipped with data, policies and best practice guidelines to allow 
them to make informed decisions. 
 
Transportation helps shape a region’s environment, economy and quality of life. Not 
only does the transportation network provide for the mobility of people and goods; it 
also influences patterns of growth and economic activity by providing access to land. 
The Federal Highway Administration and Federal Transit Administration (2007) 
report stated that ‘the performance of the system affects public policy concerns like 
air quality, environmental resource consumption, social equity, land use, urban 
growth, economic development, safety, and security’. Transport network upgrades or 
additional network improvements are needed to provide for urban and rural 
expansions. The Federal Highway Administration and Federal Transit Administration 
(2007) report further stated that ‘Transportation planning plays a fundamental role in 
the state, region or community’s vision for its future’. Transport movements, the 
types of vehicle combinations that use the available road space and transport 
infrastructure dictate conditions such as environmental pollution due to air pollution, 
road safety, travel times and reliability. Decision making provides for strategic 
planning frameworks, long-term directions, high-level investment strategies and 
coordination of service and infrastructure delivery (State of Australian Cities 2011). 
The analysis presented in this thesis provides an insight into a typical decision-
making process. 
 
Jenelius and Mattsson (2006) identified that ‘reliable transport services are necessary 
for a well-functioning labour market that allows the employees to commute in an 
efficient way’. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) (2010) report Improving Reliability on Surface Transport Networks 
identified that transport network reliability is important and defined it as ‘the ability 
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of the transport system to provide the expected level of service quality, upon which 
users have organised their activities’. Similarly, Nicholson and Du (1997) suggested 
that these dependencies are likely to increase because of the trend towards just-in-
time production methods, which involve reducing the space and investment 
associated with storage and reliance on a fast and reliable transportation system. The 
transport system is designed to cater to the community needs and provide 
accessibility to goods and services, as well as providing ‘escape routes’ during 
disasters. Transport networks need to be improved and new networks need to be 
planned and constructed to cater to the growing population and to improve the social 
status of people. If strategic transport planning is not considered together with urban 
and rural growth, it affects the transport network and transport infrastructure. 
 
Land use planning processes have a major impact on society. Pearson’s (2008) report, 
Victoria’s Planning Framework for Land Use and Development, identified that 
‘Planning decisions affect the lives of all Victorians and they can have a significant 
impact on local communities, the environment, key industries and the broader 
economy’. Land use planning is carried out in every country around the world and 
there are many types of planning processes and assessment methods. Because of rapid 
development of cities worldwide, which in turn accelerates rapid urbanisation, land 
use planning has an impact on traffic-related risks to society as a whole. It has also 
been identified that ‘the relationship between land use, transport demand and supply 
is dynamic and complex and the outcome rests partly on assumptions and policies 
that transport planning has little chance of validating’ (Bjornland 1994). Therefore, it 
is noted that transportation and land use decisions affect each other. One of the main 
observations is that transport planners are mainly focussed on identifying and 
planning for the accessibility needs of people and freight within liveable and 
sustainable communities. This study highlights the fact that decision makers need to 
consider land use development planning and transport network planning together. 
 
If land use development and transport network planning are not considered together, 
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gaps begin to appear in the transport network, which can increase the risk of accidents 
and lead to poor network performance. This is further supported by Dora and 
Phillips’ (2000) report, which stated that ‘the risk of accidents varies, depending on 
the type of road, the traffic mix, the time of day and climatic conditions, and the 
speed and mass of vehicles involved’. Transport infrastructure is designed and 
constructed to provide connectivity between cities, improve efficiency, provide safety 
for communities and facilitate recovery works during a disaster. Road design is 
carried out to provide for movement of goods and accessibility with ease in the road 
network and undertake design of all transport-related infrastructure. Road design and 
transport infrastructure contribute towards community resilience and recovery 
processes during a disaster. Limitations to transportation infrastructure occur during 
decision-making stages and these decisions often affect the performance of transport 
networks and transport infrastructure and other critical infrastructure systems during 
disasters. Congested roads result in traffic congestion, road safety issues and 
environmental pollution during peak times and during hazardous events. 
 
Wolshon (2009) stated that ‘Evacuations are anything but conventional—they are a 
matter of life and death with a ticking clock. Transportation agencies need to be better 
informed and find creative and innovative solutions to the problems they face’. He 
added that ‘Evacuation is a complex topic that can be influenced by an enormous 
number of interacting factors’. Transport systems that are normally designed to cater 
to community expectations need to include design for ‘escape routes’ and critical 
infrastructure (CI) service safety. This tends to be a major gap in current strategic 
transport planning practices. 
 
The frequency of occurrence of natural disasters has increased in recent years 
globally, with significant implications for the economy, society and the environment. 
Risks to communities caused by environmental disasters are high and limitations in 
transport infrastructure can reduce community resilience. The demands on transport 
infrastructure during environmental disasters are very often overlooked during road 
5 
transport infrastructure planning stages. 
 
If emergency management planning and traffic management planning is carried out 
well pre disaster and during disaster, as stated by Chen and Yu (2016), it would 
enable Emergency Medical Service (EMS) to access the affected areas with ease and 
with the shortest response and transport times to provide medical services to the 
needy. 
 
During a disaster, transport infrastructure caters for many and plays a crucial role 
during evacuation. It has been identified that ‘Travel pattern of movement in a 
network may change dramatically after a disaster, due to people evacuating an area or 
people entering an area to render assistance’ (Du & Nicholson 1991). However, 
transportation infrastructure is not designed to accommodate evacuations. This is a 
major gap .in current practice. 
 
Strategic planning of transport infrastructure needs to extend beyond protecting 
infrastructure and be able to provide opportunities for improving community 
resilience, by providing good transport networks that enable both economic growth 
and transport infrastructure. 
  
Research has addressed important areas in transport planning and used techniques 
contributing to assessment of transport infrastructure. Findings have highlighted that 
decision making has been a major factor during extreme events that contributed 
towards CI failures and community resilience. The research presented here identifies 
that there are no formal processes to accommodate elimination of the causes of failure 
with respect to strategic transport planning and decision making. There is a gap in 
knowledge linking strategic transport planning and ensuring that processes are in 
place for informed decision making. The current research proposes to addresses this 
gap by utilising current research findings and linking strategic transport planning and 
land use development planning into decision-making processes. 
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 There is a growing awareness of impacts of transport networks on the economy and 
the environment, and how this affects communities, cities and countries. It has been 
experienced that there are many planning and decision-making processes involved in 
transport planning, land use development planning and transport infrastructure design 
and provision. Traffic management and transport network planning decision making 
influences the performance and sustainability of key transport infrastructure 
components. Along these corridors, informal land use developments are seen as one 
of the main causes of traffic congestion, road safety and environmental pollution 
issues. The existing land use development approval decision-making strategies and 
policies influence the decisions made during development approvals. Developments 
not only change travel patterns, but they induce more traffic movements into the 
transport network, thus affecting network performance. This was supported by Cox 
(1997), who reported an increase of 64% in urban travel between 1981 and 1994, and 
a doubling of motor vehicle travel over a period of 27 years. 
 
Disasters that affect the transport network can be grouped as in Table 1-1 and further 
categorised as follows. 
 
Table 1-1: Disaster classifications (selected) 
Technological 
or due to 
human 
influence 
Transport accidents, war, explosions and fires, toxic gases, building failures, 
failure of critical infrastructure, nuclear power station accidents, chemical 
spills, bridge collapses, rail crossing blockages, terrorist attacks, repair and 
replacement and maintenance works. 
Hydrological Floods, Glaciers, Icebergs, coastal erosion, and water logged areas 
Geological Earthquakes, erosion, volcanic activities, soil erosion, landslides and mud 
slides, avalanches 
Atmospheric Thunderstorms, hurricanes, cyclones, typhoons and tornadoes (created due 
to wind and rain intensities), Snow blizzards, dust storms and droughts (heat 
related), lighting strikes (create bushfires). 
Biological Epidemics, famine, plagues  
 
Transportation issues vary from time to time. Some of these elements were 
highlighted and summarised by Litman (2006), as in Table 1.2, showing that disasters 
affect people and infrastructure in many different ways. Warning times depend on the 
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type of disaster. Most issues are related to safety through evacuation using existing 
transport networks and utilising transport infrastructure. During a disaster, emergency 
services need to enter hazardous areas to access vulnerable people, and the transport 
infrastructure provides the means to escape hazardous situations. Transport networks 
need to be able to cope with the extra demand during disaster or emergency 
evacuations, which should be integrated into decision-making processes. 
Table 1-2: Major transport issues 
 
 
(Litman 2006) 
 
Therefore, traffic management processes become important and should influence 
decision making. The standard use of traffic management is mainly considered an 
‘operational’ solution to reduce congestion on the road network on a day-to-day basis. 
Traffic management can provide solutions to emergency demands on traffic routes. 
Traffic management software packages can be used to identify and resolve 
‘bottlenecks’ on the road network during peak times of the day and during emergency 
times. This type of decision-making improvement enhances transport network 
performance during times such as emergency, bushfire, tsunami, hurricane or man-
made disaster evacuations. Therefore, existing policies in regard to network decision 
making must be changed or upgraded to accommodate these requirements. 
8 
 This research explores existing problems and opportunities of considering traffic 
management and transport planning to improve the resilience of transport 
infrastructure along transport networks. The research examines some selected case 
studies to ascertain the impact of failure of the transport infrastructure on community 
resilience during a disaster. The case studies are examined to identify specific issues 
related to transport infrastructure and community resilience during a disaster event. 
Gaps in transport planning that affect community resilience are identified through 
analysis of the case studies. 
 
Decision making on transport networks, transport infrastructure and land use 
development planning have an immediate impact on livelihoods. Decisions taken 
during disasters will have numerous effects on the long-term performance of a 
country’s CI, as well as the resilience of communities. Decision-making intensity 
changes according to the dynamic nature of the disaster. Therefore, decisions made 
with respect to normal day-to-day conditions require very different decision-making 
styles from decisions taken during disaster events. The impact of these two decision-
making scenarios will have numerous effects on the long-term performance of a 
community’s resilience, economy, environment and transport networks and transport 
infrastructure. The effects of disasters are felt immediately in some instances, while 
in others they are felt at a later time. Secondary impacts could be influenced by CI 
failures (Withanaarachchi & Setunge 2014). Decision makers need to understand the 
full effects of the hazard and its levels of impact. 
1.2 Significance of the Research 
 
The above discussion outlined the significance of strategic transport planning, land 
use development and road design, and the effects of decision making. The 
significance of the research presented in this thesis can be summarised as follows: 
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• Strategic transport planning is a key area to be addressed to arrive at a 
decision-making strategy for transport planning and land use development, 
which provides resilience to transport networks and transport infrastructure 
and facilitates community resilience. No relevant models are reported in the 
literature to illustrate the connection between strategic transport planning and 
land use development, and traffic management and disaster resilience. 
• Land use zone changes create many issues for road and land use planning 
authorities. This is another area that needs to be addressed to identify the 
impact of land use zone changes on communities, road infrastructure and the 
network. Neither the recently revised Victorian Land Use Planning Zone nor 
the Victorian Transport Integration Act 2010 (hereinafter the TIA) clearly 
show ways to measure the impacts associated with land use zone changes. 
There is no clear process to identify parameters to validate these impacts. 
• Initial analysis of data from case studies of natural disasters highlighted the 
fact that there are no proper system flow paths for decision making when 
addressing natural disaster events. 
• Transport infrastructure and corridor planning was an important area that 
needs to be included in this research. The planning that goes into transport 
infrastructure and corridor planning is important to show how the community 
is affected during a disaster event. Transport modelling was carried out in 
this study to ascertain impacts on the road network. 
• The outcome of the analysis is a list of gaps in strategic transport planning, 
which can be ranked using a risk-based approach. 
 
1.3 Aims and Objectives of the Research 
 
The overall aims of this research were to: 
1. identify gaps in strategic transport planning processes that influence the 
resilience of the transport infrastructure during a disaster event 
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2. develop a framework to address the identified gaps in a systematic manner. 
 
To achieve the outcome, the following specific objectives were focussed on: 
• identifying gaps in land use planning and development approvals that have 
contributed to failure of transport infrastructure during a disaster 
• identifying gaps that persist after being identified as major risks in previous 
studies 
• establishing a risk framework to assess the gaps in strategic transport planning 
decisions 
• validating the identified gaps through a questionnaire survey. 
 
1.4 Research Scope 
 
The scope of the research included: 
1. deriving a method to quantify risk associated with gaps in strategic planning 
in transport infrastructure during a disaster, through analysis of case studies 
2. developing a decision-making process that eliminates the gaps identified in 
land use development, traffic management and evacuating. 
 
To cover the scope of works, case studies covering the decisions taken at all three 
stages of planning were sourced and analysed to understand the gaps that lead to 
vulnerabilities in road transport infrastructure during a disaster. The case study 
analyses were then used to develop a list of gaps in strategic decision making in 
transport. Traffic modelling was used to further identify the gaps in transport corridor 
planning and road design. These gaps were then validated using further data or 
capturing expert opinion. Risks related to the gaps in decision making were captured 
so that the impact of the gaps could be quantified. 
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1.5 Outline of the Thesis Chapters 
 
Chapter 1 Introduces the background to this research, identifying key areas 
considered in the research. This is followed by aims and objectives of the research 
and identification of research gaps. The significance of the research and the research 
scope are presented in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 2 This chapter presents the literature review and considers the areas within 
the scope of this research. A critical analysis of these areas is presented, including 
land use development practices, strategic transport planning, risk and resilience and 
traffic management, followed by gaps identified by previous researchers in relation to 
the first two case studies. 
 
Chapter 3 This chapter introduces the research methodology, followed by research 
questions and the research framework, a list of the case studies analysed, transport 
modelling and validation using focus group study questions and a summary. 
 
Chapter 4 This chapter presents Land Use Planning, land use planning policies, 
land use planning processes, other planning processes, strategic decisions made in 
land use planning, case studies, gaps in strategic decision making in land use 
planning and a summary. 
 
Chapter 5 This chapter presents Traffic Management and analyses traffic corridors 
to ascertain how an emergency evacuation would affect the road network and traffic 
modelling, and discusses road capacities and road hierarchy.  
 
Chapter 6 In this chapter a framework is proposed that identifies gaps and the risk of 
these gaps during a disaster event. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion Summarises the general conclusions drawn from the research 
and recommends further research to expand the list of gaps and associated risks. 
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Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, strategic transport planning, the definition of resilience, the gaps 
identified by previous researchers, a transport corridor analysis and methods to 
quantify risks are presented with a detailed analysis of two case studies. 
 
2.2 Strategic Transport Planning 
 
Strategic transport planning is the key element in transport planning and land use 
development, which influences the resilience of transport networks and transport 
infrastructure and facilitates community resilience during hazardous events that affect 
safety. 
 
Cox (1997) described the importance of the strategic transport planning process 
caused by increased economic integration of all states via improved logistics. Further, 
he considered that integration is less when economic, environmental and social 
outcomes are considered, and that there is a discontinuation in the road system in 
urban areas. 
 
‘Strategic planning (SP) is taking up an increasing part of transport planning’ (Kolbl, 
Niegl & Knoflacher 2008). Transport planning has many elements. 
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2.3 Transport Planning 
2.3.1 Definition of Transport Planning 
 
Tsolakis et al. (2009) stated that road transport planning is a key component of an 
overall transport system, and requires the multi-disciplinary input of transport 
planners, traffic engineers and economists. It also plays a major role in the 
community’s vision for the future. Figure 2-1 illustrates the typical transportation 
planning process. 
 
 
Figure 2-1: Transportation planning process 
(Federal Highway Administration & Federal Transit Administration 2007) 
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 Transport networks consist of roadways, waterways, railways and airports. Berdica 
(2002) stated that the road transportation system is one of our most important 
lifelines. Transportation systems provide vital services to cities (Chang et al. 2005). 
 
Historical records show that transport has played a crucial role in economic 
development (Eddington 2006). Transport planning decisions influence the land 
available for transport, transport facilities and land use accessibility (Litman 2010). 
The Federal Highway Administration and Federal Transit Administration report 
(2007) includes a comprehensive consideration of possible strategies; an evaluation 
process that encompasses diverse viewpoints; and the collaborative participation of 
relevant transportation-related agencies. 
 
During a disaster, whether natural or human induced, transport network disruptions 
are seen as one of the most crucial elements having a great impact on social and 
economic losses. Transportation decisions affect land use developments directly or 
indirectly and these impacts are seen as significant. Therefore, such decisions should 
be considered during projects or policy review proceedings (Litman 2010). The 
current transportation planning process tends to focus on just a few impacts, such as 
project costs, vehicle time savings, vehicle operating costs and sometimes air 
pollution impacts (Litman 2006). Despite its deficiencies, transport will remain a key 
element in comprehensive modelling tools (Bjornland 1994). 
 
Transport network reliability is important and defined as the ability of the transport 
system to provide an expected level of service quality upon which users have 
organised their activities (Improving Reliability on Surface Transport Networks 
2010). Transport services should be reliable and should cater to a well-functioning 
labour market by providing efficient employee commuter facilities (Jenelius & 
Mattsson 2006). 
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Transport networks need to be improved and new networks need to be planned and 
constructed to cater to the growing urban population and to improve the social status 
of people. Economies in developed countries depend heavily upon their transport 
systems. Nicholson and Du (1997) stated that these dependencies are likely to 
increase because of the trend towards just-in-time production methods, which involve 
reducing the space and investment associated with storage and reliance on a fast and 
reliable transportation system. 
 
Cox (1997) identified that the Australian road system is the responsibility of all levels 
of government. Transport planning should aim to address issues such as congestion 
management, sustainable transport, transport modes and freight, economic growth 
and environmental protection for community and transport infrastructure resilience. 
 
When a transport network is affected, the costs to the economy and society are high. 
Edwards and Smith (2008) estimated in the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) report that economic costs of congestion in the city of Sydney were $3.5 
billion in 2005 and that this will rise to $7.8 billion in 2020. They further identified 
that the major externality costs were congestion ($4.9 billion), accidents ($1.4 
billion), environmental pollution ($1.3 billion) and road damage ($0.7 billion). The 
focus of all cost recovery studies—road damage—was found to be the least important 
when pricing to internalise all social costs, being only 9% of total external costs. 
However, this is the most important cost in rural areas (Cox 1997). 
 
Nicholson and Du (1997) stated that the travel pattern of movement in a network may 
change dramatically after a disaster because of people evacuating an area or entering 
it to render assistance. The transport system is designed to cater to community needs 
and provide accessibility to goods and services and ‘escape routes’ during disasters. 
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2.3.2 Catastrophic Incident Definition 
 
A 2006 report to the United States (US) Congress, Catastrophic Hurricane 
Evacuation Plan Evaluation, stated that a ‘catastrophic incident’ is any natural or 
man-made incident that causes mass casualties and severely affects the population, 
infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale and government functions. 
Because of rapid urbanisation, land use planning and development changes, impacts 
on the economy, environment and society have increased. 
 
2.4 Transport Network Planning 
2.4.1 What is a Transport Network? 
 
Transportation networks are a key component of transport infrastructure. Transport 
networks are considered ‘bundles of infrastructure that link two or more urban areas 
(Priemus & Zonneveld 2003). These can be highways (sometimes via different 
routes), rail links (high-speed trains, intercity lines, local trains or trams), separate bus 
lanes, cycle paths, canals, short-sea connections and air connections’. 
 
2.4.2 Why is it Important? 
 
Transport has been the origin of the economic development of many countries 
(Vreeker & Nijkamp 2005). Transport networks provide high-level connection 
between major urban and regional cities and provide for different transport modes, 
freight logistics and medium to low-level connectivity for sustainable transport, such 
as for public transport and bicycle linkages and access to activity centres, 
employment centres and peri-urban residential living. Networks provide a more direct 
connection between the movement of people and goods and economic activity of 
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state significance (Carr, Dixon & Meyer 2010). A low road-hierarchy-level transport 
network provides direct connectivity to activity centres such as schools, places of 
work, shops and other amenities that are used on a daily basis. There are also roads 
for high pedestrian connectivity and local traffic mixed with other modes of traffic. 
Freight brings economic benefits to major and regional cities through this 
connectedness via the higher road hierarchy in transport networks. The demand for 
movement has a specific purpose—such as work, business, shopping, education, 
recreation and social travel—and takes the form of trips, characterised by direction 
(origin and destination), time (peak, off-peak), duration (travel time), mode choice 
(private vehicle, public transport, walking, cycling), route choice and cost of travel 
(Westerman 1998). 
 
2.4.3 What is the Current Planning Process? 
 
Transport network planning is a complex area that is analysed in smaller segments. 
There is a need for a strategic assessment of this whole area. Current transport 
planning takes into consideration desirable social, environmental and economic 
outcomes and develops business plans, action plans, feasibility studies and strategies 
to achieve the outcomes within planning frameworks (Litman 2011). 
 
The transport planning process should integrate and consider relationships between 
transport networks, the economy, social and physical environment and land use 
development. An important characteristic of the initial step in the process is that 
individual transport networks are likely to be identified and proceed into more 
detailed analysis at different times (Carr, Dixon & Meyer 2010). 
 
The standard or typical transport network planning process involves establishing 
desired outcomes and priorities; assessing opportunities and limitations for action; 
identifying the short and long-term consequences of alternative choices and how they 
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will satisfy community goals and objectives; and presenting the information to 
decision makers in an understandable and useful form. Land is used for a variety of 
purposes, such as housing, offices, shops, industries, warehouses, schools and other 
activities (Westerman 1998). In transport network planning, plans should integrate 
land use development planning and multi-modal network planning, thereby reducing 
the impacts on society, the economy and the environment. 
 
New transport network links need to be identified through transport network planning 
to remove or minimise gaps in the transport network. The transport network caters to 
present transport demands and improvements are recommended through political 
influences because of community pressure. The process of transportation planning 
will remain a contentious topic for years to come. 
 
2.4.4 Who Makes Decisions 
 
Decisions made at the transport network and land use development planning stages 
influence the resilience of transport infrastructure as well as community resilience 
during a disaster. Transportation and land use decisions are mainly focussed on the 
identifying accessibility needs of people and freight within liveable and sustainable 
communities. It has been identified that the relationship between land use, transport 
demand and supply is dynamic and complicated and the outcome rests partly on 
assumptions and policies that transport planning has little chance of validating’ 
(Bjornland 1994). Transport network planning needs to address future demands on 
the network caused by land use developments and changes in travel patterns and 
freight movements and also to identify network improvements by understanding 
future transport and CI demands and improvements. This is acknowledged by 
Bjornland (1994), who stated that transport management and transport infrastructure 
planning requires skill, and transport flow modelling has rapidly increased in 
complexity. Project control for a transport corridor should consider the function of 
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the corridor and what benefits it provides, and assess these against triple bottom-line 
elements. 
2.4.5 What are the Consequences of Gaps in the Process? 
 
Past findings have highlighted that lack of informed decision making is a major factor 
during a disastrous event that contributes to transport and CI failures and lack of 
community resilience. Research has addressed important areas in transport planning 
and used techniques contributing to the assessment of transport infrastructure. The 
consequences of gaps may vary depending on many factors, from active transport, 
public transport and evacuations to resilience of transport infrastructure. Therefore, 
inadequate planning will compromise safety and economic befits and contribute to 
high congestion of transport networks. Thus, managing transport networks and 
transport infrastructure is considered a very complex and important item in transport 
network management. 
 
The main cause of vehicle increases on roads during the last century is transportation 
and land use planning practices that have reinforced the cycle of increased 
automobile dependency and sprawl (Litman 2010). Taylor, Sekhar and D’Este (2006) 
stated that the concept of network vulnerability is still new, and so it is important to 
define what is meant by vulnerability; similarly, Jenelius and Mattson (2006) 
identified that ‘reliability and vulnerability of critical infrastructure has attracted a lot 
attention recently’. To address the gaps there is an opportunity to continue further 
research to compare engineering with other fields of study to identify best practices 
and integrate them into planning processes. 
 
Jenelius, Peterson and Mattson (2006) analysed the importance and exposure of road 
network vulnerability using several link importance and site exposure indices, based 
on the increase in generalised travel cost when links are closed; similarly, Taylor, 
Sekhar and D’Este (2006) developed a method for strategic assessment of 
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vulnerability in road networks, considering socio-economic impacts of network 
degradation, on the basis of changes in the levels of accessibility provided by the 
degraded network. However, these areas of studies do not link the vulnerabilities in 
road networks to the strategic transport planning and decision-making stages. Bell 
(2000) used a game theory approach to measure the performance reliability of 
transport networks, Nagurney and Qiang (2008) applied a new network performance 
efficiency measure to CI networks to capture demands, flows, costs and behaviour of 
networks. Jenelius (2009) showed that geographical disparities depend on the road 
network structure and travel patterns, and Wua, Suna and Gaoa (2007) introduced 
practical flow assignment mechanisms to assess cascading failure of weighted urban 
traffic equilibrium networks. The method is quite effective in evaluating the 
interdependencies of the systems. These study areas are useful for analysing the 
performance of road networks, but fail to connect together as part of strategic 
transport planning. Murray, Matisziw and Grubesic (2007) showed that effective 
management of critical network infrastructure assessment could be achieved through 
potential ‘interdiction’ scenarios, and Dekker (2005) used simulations to measure the 
robustness of CI networks in the face of terrorist attacks. These scenarios and 
simulation methods highlight the critical nature of network robustness, which should 
be part of the strategic planning stages. 
 
Zimmerman (2004) addressed how case analysis findings can be used in decision 
making to promote non-adverse interdependency-related outcomes in extreme events. 
The current study uses case studies to ascertain impacts on transport networks and 
land use developments. 
 
Bologna, Luiijf and Setola (2008) used modelling to express CI dependencies, the 
limitations of existing approaches with respect to clarity of definitions, support for 
quality and the influence of operating states of CIs and environmental factors. These 
statements highlight effects on CI during extreme events. The current research utilises 
a similar approach using case studies to analyse impacts created through failures in 
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strategic transport planning and decision making. Similarly, Jenelius, Westin and 
Holmgren (2009) used a modelling framework that incorporated imperfect attacker 
perception by introducing random observation errors in a previously studied baseline 
model. Blackwell et al. (2009) explored the feasibility of various techniques to help 
reveal blind spots in CI planning. Ulieru (2007) used an intelligence network called 
an ‘eNetwork’ as the ‘nervous system’ of interdependent CIs. 
 
Bologna, Luiijf and Setola’s (2008) study also identified the most relevant gaps in 
relation to software between stakeholder needs and the current research activities on 
critical information infrastructure protection relevant to Europe. Transport modelling 
software to ascertain the transport network elements will also be used in the current 
research. Bobylev (2007) discussed sustainability and vulnerability issues related to 
critical underground infrastructure. Becking (2004) showed the importance of current 
use of space for public safety during emergencies in Canada. This area of study will 
be useful for this research analysing transport networks. 
 
Koetse and Rietveld (2009) used the empirical literature on the effects of climate 
change and weather conditions on the transport sector, and Du and Nicholson (1991) 
carried out a sensitivity analysis for a degradable transportation system based on an 
integrated equilibrium model with elastic travel demand, to identify critical 
components and assist efforts to improve system reliability. This area of study will be 
useful during the current case study analysis, which is expected to highlight the risks. 
Rapid development of cities worldwide, which in turn accelerates rapid urbanisation, 
and land use planning have an impact on traffic-related risks to society as a whole. 
 
As highlighted by previous research, the element of decision making been integrated 
with transport network planning, traffic management and land use development is not 
considered thus far. 
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2.5 Decision Making 
 
Decision making is an important task carried out by everyone. People, organisations, 
state and federal authorities and all other entities make decisions to carry out their 
daily tasks. In an organisational context, decisions are made at every level. Some are 
approved or discarded or even stalled according to the culture and sometimes through 
inherent bureaucratic processes. Decision makers are entrusted with the task of 
making responsible decisions and they hold responsible roles within organisations. 
Many decisions are taken to provide solutions to problems and to prevent a problem 
occurring. The outcomes of decisions change according to the dynamics of the 
situation and create many scenarios and actions that are connected with the outcomes. 
Wang and Guenther (2007) stated that decision making is one of the basic cognitive 
processes of human behaviours by which a preferred option or a course of actions is 
chosen from among a set of alternatives based on certain criteria. 
 
Decisions depend on the decision maker’s abilities, expertise, characteristics and 
approach towards reaching a solution. Lahidji (2004) stated that decision making 
must be flexible and responsive and must be capable of reacting to the unexpected in 
a timely and effective manner. The bottom line is saving lives and protecting 
infrastructure, environment and the economy. To do this, decision makers need to 
have the required skill set. However, is it this simple when the cost of a human life in 
2011 was estimated at $9.1 million (Environmental Protection Agency; Partnoy 
2012)? The road system has been managed predominantly for political purposes 
during Australia’s history (Cox 1997). The inter-relationship of transport systems and 
economic processes has been extremely dynamic (Cox 1997). 
 
Leoni, Radford and Schulman (2010), stated that disasters are a combination of 
hazards, conditions of vulnerability and insufficient capacity or measures to reduce 
the negative consequences of risk. The reliability of transport networks is defined as 
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the ability of transport systems to provide the expected level of service quality upon 
which users have organised their activities (Improving Reliability on Surface 
Transport Networks 2010). Land use changes have influenced travel pattern changes, 
which has increased the need for reliable transport networks. Urban transportation 
creates many difficulties for transport decision makers. Therefore, it is necessary to 
expand the system capacity of transport and communication services (Shefer 1994). 
The impact on transportation of urban development is one of the most important and 
contested concerns in contemporary metropolitan transport planning (Waddell et al. 
2007). Wolshon (2006) stated that transportation infrastructure is not designed to 
accommodate evacuation land demand. 
 
Decision inputs made during a typical disaster scenario, and expected outputs are 
shown in Figure 2-2. These inputs and outputs can vary depending on the hazard and 
impact levels. Therefore, depending on the input, the output will be different. Each 
hazard impact will be different and will have different impacts on the community, 
environment, the transport network and transport infrastructure. Decision making 
needs to be carried out by people with experience and understanding of these fields of 
study to make informed decisions. 
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Figure 2-2: Disaster decision-making inputs and outputs 
(Withanaarachchi & Setunge 2014) 
 
2.6 Strategic Planning in Australia 
 
The State of Australian Cities (2011) report stated that ‘Melbourne has enjoyed 
metropolitan strategic planning since 1927 when the Metropolitan Town Planning 
Commission was established. Planning strategies for Melbourne have been produced 
from time to time, notably through the first comprehensive planning scheme for the 
metropolitan area in 1954’. The report further added that ‘In 2002 the Victorian 
Government released Melbourne 2030—planning for sustainable growth as a whole 
of government endorsed strategic planning framework for metropolitan Melbourne 
and its relationship with regional Victoria’. 
 
In Australia, the National Charter of Integrated Land Use and Transport Planning 
(hereinafter the National Charter) was released in 2003 to instigate good planning 
practices. This was considered a high-level agreement to commit to an agreed set of 
good planning practices and to working together to achieve better outcomes for land 
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use and transport planning. This report further stated that ‘the National Charter is a 
high-level agreement between transport and planning ministers committing to an 
agreed set of good planning practices and committing to working together to achieve 
better outcomes’. Also, ‘the National Charter is designed to support existing and 
future planning mechanisms by providing a national commitment to a framework for 
responsive planning, consistent decision-making, and good design and management. 
All states, territories, and the Commonwealth Government have collaborated to 
develop this National Charter’. The National Charter had nine aims: 
1. integrated and inclusive processes 
2. linked investment decisions 
3. increasing accessibility by widening choices in transport modes and reducing 
vehicle travel demand and impacts 
4. making better use of existing and future infrastructure and urban land 
5. protecting and enhancing transport corridors 
6. creating places and living areas where transport and land use management 
support the achievement of quality of life outcomes 
7. increased opportunities for access in both the present and longer term 
8. a safer and healthier community 
9. recognising the unique needs of regional and remote Australia. 
 
Figure 2-3 provides a guide to process improvements and shows the eight steps to 
program delivery. Figure 2-4 illustrates the evaluation framework for transport 
decisions. The National Charter produced in 2003 identified best practice or 
‘elements’ that should be considered, but it did not address the integration of land 
development with transport networks and transport infrastructure. 
 
Figure 2-4 proposes a recommended best practice framework for ‘transport decision 
making’. This framework takes into consideration a regional development element, 
which is grouped under ‘whole of government objectives’. This framework can be 
enhanced to include land use development and planning. 
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 Figure 2-5 has a section called ‘integrated land use transport planning’. There is an 
opportunity to improve this figure to integrate land use development models, tools 
and data, similarly to transport. 
 
With respect to Figures, 2-3, 2-4 and 2-5, a new item, ‘disaster evacuation scenarios’, 
needs to be integrated and discussed with respect to higher-level planning strategies 
and policies at federal and state levels. This is seen as an important element that 
would provide resilience to communities and transport infrastructure. 
 
 
Figure 2-3: National Guidelines Transport System-Management Framework 
(Guide to Road Transport Planning 2009) 
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Figure 2-4: Evaluation framework for transport decisions 
(Guide to Road Transport Planning 2009) 
 
29 
 
Figure 2-5: Evaluation framework for transport decisions 
(Guide to Road Transport Planning 2009) 
 
2.6.1 Victoria’s Transport Integration Act 2010, Australia 
 
The State of Australian Cities (2011) report stated that ‘Victoria has progressively 
modernised its transport legislation. The Transport Integration Act 2010, the new 
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principal transport statute, sets out a vision, objectives and principles for transport, 
making it clear that the transport system needs to be integrated and sustainable’. The 
report further stated that, ‘The Act requires transport agencies and other decision 
makers to have regard to broader social, economic and environmental considerations. 
It unites all elements of the transport portfolio to ensure that transport agencies work 
towards a common goal of an integrated transport system. It integrates land use and 
transport planning and decision-making by extending the framework to land-use 
agencies whose decisions can significantly affect transport, including the 
government’s planning functions, municipal councils, the GAA and Parks Victoria’. 
 
2.6.2 Transport Legislation—Transport Integration Act 2010 
 
The TIA is Victoria’s principal transport statute. Passed by Parliament in February 
2010, this Act establishes the most modern and comprehensive transport policy and 
legislation framework in Australia. The TIA replaced the Transport Act 1983 (to be 
renamed) as Victoria’s principal transport statute. As summarised by the Department 
of Transport (2010), the new Act: 
• will ‘Unify all elements of the transport portfolio to ensure that transport 
agencies work together towards the common goal of an integrated transport 
system’ 
• makes it clear that the transport system needs to be sustainable—in economic 
terms, in environmental terms and in social terms—strongly establishing 
transport as a triple bottom-line issue 
• provides a framework—a vision, objectives and principles—for integrated and 
sustainable transport policy and operations 
• recognises that a 21st-century transport system should be conceived and 
planned as a single system performing multiple tasks rather than separate 
transport modes 
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• integrates land use and transport planning and decision making by extending 
the framework to land use agencies whose decisions can significantly affect 
transport (‘interface bodies’) 
• re-constitutes transport agencies and aligns their charters to make them 
consistent with the framework. 
 
2.6.3 The Need for the New Transport Integration Act 
 
According to Transport for Victoria’s website 
(http://www.transport.vic.gov.au/legislation, last updated 17 March 2017), new 
legislation was required because: 
• there is no single overarching coordinating statute for the transport portfolio; 
the main statue, the Transport Act 1983, is very old and dated and only 
covers land transport 
• the policies in the Transport Act were old and represented an insufficient 
platform for a modern transport system; the government’s policy objectives 
are generally not articulated in legislation; social and environmental 
outcomes, for example, are barely mentioned 
• transport bodies are established under different legislation throughout the 
portfolio with different objectives, and some decision makers who influence 
transport outcomes were not recognised by the Transport Act 
• the lack of overarching objectives for transport was a major issue 
• the old legislation was not integrated with other transport and non-transport 
legislation, and provided a poor platform for a modern transport system. 
 
The list of objectives of the TIA is provided in Appendix 1. The structure of the 
legislation before 30 June 2010 and after November 2010 is shown in Figures 2-6 and 
2-7. As the figures show, the TIA was expanded to include ‘Ports and Marine’ into 
the legislation in June 2010. 
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 Local Government and Land Use Integration remain outside the shaded area and are 
governed by different acts, such as the Local Government Act 1989, Planning and 
Environment Act 1987 and Major Transport Projects Facilitation Act 2009. This 
clearly shows that transport integration is evolving. 
 
 
Figure 2-6: TIA before June 2010 
(Economic Development,  Jobs, Transport and Resources 2017) 
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Figure 2-7: TIA after November 2010 
(Economic Development,  Jobs, Transport and Resources 2017) 
2.6.4 Transport Integration Act 2010 Policy Framework 
 
The TIA has established a new framework, as shown in Figure 2-8. In this figure, the 
decision-making section is a very important element. Integrated decision making and 
triple bottom-line assessment should capture the most elements in the process. As 
shown in Figure 2-9, the TIA’s structure was further improved to show the portfolio 
framework. 
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Figure 2-8: TIA policy framework 
(Economic Development,  Jobs, Transport and Resources 2017) 
 
 
 
Figure 2-9: TIA structure of transport portfolio legislation (19 May 2014) framework 
(Economic Development,  Jobs, Transport and Resources 2017) 
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2.7 The Role of Municipal Councils 
 
Victorian local municipal councils play an important role in this legislation. As 
shown in Table 2-1, each local council has a responsibility. 
 
Table 2-1: Role of municipal councils 
Municipal Councils as transport bodies Municipal Councils as planning authorities  
The Transport Integration Act 2010 requires bodies which make decisions that impact the transport 
system to have regard to the Act’s vision, transport system objectives and decision making principles.  
The Act recognises that transport and land use decisions are made by both ‘transport bodies’ such as 
the Director of Public Transport, VicRoads and the Port of Melbourne Corporation, and ‘interface 
bodies’ such as planning authorities and land managers.  
A Municipal Council is acting as a ‘transport 
body’ if it is exercising powers, performing 
functions or making decisions under transport 
legislation in its capacity as: 
• A local authority within the meaning of 
section 3(1) of the Marine Act 1988 (i.e. in 
 respect of State waters or a port); 
• A waterway manager within the meaning of 
section 3(1) of the Marine Act 1988; or 
• A coordinating road authority within the 
meaning of section 3(1) of the Road 
Management Act 2004.  
Section 3 of the Act lists these interface bodies, 
including Municipal Councils under the Local 
Government Act 1989, and planning authorities 
under the Planning and Environment Act 1987. 
Section 3 also lists interface legislation i.e. 
legislation under which interface bodies makes 
transport and land use decisions. 
 
When a transport body exercises a power, 
performs a function or makes a decision under 
transport legislation, section 24 of the Act 
requires that it have regard to the transport 
system objectives and decision making 
principles. These are set out in Part 2 of the Act.  
When an interface body exercises a power, 
performs a function or makes a decision under 
interface legislation that is ‘likely to have a 
significant impact on the transport system’, section 
25 of the Act requires that it have regard to the 
transport system objectives and decision making 
principles. These are set out in Part 2 of the Act.  
Under sections 26 and 27, a transport body may determine the weight to give to each transport system 
objective or decision making principle.  
The Act also allows the Minister to make a statement of policy principles in relation to a transport body. 
The transport body must have regard to any such statement.  
The Act benefits transport bodies by providing clear guidance and structure for making informed and 
well-rounded decisions on matters affecting transport.  
The common objectives and principles set out in the Act will drive the collaborative effort needed to 
deliver the projects and initiatives set out in the Victorian Transport Plan, and provide for better 
integration and collaboration across departments and divisions.  
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Transport bodies are advised to document their 
decision-making to show that they have had 
regard to the transport system objectives and 
decision making principles in the Act. 
Interface bodies are advised to document their 
decision-making to show that they have had regard 
to the transport system objectives and decision 
making principles in the Act.  
(Economic Development,  Jobs, Transport and Resources 2017) 
 
2.8 Significant Impact 
 
One key improvement in the TIA is identifying ‘significant impact’. Under section 25 
of the Act, ‘“interface bodies” must have regard to the objectives and principles of the 
Act if they are exercising a power, performing a function or making a decision under 
interface legislation which is “likely to have a significant impact on the transport 
system”’. 
 
Transport planning is an element of key decision making that significantly influences 
resilience of transport systems and transport infrastructure during a disaster. 
Decisions regarding transport networks have an effect on society, the economy, the 
environment, travel patterns and the reliability and performance of transport 
networks. Decisions taken to limit transport infrastructure often affect the 
performance of transport networks, reliability and CI systems during disasters or peak 
periods of demand. 
 
The current review of strategic transport planning and decision-making processes 
highlighted that there were many studies and investigations carried out in the field of 
critical infrastructure protection (CIP). These protection mechanisms are related to 
upgrades in software, providing physical protection to CI and revising or upgrading 
policies and strategy documentation. In most cases, the studies identified one stream 
of protection mechanisms. Further investigation as part of the literature review 
revealed no other reported work that links strategic transport planning and decision 
making to risks to public and transport infrastructure safety. 
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This review has identified that there is no formal process to accommodate into 
strategic transport planning decision making, the elimination of causes of failure. 
There is a gap in knowledge linking strategic transport planning and ensuring that 
processes are available for decision making. The proposed work addresses this gap. 
 
2.9 Risk and Resilience 
 
Zimmerman (2004) addressed how case analysis findings can be used in decision 
making to promote non-adverse interdependency-related outcomes in extreme events. 
Leoni, Radford and Schulman (2010) stated that for the period 2000–10, weather-
related disasters represented 81% of all events, 72% of all economic losses and 
accounted for 23% of fatalities for that period. Further, they stated that on average, 
around 37 million people are affected every year by cyclones, hurricanes and 
typhoons, nearly 366,000 by landslides and 102 million by floods; the economic 
damage as a result of disasters has come to around US$1 trillion; in 2010 alone, the 
total estimated damage was US$109 billion. As per the selected case studies in the 
current study, disasters resulting from natural conditions, such as hurricanes, 
earthquakes, bushfires, windstorms and floods impact the lives of people and 
communities. 
 
Leoni, Radford and Schulman (2010) stated that a ‘hazard is a physical event, 
phenomenon or human activity that can cause the loss of life or injury, property 
damage, social and economic disruption, or environmental degradation’. The ‘hazard 
environment is dynamic and because decisions are made regularly that affect 
vulnerability, disaster resilience must be seen as an ongoing process and not just an 
ideal condition that can be achieved and forgotten’ (Henstra et al. 2004). ‘Hazard can 
be identified hazard as a potential harm or a situation with a potential to cause loss; a 
potential or existing condition that may cause harm to people or damage to property 
or the environment’ (State of Australian Cities 2011). 
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 ‘The characteristics and circumstances of a community, system or asset that make it 
susceptible to the damaging effects of a hazard (Making Cities Resilient Report 
2012). There are many aspects of vulnerability, arising from various physical, social, 
economic and environmental factors. Examples may include poor design and 
construction of buildings, inadequate protection of assets, lack of public information 
and awareness, limited official recognition of risks and preparedness measures, and 
disregard for wise environmental management. Vulnerability varies significantly 
within a community and over time. 
 
Vulnerability is identified as a characteristic of the element of interest (community, 
system or asset), which is independent of its exposure. However, in common use, the 
word is often used more broadly to include the element’s exposure’. ‘Vulnerability 
arises from the intersection of human systems, the built environment, and the natural 
environment and social vulnerability of communities is borne from inequalities’ 
(Cutter et al. 2008). UN-Habitat (2010) stated that, ‘This interaction of vulnerability, 
disaster and response needs to be understood in a dynamic sense’. The threat is the 
likelihood of an initiating event, such as a bushfire or a flood. Threat therefore is 
estimated using a return period or probability of occurrence for an identified area. 
Vulnerability is the weakness (or sum of many weaknesses) that will contribute to the 
risk event. Berdica (2002) stated that vulnerability is ‘susceptibility to incidents that 
can result in considerable reduction in road network serviceability’. Other 
vulnerability definitions range from ‘susceptibility to harm’ to ‘exposure of a system 
to consequences of failure’ (Adger 2006; Jenelius, Petersen & Mattson 2006; 
Hellström 2007; Taylor 2008). 
 
The UN-Habitat (2010) report stated that ‘A disaster is the consequence of a natural 
hazard (e.g. volcanic eruption, earthquake, landslide, tsunami) which moves from 
potential into an active phase, and has an impact on human vulnerabilities’. It added 
that ‘Natural hazards such as floods, earthquakes or hurricanes do not necessarily 
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produce disastrous effects. A natural hazard becomes disastrous when human systems 
fail to cope with its social, economic and physical impacts’. Wilkins and McCarthy 
(2009), stated that ‘every year, Australian communities face devastating losses caused 
by disasters. Bushfires, floods, storms, other hazards and their associated 
consequences have significant impacts on communities, the economy, infrastructure 
and the environment’. 
 
Due to many variations of risk levels and disaster types, it is important to understand 
risk and resilience of individual areas , such as Community and infrastructure 
resilience.   
 
2.9.1 Risk 
 
The State of Australian Cities (2011) report stated that ‘People live within high risk 
areas due many reasons and more than 85% of residential living is within 50km from 
the coast line and more than 700,000 dwellings are within three kilometres of the 
coast and are less than six metres above existing sea level’. Risk is identified as the 
likelihood of harmful consequences arising from the interaction of hazards, 
communities and the environment. The components of risk are identified to be related 
to threat, hazards, vulnerability, exposure, capacity, frequency, severity and 
consequences. Threat is the likelihood of an initiating event, such as a bushfire, 
hurricane, earthquake or flood. Threat therefore is estimated using a return period or 
probability of occurrence for an identified area. 
 
‘Risk’ and ‘risk management’ are key factors that are essential to identify and 
ascertain the true impact on a quantifiable scale. The resilience of a system is inter-
connected with the term ‘risk’. The 2012 Making Cities Resilient Report stated that 
‘Risk is the combination of the probability of an event and its negative consequences. 
Risk is the product of both the degree of exposure to a hazard and the sensitivity of 
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the affected population (i.e. their vulnerability) to that particular hazard’. The 
National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (2009) stated that ‘The size, severity, 
timing, location and impacts of disasters are difficult to predict, and our changing 
climate increases the uncertainty about future risks’. United Nations Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific & International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction (2010) stated that ‘the disaster risk depends on three factors such as 
Hazard, Exposure and Vulnerability’. Leoni, Radford and Schulman (2010) stated 
that ‘Risk is the probability of harmful consequences or expected losses (deaths, 
injuries, property, livelihoods, economic activity disrupted or environment damaged) 
resulting from interactions between natural or Human-induced hazards and vulnerable 
populations’. 
 
2.9.1.1 Definitions of Risk 
 
Table 2-2: Definitions of risk 
Source Comment 
U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (2008) states that 
Resilience of a system is related to the definition of risk as 
follows: 
Risk of a specific event = Threat x Vulnerability x 
Consequences 
United Nations International 
Strategy for Risk Reduction 
(UNISDR) Hyogo Framework for 
Action 2005-2015, identifies risk as 
follows: 
Risk = Hazard (frequency and severity) x Vulnerability 
(Exposure/Capacity) 
Leoni, Radford and Schulman (2010) Stated that disasters are a combination of hazards, 
conditions of vulnerability and insufficient capacity or 
measures to reduce the negative consequences of risk. 
Risk = Hazards x Vulnerability x Exposure x Location  
The Contribution of the Surveying 
Profession to Disaster Risk 
Management, (2006) 
Identifies Risk as, 
Risk = Hazards x Vulnerability  
AS/NZS 
31000:2009 – Risk Management – 
Principles and Guidelines (2009) 
‘effect of uncertainty on objectives’ 
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2.9.1.2 Risk Management 
 
As shown in the previous section, resilience is associated with ‘risk’ and risk 
management becomes part of resilience. Figure 2-10 provides an overview of the Risk 
Management—Principles and Guidelines standards (AS/NZS ISO 31000 2009). 
 
 
Figure 2-10: Overview of the ISO 31000 
(AS/NZS ISO 31000 2009) 
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Figure 2-11: Risk framework 
(AS/NZS ISO 31000 2009) 
This international risk management standard is intended to be applied to any type of 
risk, natural or otherwise and provides general guidelines. It is in three sections, 
namely principles, process and framework. The standards identify ‘that the success of 
risk management will depend on the effectiveness of the management framework’. 
Therefore, it is important to have a framework that could be easily followed by 
respective organisations. Figure 2-11 shows the components of the framework. 
 
2.9.1.3 Risk Management Process 
 
The risk management process comprises five main sections: Communication and 
Consultation; Establishing Context; Risk Assessment; Risk Treatment; and Risk 
Monitoring & Review as shown in Figure 2-12. The frequency of natural disasters 
has increased and attracts the attention of many because of their impacts on the 
economy, community and the environment. When cities amalgamate to become mega 
cities, some city areas are prioritised for development of buildings for infrastructure. 
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City expansions are limited by existing geographic limitations. Some areas are 
suitable for development and others are prone to environmental hazards, such as 
landslides or flooding or sea water rise. Because of pressure for land area, slums are 
built in these geographically hazardous areas and vulnerable residents of these areas 
are put at risk because of economic hardship. Most city planners fail to understand the 
dynamics that take place within a city when planning for the future. After any 
disaster, the community builds resilient qualities. Therefore, vulnerable communities 
create demand for better planning. 
 
 
Figure 2-12: The risk management process 
(AS/NZS ISO 31000 2009) 
 
Cities develop, and rapid urbanisation and land use planning worldwide has an 
impact on traffic-related risks to society as a whole. Informal land use development 
creates more traffic movement, which places immense pressure on the road network 
and road hierarchy. Congested roads cause traffic congestion, road safety issues and 
environmental pollution. Dora and Phillips (2000), stated that ‘the risk of accidents 
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varies, depending on the type of road, the traffic mix, the time of day and climatic 
conditions, and the speed and mass of vehicles involved’. 
 
The frequency of occurrence of natural disasters has increased in recent years, with 
significant impacts on economies, societies and the environment. Transport 
infrastructure contributes towards community resilience and recovery processes 
during and after a disaster. Transport infrastructure is designed and constructed to 
provide connectivity between cities, improve efficiency and provide safety to 
communities and access for recovery works. Limited transport infrastructure often 
affects the performance of transport networks and CI systems during disasters and 
during demand times. Risks to the community from environmental disasters are high 
and limitations in transport infrastructure can reduce community resilience. Most of 
the time, demands during environmental disasters on transport infrastructure are 
overlooked during the planning stages. 
 
During a disaster, transport infrastructure has a special role: ‘Travel pattern of 
movement in a network may change dramatically after a disaster, due to people 
evacuating an area or people entering an area to render assistance’ (Du & Nicholson 
1997). Transport systems are designed to cater to community needs, to provide 
accessibility to goods and services, ‘escape routes’ during disasters and CI services. 
This could be considered a major gap in current practice. 
 
Decision making during disasters contributes towards community safety and 
resilience. Decisions taken to protect people from disasters have an impact on society, 
the economy, the environment, travel patterns, reliability and performance of 
transport networks. Decisions often affect the performance of transport networks and 
CI systems during disasters or peak demand. Decision making and decision styles 
observed during disaster events demonstrate aspects of the decisions that have 
worked well or that have created more risks for society. Risks to the community 
because of environmental disasters are high, and worsen when integrated with poor 
45 
decision making and actions. Good decision making provides for community 
resilience, good connectivity between cities, improved efficiency and safety to 
communities and improves network reliability to all road users during disasters. 
 
2.9.2 Resilience 
 
The Australian Government, during the 30th COAG meeting, adopted the National 
Strategy for Disaster Resilience on 14 February 2011. This strategy was prepared to 
improve the existing standards and understanding of risks of natural disasters. The 
report discusses long-term planning and importance of affective communication 
facilities to people; it also provides high-level guidance to all federal, state, local and 
other stakeholders. Emergency management in Australia is built on the four 
principles of prevention, preparedness, response and recovery (PPRR). Improving 
resilience can be achieved by a reduction in the probability of an event, reduction in 
the consequences of the event and/or reduction in the time required for system 
restoration. 
 
The level of resilience of a system will influence community expectations and will 
depend on many factors. As shown in Figure 2-13, natural disasters affect cities, 
countries, communities and infrastructure. UN-Habitat (2010) identified that ‘the 
resilience depends on many aspects, such as community initiatives, flexible tenure 
approach, focus on vulnerable groups, pro-poor approach and rebuild better and 
safer’. Community initiatives sometimes will not fit in, because of the size of the 
community and the area under threat. 
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Figure 2-13: Strengthening land system resilience after natural disasters 
 
 
Figure 2-14: How land system vulnerability can create human disasters 
(Land and Natural Disasters 2010) 
 
If these resilience qualities, actions and strategies are utilised and improved, as shown 
in Figure 2-14, the impact from the disaster will be reduced, providing for quick 
recovery. Also, this will reduce associated disaster risks. Because of risk and 
vulnerabilities, transport network infrastructure can be destroyed or become unusable 
for a period until it is repaired or re-constructed; depending on the construction 
techniques, resilience will change. Resilience is defined as the ability of a system to 
rise to a challenge of an emergency with low-level consequences and a low-down 
time. In other words, resilience can be improved by reducing the probability of 
system failure or reducing the vulnerability and improving the capacity of the system 
to return to normal operation within a low-down time. Resilience is an important 
element in community and infrastructure improvement. 
 
2.9.2.1 Definitions of Resilience 
 
Resilience is referred to in many area including community and individual, economic, 
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ecological and environmental, disaster impact, physical deterioration of transport 
infrastructure, CI and engineering infrastructure and systems (see Table 2-3). 
 
Table 2-3: Definitions of resilience 
Source Comments 
Amdal and 
Swigart, (2010)  
‘The term resilience comes from the Latin resalire, which means “to spring 
back, rebound” and can be applied across many fields of study. After a 
thorough review of published definitions of resilience, the following are two 
examples that were found to align with our research of transportation 
system resiliency and its impact on a community’ 
Steven Male 
(2009) 
 ‘Resilience is the ability of a system to withstand threats and continue to 
function, and is related to durability and performance to expected standards 
over time’ and further adds, ‘Resilience is ‘the ability to return to a previous 
good condition’ (Cambridge Dictionary)’  
U.S. Department 
of Homeland 
Security (2008) 
Resilience as ‘the ability of systems, infrastructure, government, business, 
and citizens to resist, absorb, and recover from or adapt to an adverse 
occurrence that may cause harm, destruction, or loss of national 
significance’  
The Insurance 
Council of 
Australia (2008) 
 ‘Resilience in the context of an extreme weather event is the measure of a 
community’s or individual’s ability to respond effectively to change or an 
extreme event. Communities that develop a high level of resilience are 
better able to withstand a crisis event and have an enhanced ability to 
recover from residual impacts. Communities that possess resilience 
characteristics can also arrive on the other side of a crisis in a stronger 
position than pre-event’ 
Disaster Risk 
Management For 
Coastal Tourism 
Destinations 
Responding To 
Climate Change 
report (2008) 
 ‘Resilience as the capacity of a system, community or society potentially 
exposed to hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach and 
maintain an acceptable level of functioning and structure. This is determined 
by the degree to which the social system is capable of organizing itself to 
increase its capacity for learning from past disasters for better future 
protection and to improve risk reduction measures’ 
National 
Organisational 
Resilience 
Framework 
Workshop (2007) 
Resilience - The capability of an organisation to minimise the impact of 
severe disruption events on the business, the ability to “bounce back” (Page 
6) 
World Disasters 
Report (2009) 
Resilience - The ability of a system, community or society exposed to 
hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a 
hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation 
and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions 
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Reducing Disaster 
Risk: A Challenge 
for Development 
(2004) 
Resilience - The capacity of a system, community or society to resist or to 
change in order that it may obtain an acceptable level in functioning and 
structure. This is determined by the degree to which the social system is 
capable of organising itself, and the ability to increase its capacity for 
learning and adaptation, including the capacity to recover from a disaster 
Making Cities 
Resilient Report 
(2012) 
 
Resilience as the ‘ability of a system, community or society exposed to 
hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of 
the hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the 
preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions’ 
Insurance Council 
of Australia (2008) 
Resilience in the context of an extreme weather event is the measure of a 
community’s or individual’s ability to respond effectively to change or an 
extreme event. Communities that develop a high level of resilience are 
better able to withstand a crisis event and have an enhanced ability to 
recover from residual impacts. Communities that possess resilience 
characteristics can also arrive on the other side of a crisis in a stronger 
position than pre-event 
 
 
Figure 2-15: Resilience can be quantified by Area A 
(Kimmance 2010) 
 
Figure 2-15 illustrates the definition of resilience by Kimmance (2010) as an area 
under the functional capacity versus time curve. During a disaster, infrastructure is 
damaged because of both direct and indirect impacts. Most of the time, infrastructure 
failure has a cascading effect on other types of infrastructure. During a disastrous 
event, the community is affected physically and emotionally. 
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Dorbritz (2011) identified the ‘resilient curve, the curve of the system performance in 
temporal dimension is referred to as the resilience triangle’. In this, he expanded the 
curve to show the reduction in system performance caused by disaster impacts. This 
also shows the response time to bring the system back to its former performance 
capacity. These response times are importance and depend on many scenarios in 
decision making, and available resources. 
 
O’Rourke (2007) identified the following resilient qualities of a system: 
• Robustness—the inherent strength or resistance in a system to withstand 
external demands without degradation or loss of functionality 
• Redundancy—system properties that allow for alternative options, choices, 
and substitutions under stress 
• Resourcefulness—the capacity to mobilise needed resources and services in 
emergencies 
• Rapidity—the speed with which disruption can be overcome and safety, 
services, and  financial stability restored. 
 
 
Figure 2-16: System performance, degraded operation state and disaster impacts 
(Dorbritz 2011) 
 
50 
As shown in Figure 2-16, system performance is dependent on robustness and 
redundancies. Also, it depends on the preparation levels, such as response and 
recovery times. Resilience highlights important factors that have an effect on the 
community as a whole. As shown in Figure 2-17, the sequence of timing from the 
disaster event to full reconstruction depends on many stage, such as the emergency, 
restoration and reconstruction stages (Kates et al. 2006). Timing is crucial in this 
scenario, because the time taken for restoration of systems and for providing relief to 
affected people has a bearing on the resilience levels of the community, economy and 
the transport network and transport infrastructure. 
 
 
Figure 2-17: The sequence of timing of reconstruction after Katrina in New Orleans 
(Reconstruction of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina: A research perspective 2006) 
 
2.9.3 Community Resilience 
 
During a disaster, the main physical impact is on the community. The response to the 
disaster and the time taken for recovery depends on many factors, such as 
preparation, resources and decision making. 
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As shown in Figure 2-18, Colten, Kates and Laska (2008) stated that the Community 
and Regional Research Initiative on Resilient Communities (CARRI) report defines 
resilience as ‘a community or region’s capability to prepare for, respond to, and 
recover from significant multi-hazard threats with minimum damage to public safety 
and health, the economy, and national security’ (Wilbanks 2007). 
 
 
Figure 2-18: The resilience loss recovery curve 
(Community Resilience System Initiative 2011) 
 
 
Figure 2-19: The sequence of timing of reconstruction after Katrina in New Orleans 
(Ewing & Synolakis 2011) 
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Figure 2-19 depicts community resilience and functional capacity as presented in the 
Community Resilience: Lessons from Recent Disasters report (Ewing & Synolakis 
2011). The Community Resilience System Initiative report (2011) stated that 
‘Community resilience is having the capability to anticipate risk, limit impact and 
recover rapidly through survival, adaptation, evolution and growth in the face of 
turbulent change’. The Strategic National Framework on Community Resilience 
(2011) stated that ‘Community resilience is identified as communities and individuals 
harnessing local resources and expertise to help themselves in an emergency, in a 
way that complements the response of the emergency services’. However, McAslan 
(2010) stated that, ‘the resilience of communities is a complex process as it involves 
the interaction of individuals, families, groups and the environment. Further it is 
stated that social interaction and social norms, such as trust is important and the 
understanding of community needs and expectations’. 
 
There is a need to identify ways to improve the functional capacity of a community or 
a region to provide resilience. 
 
2.9.4 Infrastructure Resilience 
 
Transport infrastructure is one of the main infrastructure types that will be affected 
during a disaster, along with other types of CI. There needs to be ways to identify the 
hazard, withstand the impact, reduce the destruction and be resilient. 
 
The Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy (2010) stated that ‘Strategic planning 
to ensure resilience of infrastructure is an important part of creating a nation where all 
Australians are better able to adapt to change, have reduced exposure to risks, and are 
better able to bounce back from disaster’. Further, the report added that ‘resilience of 
infrastructure is the ability to reduce the magnitude, impact or duration of a disruption 
to critical infrastructure—whatever its cause’. As shown in Figure 2-20, the Critical 
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Infrastructure Resilience Strategy covers seven major CI areas that are considered 
important in Australia. 
 
‘The ability of a system or organisation to withstand and recover from adversity’ (Pitt 
2008). The Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy report stated that strategic 
planning is required to ensure resilience of infrastructure and is an important part of 
creating a nation where all Australians are better able to adapt to change, have 
reduced exposure to risks, and are better able to bounce back from disaster. It further 
stated that resilience is an important element and needs to be discussed to identify the 
many factors that can improve resilience or hinder and negatively affect vulnerable 
people. Berdica (2002) identified resilience as ‘the capability of the system to “return 
to normal” after having been disturbed’; taking account of both the ‘maximum 
disturbance from which the system can recover’ and the ‘speed of recovery’. 
 
 
Figure 2-20: CI resilience strategy 
(Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy 2010) 
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Figure 2-21: CI resilience strategy framework 
(Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy 2010) 
 
Figure 2-21 depicts the Australian government’s Trusted Information Sharing 
Network for Critical Infrastructure Resilience. This was further expanded by 
O’Rourke (2007), who stated that ‘the concept of resilience, like the concept of 
critical infrastructure, is evolving. In its current form, the resilience of a community is 
an overarching attribute that reflects the degree of community preparedness and the 
ability to respond to and recover from a disaster’ (see Figure 2-22). O’Rourke added 
that ‘an infrastructural quality, such as robustness, Q (t), can be visualized as a 
percentage that changes with time’. 
 
55 
 
Figure 2-22: Resilience curve 
(O’Rourke 2007) 
 
2.10 Case Study Analysis 
 
The following case studies were selected because of the impact on society and the 
transport network that they illustrate: 
• The Hurricane Katrina case study was selected because this was the worst 
ever recorded hurricane to affect New Orleans, at a cost of more than 1,500 
lives and over US$96 billion in damages. 
• The second case study selected was the Kobe earthquake in Japan. This 
earthquake killed over 5,500 people and the damage costs amounted to 
US$100 billion. 
 
2.10.1 Case Study 2A: Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans, US 
2.10.1.1 Introduction 
 
The case study area is New Orleans in the US, which lies below sea level. There is an 
ongoing threat of flooding and the city of New Orleans has taken precautions to 
protect itself. 
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The Mississippi River is located to the south, Lake Pontchartrain to the north and 
Lake Borgne to the east; the area is prone to flooding from the river, the lakes and the 
Gulf of Mexico. The development of a system to protect the city from flooding began 
when the city was founded in the early 1700s and has grown with the increase in 
population and expansion into additional flood-prone areas. The New Orleans flood 
and hurricane protection systems are complex and massive, consisting of 350 miles of 
levees, which are embankments—usually earthen—that serve as flood barriers. The 
system also includes floodwalls, hundreds of bridges, closable gates, culverts and 
canals that facilitate transportation in and out of the system. It consists of a series of 
four main compartmented basins designed to limit flooding impacts on the entire 
system resulting from failures of individual levees and floodwalls. In addition, large 
pump stations are used to pump out and redirect water from the city. These pumps are 
designed to mitigate flooding that results from significant rainfall and can, over time, 
remove water from moderate overtopping. Currently, the levees offer protection from 
11 to approximately 15.5 feet above sea level. The current system was designed to 
withstand a Mississippi River flood the size of the Flood of 1927 and a hurricane with 
wind conditions similar to a very strong, Category 2 hurricane. 
 
The US experiences 6–10 hurricanes annually. Kates et al. (2006) found that in its 
288-year history, New Orleans has had 27 major river or hurricane-induced disasters 
at a rate of around 1 in every 11 years. A US Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security and Government Affairs report (2006) stated that since 1995, hurricane 
seasons have seen an average of 7.6 hurricanes each year, 3.6 of which were major 
hurricanes, with reported increases in their destructive power; for the period 2000–04, 
an average of 4 hurricanes per season struck the south-east coast, compared with an 
average of 1.8 per year between 1970 and 1999 (Pompe & Rinehart 2008). In 2005, 
there were 14 hurricanes, 3 of which were among the most powerful and costly in the 
154-year history of record keeping in the Atlantic Basin (Wolshon 2006). 
 
New Orleans is protected by many man-made and natural levees on the Mississippi 
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River and built levees (pierced by canals) along Lake Pontchartrain (Colten, Kates & 
Laska 2008). Levees are large embankments that make up the flood control system 
designed and built to protect New Orleans (U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security and Government Affairs 2006). 
 
2.10.1.2 Impact 
 
In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina created a trail of destruction and fatalities with 
wind speeds reaching 232 km/hr and a storm surge 8.2 m across, which inundated 
240,861 km2, killed over 1,300 people and flooded the historic city of New Orleans 
(Townsend 2006). The hurricane devastated CI in the states of Louisiana, Mississippi 
and Alabama. Gaithersburg, Cresanti and Jeffrey (2006) reported that the storm surge 
caused the most damage to CI systems and service facilities: regional potable water 
systems, wastewater treatment systems and sewage treatment plants, cooling towers 
at oil refineries, chemical plants, power stations and highway bridges and their super 
structures were extensively damaged. The storm struck 466 facilities that handle large 
amounts of dangerous chemicals, 31 hazardous waste sites and 16 superfund toxic 
waste sites, three of which flooded and left behind 118 million cubic yards of debris. 
In addition, there were power cuts to approximately 2.5 million customers, and 
communication damage to facilities crippled 38 emergency (911) call centres and 
affected 3 million customer phone lines, causing disruptions to medical care and 
evacuations and the estimated reconstruction costs of US$96 billion (Townsend 
2006). 
 
2.10.1.3 What Went Wrong? 
 
On 23 August 2005, Hurricane Katrina formed as a tropical storm off the coast of the 
Bahamas. Over the next seven days, the tropical storm grew into a catastrophic 
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hurricane that made landfall first in Florida and then along the Gulf Coast in 
Mississippi, Louisiana and Alabama, leaving a trail of heartbreaking devastation and 
human suffering. The city of New Orleans was aware in advance of this growing 
threat. 
 
Hurricane Katrina, its 115–130 mph winds and a storm surge that crested up to 27 
feet high dealt a ferocious blow to homes, businesses and property on the coast and 
for many kilometres inland. This storm surge overwhelmed levees all along the 
lowest reaches of the Mississippi River and the edges of Lake Pontchartrain. 
Significant levee failures occurred on the 17th Street Canal, the Industrial Canal and 
the London Avenue Canal. Because of levee failures, approximately 80% of the city 
was flooded. The flooding destroyed New Orleans, the nation’s 35th largest city. 
Katrina devastated far more residential properties than any other recent hurricane and 
completely destroyed or made uninhabitable an estimated 300,000 homes. In the Gulf 
of Mexico, Hurricane Katrina battered offshore energy infrastructure and forced the 
evacuation of more than 75% of the Gulf’s 819 manned oil platforms. Katrina 
affected nearly 93,000 square miles across 138 parishes and counties (Townsend 
2006). 
 
Estimates vary, but considering property damage alone, Hurricane Katrina was 
America’s first disaster—natural or man-made—to approach the US$100 billion 
mark. Hurricane Katrina has been the most destructive natural disaster in the US. Its 
devastating effects were felt before the storm even reached the Gulf Coast on 29 
August 2005. When the winds and floods of Hurricane Katrina subsided, an estimated 
1,330 people were dead as a result of the storm. As of 17 February 2006, 2,096 
people from the Gulf Coast area were still reported as missing. Around 770,000 
people were displaced—the largest number since the Dust Bowl migration from the 
southern Great Plains region in the 1930s (Townsend 2006). 
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2.10.2 Case Study 2B: Kobe Earthquake (17 January 1995), Japan 
2.10.2.1 Introduction 
 
Kobe City is the sixth largest city in Japan and is located between the coast and the 
mountains. The Kobe (Hyogo-ken Nanbu) earthquake (17 January 1995; MW 6.9) 
caused Kobe and its neighbouring cities the worst damage in Japanese modern history 
since the 1923 Great Kanto earthquake (MS 8.2). The event attracted much attention 
from seismologists and many models have since been derived for its source fault 
system (Koketsu, Yoshida & Higashihara 1998). 
 
2.10.2.2 Impact 
 
The Kobe earthquake, or Great Hanshin earthquake, occurred at 0546 hours (Japan 
Standard Time) on 17 January 1995 (Scawthorn & Cowell 1995; Baba et al. 1996; 
Koketsu, Yoshida & Higashihara 1998; Chang 2000). The magnitude of the 
earthquake was 7.2 on the Richter scale and it lasted for 20 seconds. The epicentre 
was located approximately 20 km away from Kobe, below the surface of Awaji-
Shima Island. Most of the deaths occurred because of the collapse of wood-framed 
houses built prior to Japan’s Seismic Code 1981. Because of the earthquake, 92,877 
houses and buildings were completely destroyed; 99,829 houses and buildings were 
partially damaged; 7,456 houses were burnt down; and 6,281 people died during the 
disaster, with 34,900 more injured and more than 300,000 people made homeless 
(Watanabe 2006). CI services provided for water, gas, electricity and sewers through 
an underground network of pipes and cables failed during the earthquake. There was 
insufficient water for firefighters. Many households had no gas, water or sewerage 
services for more than four months. The infrastructure damage costs were estimated 
at US$90.24 billion (Watanabe 2006). 
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During hazards such as earthquakes, transport network performance is heavily 
affected. Scawthorn et al. (1995) and Tierney and Goltz (1997) identified that 
following the Kobe earthquake, because of traffic congestion, many disaster services 
were disrupted and road, port and rail infrastructure was damaged extensively, 
including many structures such as bridges, rail, highways and buildings, mainly in the 
Kobe Central Business District (CBD). There was disruption and damage to Japan’s 
high-speed Shinkansen (rapid rail)—which passes through Kobe—and other 
expressways such as the Kobe–Osaka (Hanshin Expressway), Kobe–Nagoya 
(Meishin Expressway) and Kobe–Yamaguchi Expressway. The Kobe earthquake also 
caused several portions of the elevated highway between Kobe and Osaka to collapse, 
trapping many motorists. Many businesses and the Port of Kobe were shut down for 
repairs. 
 
2.10.2.3 Impact—Deaths, Demographics, Injuries 
 
At 0546 hours on 17 January 1995, the Great Hanshin earthquake struck the most 
crowded part of Kobe City, Awaji Island, Japan and the southern region of the Hyogo 
Prefecture. The earthquake had a recorded magnitude of 7.2 on the Richter scale and 
affected 3–5 million people living in Kobe and 20 other cities and towns in the 
Hyogo Prefecture. Although it was a moderate earthquake in terms of magnitude 
(MW 6.9), it caused an estimated ¥10 trillion in damage (US$100 billion at exchange 
rates at the time) and caused the loss of over 6,000 lives. Most of the loss was 
suffered in Kobe, a port city of 1.5 million people located some 25 km west of Osaka 
(Chang 2000). The 1995 earthquake was the most significant seismological event in 
Japan since the 1923 Great Kanto earthquake (Risk Management Solutions 2005). 
Mortality in the Great Hanshin earthquake (Kobe and surroundings, January 1995) 
was very heavily concentrated in older age groups. Twenty-three percent of casualties 
were aged 75 years or older. Another 30% were between 60 and 74 years. In other 
words, more than half of the casualties (53%) were over 60. These elderly people 
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tended to live in old wooden houses that collapsed and, in many cases, burnt (Wisner 
(998). 
 
Four days after the incident, 342,000 people (10% of the total population in this 
region) were staying in shelters because their houses (92,000) were totally or partly 
damaged: as of April 1995, there were still 55,000 people living in these shelters. 
This number reduced to around 30,000 by 10 June 1995, and to 1,000 by 31 
December 1995. Twenty percent (or 415,659) of households and 200,162 buildings 
and houses were damaged or burnt down. The number of deaths in Hyogo, Osaka and 
Kyoto prefectures was unprecedented: the figure had risen to 5,502 by 1 April 1995. 
The Great Hanshin earthquake has taught us valuable lessons in healthcare 
management during times of crisis (Baba et al. 1996). 
 
The earthquake left 320,000 people homeless as 93,775 houses collapsed, 106,000 
were partially damaged and 7,000 were burnt during the fires spreading as a 
consequence of ignited gas leaking from damaged pipes, especially in the southern 
part of the city (Menoni 2001). A total of 6,279 people died as a result of the 
earthquake; nearly 90% of the deaths occurred as a direct result of building collapse, 
and the remainder were due largely to the fires that broke out following the 
earthquake. The greatest loss of life occurred in the cities of Kobe (4,484), 
Nishinomiya (1,107) and Ashiya (453). An estimated 34,900 people were injured 
(Hyogo Prefecture 1996; Tierney et al. 1997). 
2.10.2.4 Infrastructure Damage 
 
The Port of Kobe, one of the largest container facilities in the world, had major 
damage, with only 6 of 187 berths usable after the earthquake. Steel bridges and other 
structures sustained significant damage. Significant damage was observed to have 
affected a wide variety of structures including buildings, bridges, railways and 
highways. The largest concentration of damaged large buildings was observed in the 
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Sannomiya area of Kobe’s CBD, where most of the commercial buildings sustained 
some structural damage, and collapses occurred on virtually every block. 
 
Most damage was to wood-framed buildings, including traditional one- or two-storey 
residential or small commercial buildings in Shinkabe (mud wall, post and beam) or 
Okabe (lath and plaster, post and beam). These residences normally were constructed 
with very heavy mud and tile roofs, and lateral bracing within the walls was generally 
provided by nominal bracing (Scawthorn & Yanev 1995). Failures in these buildings 
were typically caused by large inertial loads from the heavy roofs exceeding the 
nominal lateral-load-resisting capacity of the supporting walls. This type of 
construction experienced the most widespread damage throughout the region, 
resulting in the largest number of casualties. 
 
Over 136,000 housing units were destroyed in the earthquake or were subsequently 
demolished, and more than 300,000 people lost their homes (Hyogo Prefecture 1996; 
Tierney 2009). Fires consumed 82 Ha of urban land, and more than 400,000 buildings 
were damaged, of which 100,000 collapsed completely. A similar number was 
partially damaged and thousands more sustained minor damage. Two hundred 
thousand housing units were either partially or completely destroyed, and 85% of the 
region’s schools, many hospitals, and other major public facilities sustained heavy 
damage (Risk Management Solutions 2005). 
 
2.10.2.5 Critical Transport Infrastructure Damage 
 
• Fire following earthquakes— More than 150 fires occurred in Kobe and its 
surrounding areas in the hours after the earthquake. These included several 
large fires that firefighters were largely unable to combat because of traffic 
congestion and water system damage. However, fortuitous calm wind 
conditions meant that no major conflagrations occurred. In the 1994 
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Northridge (California) earthquake, there were more than 100 fires. The US 
and Japan in this century have both sustained the largest peacetime urban 
conflagrations in history, because of earthquakes. Fire following earthquakes 
is a potentially major agent of damage, of possibly holocaust proportions, for 
both the US and Japan. 
• Water and gas system damage—The water and gas systems in Kobe 
incurred major damage, generally caused by ground or building failure, 
which contributed significantly to the fire problem. Additionally, loss of 
these systems for the next several months was a major hardship for the 
population. 
 
Research is needed to: 
1. review water and gas systems in seismic areas, for potential damage and 
emergency preparedness 
2. investigate high-technology methods for automatic system control, at the 
meter and upstream. 
 
• Port damage—The Port of Kobe was devastated by widespread and severe 
liquefaction, which destroyed more than 90% of its 187 berths. Shipping was 
disrupted for many months, with major losses to the local economy and 
strains on alternative transportation modes. Ports in Los Angeles and the San 
Francisco Bay Area are particularly susceptible to similar events as occurred 
in Kobe. The real possibility exists that a large portion of the West Coast’s 
shipping capacity could be crippled by a major earthquake. 
• Rail and highway damage—The Hanshin Expressway, built in the 1960s 
primarily of non-ductile, reinforced concrete construction, was virtually 
destroyed over more than 20 km. Although some differences do exist, the 
major rail and highway concrete structures are similar in many respects to 
those in the US and other countries’ construction: earthquakes can result in 
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the loss of major transportation lines and large bridges, which no region can 
afford (Scawthorn & Cowell 1995). 
o The extent of the damage to the highway and rail transportation 
systems and the volume of debris in the streets created major traffic 
congestion and blocked emergency vehicle access. 
o Disruption to communication systems and the sheer magnitude of the 
damage to structures and roadways made early situation assessment 
difficult. 
o Building collapses crushed or trapped an estimated 20,000 people. 
o The approximately 300 fires that broke out in the impact region 
following the earthquake far exceeded the capacity of local 
firefighting resources. 
o Firefighting efforts were severely hampered by the sheer number of 
fires that started (over 100 in the city of Kobe following impact), 
water shortages that developed because of breaks in the water 
distribution system, inability to use fire hydrants, blocked and debris-
filled roads that prevented access to fires, and the need to divert fire 
service resources for search and rescue (Scawthorn & Cowell 1995). 
o Lifeline failures left the majority of the population in the impact area 
without water, gas or electricity. Hundreds of thousands of people, 
including a large elderly population, were forced out of their homes. 
o During the peak demand period between 20 and 24 January, more than 
342,000 people in Hyogo Prefecture sought refuge in 1,153 shelters 
(Tierney & Goltz 1997). 
o One of the most far-reaching aspects of the Kobe earthquake was the 
severe damage to the transportation and other lifeline systems. 
o Kobe is part of the main transportation corridor between the central 
and southern parts of Japan’s main island of Honshu. 
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o Earthquake damage to highways, bridges and rail systems as described 
above left the city streets as the only land access along this corridor, 
resulting in major congestion and greatly impeded relief efforts. 
o Many of these surface streets were also unusable, blocked by debris 
from collapsed structures. 
o Use of alternative road or rail lines added hours to normally short 
trips. 
o It is clear that, had the earthquake occurred during rush hour, there 
would have been hundreds of fatalities on collapsed freeways and 
numerous crowded trains would have derailed, in some cases 
plunging onto city streets (Scawthorn & Yanev 1995). 
 
2.10.2.6 Economic Impact 
 
The economic losses caused by the 1995 event may be the largest ever caused by a 
natural disaster in modern times. The direct damage caused by the shaking was 
estimated at over ¥13 trillion (US$130 billion) (Scawthorn & Yanev 1995) and was 
included the following: 
• Unemployment rates rose quickly, and 80% of the city’s 2,000 small and 
medium-sized businesses failed. 
• While the true cost will never be known, the total economic losses from the 
disaster have been estimated at US$150 billion, with more than US$100 
billion in infrastructure and property damage and as much as US$50 billion 
in economic disruption. 
• The total loss of transport infrastructure, the port closure, manufacturing shut-
downs and other business and institutional impacts diverted substantial sales, 
employment, income and investment to competing regions in Japan and 
elsewhere. 
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• Insurance losses to domestic carriers were around US3 billion, with a similar 
cost to the international market for claims arising from additional shipping 
costs, business interruption and inventory losses. Japan’s central government 
paid over US$780 million in residential earthquake insurance scheme claims. 
Much of the remaining losses were claims paid on large commercial 
properties, particularly to multi-national operations (Risk Management 
Solutions 2005). 
 
2.10.2.7 Government 
 
Japan’s central government provided the majority of funds, allocating more than 
US$58 billion in the first three years to reconstruct basic infrastructure, public 
facilities and housing. Post-earthquake land readjustment projects used central 
government funds to widen roads, add parks and open spaces, and construct other 
public facilities. In doing so, each property owner in the project area received a new 
parcel that was proportionately smaller than the original parcel. Where streets were 
added or realigned, an owner’s new parcel was not necessarily in the original 
location. Central government funds mainly paid for public facilities constructed in the 
projects (such as land acquisition for road and infrastructure construction), but did not 
explicitly cover private construction (Risk Management Solutions 2005). 
 
2.10.2.8 Planning 
 
The Great Hanshin earthquake exposed serious flaws in the Japanese emergency 
services. Thus, a worldwide strategy for earthquakes needs to be developed for 
disaster relief efforts to be effectively carried out. We have learned an enormous 
amount about medical care as a result of the Great Hanshin earthquake. It is hoped 
that the mistakes in the preparation and execution of plans and that the loss of life 
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suffered by Kobe will not be repeated (Baba et al. 1996). 
2.10.2.9 Main Issues Identified During Kobe Earthquake 
 
The main issues included road capacities affected by debris on roads and emergency 
vehicle access difficulties; CI system failures including electricity, water, 
telecommunication, phones and technology; and planning issues such as gaps in 
emergency planning, residential developments in high-risk areas, fire breaks, roadside 
hazards, emergency management strategies and policy deficiencies, community 
resilience issues and infrastructure management. 
 
2.11 Gaps in Decision Making Identified by Previous Researchers 
 
An analysis of the literature and case studies has identified in detail the gaps in 
decision making that influence or reduce community resilience. Table 2.4 summarises 
these findings. 
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Table 2-4: Gaps identified by previous research (in regard to case studies: Hurricane Katrina and Kobe earthquake) 
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Case Study – Hurricane Katrina Impacted Area of Responsibility 
Wolshon (2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 The primary dilemma faced by New Orleans is that it is situated on land that is 
predominantly below sea level. Primary reason is lack of access to transport.  X     X 
Wolshon (2002) 2 The primary hindrance to the evacuation is the limited number of routes leading out of 
the city. X X X X   X 
Wolshon (2002) 3 An evacuation is an extreme response to an extreme threat where the potential for mass 
loss of life exists. X  X     
Wolshon (2002) 4 Research must also continue to identify better ways to address issues of safety, efficiency, 
information exchange and post-storm re-entry during evacuations. X X X X X X X 
Wolshon (2002) 5 ‘To meet the need for faster and more efficient evacuations, disaster-planning agencies 
are presently seeking to more activity involve transportation professionals in the 
evacuation planning and preparedness process to develop strategies to effectively use and 
manage the transportation infrastructure when the need arises’.  
X  X X X  X 
Wolshon (2002) 6 Although little can be done to alter the weather, we can prepare for the eventuality of 
hurricanes and other natural and man-made hazards.  X    X X X 
Wolshon (2002) 7 Evacuations are life-and-death scenarios, and planning decisions must be made with 
preserving lives in mind. 
 
 
 
 
X X X X X X X 
Wolshon (2006) 
8 The only way to protect people, however, is to evacuate them when threats arise, but this 
is often easier said than done. X  X X X  X 
Wolshon (2006) 
9 In reality, evacuations, particularly evacuations on a mass scale, are complex 
undertakings. X X X X X X X 
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Wolshon (2006) 10 One complicating factor is that transportation infrastructure is neither planned nor 
designed to accommodate evacuation-level demand; building enough capacity to move 
the population of an entire city in a matter of hours is simply not economically, 
environmentally, or socially feasible. 
X X X X X X X 
Wolshon (2006) 11 Roadways are not even designed to be delay-free under routine peak-period conditions.  
X  X X  X X 
Wolshon (2006) 12 The effectiveness of an evacuation is also greatly affected by human behaviour and 
socioeconomics.     X X X 
Wolshon (2006) 13 The evacuation that it precipitated, however, revealed numerous deficiencies in the plan 
that resulted in monumental congestion and delays on several key evacuation routes. X  X X X X X 
Wolshon (2006) 14 After a review of traffic volume and speed data, traffic videos, media accounts, and 
interviews of evacuees, the task force identified four primary issues that had hampered 
the evacuation: 
(1) over-reliance on westward traffic movement; 
(2) inefficient loading of the contra flow freeway segment out of New Orleans; 
(3) extreme congestion resulting from the confluence of multiple regional evacuation 
routes in Baton Rouge, Hammond, Lafayette, Covington, and Slidell; and 
(4) The lack of real-time, accurate traffic information. 
X  X X X X X 
Wolshon (2006) 
15 The analysis after Hurricane Ivan showed that the movement of traffic was further 
hindered by the configuration of the contra flow initiation point. X  X X  X X 
Wolshon (2006) 
16 The traffic control strategy at this location resulted in a capacity restriction that 
effectively regulated flow into the downstream section thereby preventing full use of the 
contra flow lanes. 
  X X  X X 
Wolshon (2006) 
17 Traffic modelling was used to assess loading techniques and identify a method that would 
allow for optimal use of the contra flow lanes without limiting the capacity of the normal 
lanes or vice versa. It was hypothesized that direct access to the contra flow lanes, similar 
  X X X  X 
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to normal entrance ramps to a freeway, would avoid the friction and, therefore, lost 
capacity of a crossover/decision point for drivers. The anticipated benefits of this plan 
were clearly supported by the results of traffic simulation modelling, which showed a 
potential increase in outbound volume of more than 60 percent, or 30,000 vehicles, over a 
12-hour period. Ultimately, this concept was rejected, however, because of the cost and 
time required to build the crossover, but the knowledge gained about the benefits of using 
multiple loading points with direct was used to develop a plan with three interchanges and 
a single lane crossover. 
 
Wolshon (2006) 
18 It has been estimated that between 100,000 and 300,000 people did not or could not be 
evacuated from the city. Local governments have been blamed for poor planning and not 
providing adequate transportation to shelters of last resort. A major failure of the plans 
for evacuating the low mobility population was the lack of communication. 
X  X   X X 
Report to Congress on 
Catastrophic 
Hurricane Evacuation 
Plan Evaluation (2006) 
19 A catastrophic incident is defined as “Any natural or manmade incident, including 
terrorism that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption 
severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national 
morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic event could result in sustained 
national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost immediately exceeds resources 
normally available to State, local, tribal, and private-sector authorities in the impacted 
area; and significantly interrupts governmental operations and emergency services to 
such an extent that national security could be threatened. 
All catastrophic events are Incidents of National Significance.” 
 
X  X  X X X 
Report to Congress on 
Catastrophic 
Hurricane Evacuation 
Plan Evaluation (2006) 
20 Understanding the time required for evacuations is essential for all those who must 
evacuate to do so safely. A number of evacuation planning and operations models have 
been developed by Federal agencies and are available to State and local agencies. FEMA, 
the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), and the National Oceanic & 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) conduct hurricane evacuation studies for the Gulf 
Coast and other States to help State and local emergency managers decide who should 
evacuate during a hurricane threat and when the evacuation order should be given based 
on the estimated time to evacuate a certain number of persons from a given location. 
X X X X X X X 
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Report to Congress on 
Catastrophic 
Hurricane Evacuation 
Plan Evaluation (2006) 
21 Responsible State and local agencies should develop and deploy systems to provide 
information to evacuees and emergency managers during the course of evacuations on 
the status of traffic, shelters, fuel, and other services along evacuation routes. 
X    X X X 
Report to Congress on 
Catastrophic 
Hurricane Evacuation 
Plan Evaluation (2006) 
22 State and local agencies should work with the special needs communities to develop 
systems whereby those requiring specialized transportation or sheltering services during 
evacuations can make those needs known to emergency managers and operators of 
transportation and sheltering services before evacuations. 
X   X X X X 
Report to Congress on 
Catastrophic 
Hurricane Evacuation 
Plan Evaluation (2006) 
23 Sheltering requirements for all segments of the population and evacuees by all modes of 
transportation should be more directly integrated into the evacuation planning process. X    X X X 
Report to Congress on 
Catastrophic Hurricane 
Evacuation Plan 
Evaluation (2006) 
24 A challenge was faced with staging evacuees for passenger rail services offered by Amtrak, 
due to the lack of communication, coordination, and prior planning among local, State, 
and Federal officials. Assistance offered by Amtrak prior to the landfall of Hurricane 
Katrina was not accepted and resulted in a train with 900 seats (7 locomotives and 20 cars) 
leaving prior to the storm. 
X    X X X 
Report to Congress on 
Catastrophic Hurricane 
Evacuation Plan 
Evaluation (2006) 
25 The five areas in which evacuation plans were weakest are: 
Information during Evacuations (Public Communications): Nearly two-thirds of the 
evacuation plans reviewed were judged to be either marginally or partially effective 
regarding measures to keep evacuees informed during evacuation. 
X    X X X 
Report to Congress on 
Catastrophic Hurricane 
Evacuation Plan 
Evaluation (2006) 
26 Evacuating Groups with Various Special Needs (Special Needs): A significant majority of 
the evacuation plans were judged to be either marginally or partially effective regarding 
provisions for evacuating persons with various special needs. 
X     X X 
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Report to Congress on 
Catastrophic Hurricane 
Evacuation Plan 
Evaluation (2006) 
27 Returning Evacuees to Their Homes (Planning): A significant majority of the evacuation 
plans were judged to be either marginally or partially effective regarding provisions for 
returning evacuees to their homes. 
X     X X 
Report to Congress on 
Catastrophic Hurricane 
Evacuation Plan 
Evaluation (2006) 
28 Contra flow (Operations): More than three-quarters of the evacuation plans were judged 
to be only marginally or partially effective regarding the use of contra flow operations.  X  X X X X X 
Report to Congress on 
Catastrophic 
Hurricane Evacuation 
Plan Evaluation (2006) 
29 Care and Protection of Animals (Sheltering): Almost three-quarters of the evacuation 
plans were judged to be either marginally or partially effective regarding provisions to care 
for and protect animals. 
X      X 
Dean (2006) 30 A general question for the engineering and political communities is how to identify areas 
of extreme vulnerability and address these vulnerabilities before disasters occur. It was 
well known that New Orleans was vulnerable to hurricanes of magnitudes that had 
occurred in the past and would recur in the future. 
X X X X X X X 
Kunreuther & Pauly, 
2006) 
31 The lack of interest in insurance protection and mitigation by property owners and by 
public sector agencies prior to a disaster often creates major problems following a 
catastrophic event for victims and the government. 
    X X X 
Dreier (2006) 32 Lessons For Urban Scholars And Practitioners: 
The Katrina disaster could have triggered a bold social experiment. In its wake, policy 
makers could have applied the lessons, learning from both successes and failures, of past 
urban policy to help rebuild New Orleans and the Gulf Coast region. 
X X    X X 
Liu ( 2006) 33 According to the latest FEMA estimates, there were approximately 204,700 homes and 
rental units that sustained severe or major damage from the storms, either from flooding 
or wind.7 Nearly 19,000 state businesses were similarly destroyed or severely damaged. 
The storm left behind an estimated 50 million cubic yards of debris to be removed from 
the New Orleans area alone. Over 200,000 persons were displaced from greater New 
Orleans. 
    X X X 
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Olshansky (2006) 34 Post-disaster recovery is all about urban planning. This is not an area that we can leave to 
emergency managers, engineers, architects, the military, insurers, or bankers. Recovery, 
like planning, is all about creating liveable, sustainable places for people to live and work. 
The fact that it takes place under extreme circumstances, and demands rapid action with 
severely constrained resources, requires the expertise that planners have to offer. This is 
the greatest planning problem most of us have ever seen, and it warrants a 
correspondingly large response. 
X X X X X X X 
Galloway (2006) 35 Except for enforcing water quality standards, there is little federal guidance, other than 
budgetary or ad hoc initiatives, on other water issues. 
Given the present policy vacuum and the reluctance on the part of Congress and the 
administration to support comprehensive planning, New Orleans and coastal Louisiana 
will have to develop, in coordination with federal agencies, their own vision for the future 
and move ahead in a way that brings together solutions to Since 1983, there has been no 
central direction or coordination of water related activities. The many water challenges 
facing the region. This comprehensive plan must address all aspects of coastal 
Louisiana’s water challenges. 
    X X X 
Wolshon (2009) 
36 ‘The low-level of involvement and lack of experience within the transportation 
community has meant that some of the nation’s most knowledgeable and useful sources 
of information on the planning and utilization of transportation resources for emergency 
conditions have gone underutilized’. 
X  X X X X X 
Wolshon (2009) 37 ‘Although the role of transportation in evacuation has been somewhat limited, the 
general topic of evacuation is quite large’ X X X X X X X 
Wolshon (2009) 38 ‘The level of interest in evacuation, as a behavioural, geographic-, research-, planning, and 
engineering-related topic has ebbed and flowed with the needs and conditions of the day, 
and the number and types of hazard conditions for which an evacuation could become 
necessary is also growing’. 
X    X X X 
Wolshon (2009) 39 Wolshon 2009 stated that ‘Evacuations are anything but conventional—they are a matter 
of life and death with a ticking clock. Transportation agencies need to be better informed 
and find creative and innovative solutions to the problems they face’ 
X  X X X X X 
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Wolshon (2009) 40 ‘Evacuation is a complex topic that can be influenced by an enormous number of 
interacting factors.’ X  X X X X X 
Wolshon (2009) 41 ‘It is difficult to identify gaps in practice, “best” practices, or even “effective” practice 
because the types, scales, and characteristics of the hazards, populations, and 
transportation networks and resources are so variable across the country. No single type 
of practice or even group of practices is necessarily appropriate in all locations’. 
X    X X X 
Wolshon (2009) 42 ‘Modeling and Simulation 
An emerging area that has seen significant and rapid improvements in both theory and 
practice has been in modeling and simulation of evacuation traffic’. 
X    X X X 
Carr, Dixon and Meye 
(2010) 
43 Based on state Department of Transport (DOT) surveys and case studies, the following 
have been identified as the primary benefits of a corridor-based state wide planning 
process as compared with a systems wide or project-based planning process: 
X  X     
Carr, Dixon and Meye 
(2010) 
44 A more direct connection between the movement of people and goods and state-
significant economic activity; X  X  X   
Carr, Dixon and Meye 
(2010) 
45 The ability to more closely examine the trade-offs among different modes; 
X  X X    
Carr, Dixon and Meye 
(2010) 
46 A higher precision in monitoring the performance of transportation facilities and 
services; X  X  
X X X 
Carr, Dixon and Meye 
(2010) 
47 A more complete investigation of non-transportation strategies for addressing 
transportation challenges; X  X  
X X X 
Carr, Dixon and Meye 
(2010) 
48 A focus of multi-state efforts at improving transportation capabilities across boundaries; 
X    X X X 
Carr, Dixon and Meye 
(2010) 
49 Familiarity to planning agency partners since corridor planning is already used 
X  X   X X 
Carr, Dixon and Meye 
(2010) 
50 Greater engagement in planning by local officials and other stakeholders because of 
their ability to better relate to the issues being faced. 
 
 
 
 
    X X X 
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Gabe, Falk and 
McCarty (2005) 
51 CRS estimates that 700,000 or more people may have been acutely impacted by Hurricane 
Katrina, as a result of residing in areas that flooded or sustained significant structural 
damage. 
    X X X 
Litman (2006) 52 There was no effective plan to evacuate transit dependent residents 
X    
X X X 
Litman (2006) 53 Transit dependent people were directed to the Super dome, although it had insufficient 
water, food, medical care and security. This lead to a medical and humanitarian crisis. X    X X X 
Litman (2006) 54 Not planning for proper evacuation of motorists, transit dependent persons and elderly. 
And directing evacuees to the Super dome, although it had insufficient water, food, 
medical care and security. This lead to a medical and humanitarian crisis. 
X    X X X 
Litman (2006) 55 Federal emergency officials also failed to deploy buses for evacuation as planned. A top 
FEMA staff described his surprise and frustration at the agency’s inadequate preparation 
before Katrina struck, despite his urgent warnings to agency executives (Bosner, 2005). 
Federal emergency officials also failed to deploy buses for evacuation as planned. 
X  X  X X X 
Litman (2006) 56 Disaster Transportation Issues: 
Evacuations before, during or after an event, and adequate accommodation of evacuees 
at refuge destinations. / Delivery of emergency supplies and services, including water, 
food, medical care, utility maintenance, law enforcement, / Search and rescue operations 
/ Quarantine/ Transportation infrastructure repair. 
X  X  X X X 
Litman (2006) 57 Gaps in Decision Making: 
However, there was no effective plan to evacuate transit dependent residents. X  X   X X 
Shah (2005) 58 The failure of the levees caught officials and emergency responders off-guard, and it 
appears that police, medical, and other means of assistance were inadequate to cope with 
the scale of the disaster 
    X X X 
Shah (2005) 
59 Some of the evacuation plans, such as providing buses, failed. 
X  X  X X X 
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Leavitt and Kiefer 
(2006) 
60 Infrastructure refers to physical systems or facilities that provide essential public services, 
such as transportation, utilities (water, gas, and electricity), energy, telecommunications, 
waste disposal, park lands, sports, recreational buildings, and housing facilities. 
X X X X X X X 
 Colten et al. (2008) 61 Despite more than 290 years of effort, overall vulnerability to hurricanes has grown. 
Geophysical vulnerability in New Orleans is marked by its bowl-shaped location partly 
below sea level, accelerating subsidence, rising sea level, storm surges, and possible 
increased frequency of larger hurricanes. 
 X   X X X 
Colten et al. (2008) 62 These partly natural phenomena have been enhanced by human location decisions, 
extraction of groundwater, oil, and natural gas, canal development, loss of barrier 
wetlands, internal rainfall storage, global warming, and the design, construction, and 
failure of protective structures. 
 X   X X X 
Frickel and Vincent 
(2007) 
63 Argues that society’s understandings of environmental and public health threats are 
dangerously compromised by expert systems that create and legitimate those 
understandings.  
 X   X X  
Frickel and Vincent 
(2007) 
64 Principal among those expert systems, scientific disciplines and regulatory agencies 
reinforce expectations and practices for producing knowledge in ways that minimize the 
ecological and socio-historical contexts in which that knowledge is created. The result, in 
effect, is organized ignorance—a system of knowledge production that articulates risk in 
ways that leave much potential knowledge ‘‘undone.’’ We use the organization of 
environmental testing in Orleans Parish following Hurricane Katrina to illustrate these 
claims. 
    X   
Frickel and Vincent 
(2007) 
65 We need to develop and adequately fund new knowledge institutions—for example, a 
National Institutes of Environment—whose primary mission at both the basic and applied 
ends of the research stream is to tackle real-world environmental and public health 
problems, doing so in ways that seek to embrace, rather than deny, the complexity of 
ecological and social systems in interaction. 
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Landscape Planning in 
Hazardous Zones, 
Lessons 
from Hurricane 
Katrina, August 2005, 
Landscape and Urban 
Planning 79 (2007) 
P1–4 
66 The land planning aspects of both the recovery and continued development of the region 
need to be reconsidered.  X    X  
67 The following discussion offers the reader three proposals for modifying how we might 
plan better.   X      
68 (I) Planning for recovery and sustainable growth speaks to the need to upgrade our land 
planning conventions.  X X    X X 
69 (II) Regional landscape sustainability addresses the need to reorganize the scale and 
emphasis of future development plans. X X    X X 
70  (III) Spatial solutions concepts are reviewed as a possible means to integrate landscape 
ecology theory in future planning for the natural landscape and the people who will live in 
this region. 
 X   X   
Griffis (2007) 71 Addresses the overall design of the engineering works that protect the City of New 
Orleans from major storm events. It briefly describes the history of the drainage of the 
city, and discusses the natural and engineered flood-protection structures and strategy for 
major hurricanes. This is followed by an analysis of the failures of the natural system, as 
well as failures of the levees, floodwalls, pumping stations, and the absence of flood gates 
on the canals. The paper concludes that the ‘‘design storm’’ specified by congressionally 
authorized projects deserves reconsideration, and that engineering design reviews should 
be reorganized and implemented. 
There is always a trade-off in engineering risk analysis—in this case it was dollars versus 
degree of protection. 
    X X  
Wesselink (2007) 72 The question whether there is a need or even a possibility to escape from the present 
technological lock-in seems to remain out of bounds for a society that imagines flood 
protection to be absolute. The need for similar absolute protection was demanded in New 
Orleans shortly after Hurricane Katrina caused extensive flooding there. Because of its 
circumstances and its much shorter history, New Orleans appears to have an opportunity 
to deal with flood risk in more creative ways. 
    X   
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Pompe and Rinehart 
(2008) 
73 Discusses current public and private sector actions that impact damage costs and consider 
ways to mitigate future damage costs and government financial exposure.      X   
Pompe and Rinehart 
(2008) 
74 Encouraging adaptive and avoidance measures through market signals and government 
policies, and protecting areas such as wetlands which mitigate storm damage will help 
limit damage from hurricanes. 
 X      
Dass-Brailsford (2008) 
75 Describes a disaster responder’s experiences of working with displaced survivors of 
Hurricane Katrina, providing crisis and mental health support in the acute phase of the 
disaster. 
    X   
Cruz and Krausmann 
 (2008)  
76 Analysed the damage caused by the two hurricanes on the offshore oil and gas industry. 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused the largest number of destroyed and damaged 
platforms and pipelines, and the highest number of mobile offshore drilling units set adrift 
in the history of GoM operations. Following the hurricanes, changes have been proposed 
to operating and emergency procedures, maintenance requirements, and design practices 
including mooring practices for mobile offshore drilling units. 
    X   
Kates et al. (2006) 
77 Four propositions drawn from 60 years of natural hazard and reconstruction research 
provide a comparative and historical perspective on the reconstruction of New Orleans 
after Hurricane Katrina. Decisions taken over its 288-year history that have made New 
Orleans, so vulnerable to Katrina reflect a long-term pattern of societal response to hazard 
events-reducing consequences to relatively frequent events, and increasing vulnerability 
to very large and rare events. 
For three centuries, New Orleans sought to lessen the impacts of its recurrent floods and 
hurricanes by providing marginal increases in safety. 
X X   X   
Kunreuther & Pauly, 
2006) 
78  The lack of interest in insurance protection and mitigation by property owners and by 
public sector agencies prior to a disaster often creates major problems following a 
catastrophic event for victims and the government. 
    X X  
Elliott and Pais (2006) 
79 Study uses survey data collected from over 1200 Hurricane Katrina survivors to examine 
these influences on a wide array of responses, ranging from evacuation timing and 
emotional support to housing and employment situations and plans to return to pre-storm 
communities. Results reveal strong racial and class differences, indicating that neither of 
    X   
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these dimensions can be reduced to the other when seeking to understand responses by 
survivors themselves. This intersection renders low income black home owners from New 
Orleans those most in need of targeted assistance as residents work to put themselves 
and the region back together. 
Sommers et al. (2006) 
80 Analyse three aspects of media depictions of Hurricane Katrina, focusing on the 
relationship between race and coverage of the crisis.      X  
Gallagher, Fontenot & 
Boyle (2007) 
81 examines the framing of crisis communication strategies before, during, and after 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita by analysing news releases from the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, Homeland Security, and U.S. Senators and Governors 
from Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. A qualitative content analysis found that all entities 
analysed did not acknowledge their parts in the crises, placed blame on others, and tried 
to distance themselves from the crises. State leadership also used a unifying approach 
where they included themselves in the hardships affected residents were experiencing. 
A qualitative content analysis was conducted in this study. 
Theme categories were developed after reading the news releases and three coders 
examined the 1921 news releases. 
Five categories emerged from the news releases analysis: government response, relief 
efforts, economic recovery, reports, and health issues. 
    X X X 
Fritz at al. (2008) 
82 The land loss on the barrier islands and the increased vulnerability of the US Gulf Coast to 
future hurricane storm surges is discussed. The vehicle-based survey was complemented 
by inspections with the reconnaissance boat along the Gulf Coast and the Mississippi 
Barrier Islands. The survey covered both the impact on the built and the natural 
environments. The storm surge peaked to the east of Katrina’s path exceeding 10 m in 
several locations along the Mississippi coastline. The storm surge measurements show 
that the lower floors of specially designed buildings were damaged by the surge of 
seawater and associated wave action, while the upper floors sustained minimal wind 
damage. The storm surge measurements along New Orleans Lakeshore allowed the 
investigators to exclude overtopping as failure mechanism for the 17th Street outfall canal 
levee. Hurricane Katrina’s storm surge distribution _Category 3 at landfall_ is compared 
against Hurricane Camille’s storm surge distribution _Category 5 at landfall.  
 X   X  X 
 
Source 
Ite
m
 N
um
be
r 
Gaps stated by previous researchers 
St
ra
te
gi
c 
Tr
an
sp
or
t 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 
La
nd
 U
se
 
De
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
Tr
an
sp
or
t C
or
rid
or
 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 
Ro
ad
 D
es
ig
n 
Ri
sk
 &
 R
es
ili
en
ce
 
O
th
er
 S
tr
at
eg
ic
 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 G
ap
s 
St
at
e 
an
d 
Lo
ca
l 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
Kromm and Sturgis 
(2008) 
83 In the United States, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act 
establishes a framework for government response in situations involving hurricanes or 
other major disasters. Signed into law in 1988, the Stafford Act authorizes the President to 
issue major disaster declarations, which in turn authorize federal agencies to provide 
assistance to affected states and local governments. Through executive orders, the 
President has delegated responsibility for administering the Act’s major provisions to the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS). Funding for actions taken under the Stafford Act’s authority comes from 
the federal Disaster Relief Fund. 
In the wake of Katrina, the Stafford Act has come under criticism from state and local 
officials in the Gulf Coast for failing to adequately address catastrophic disasters. 
X X X X X X X 
Burnside(2006) 
84 Further, the findings of this analysis suggest that storm specific facts were the most 
important consideration in the evacuation decision-making process. Thus, public officials 
and the media should be more cognizant of the information they are giving residents and 
should coordinate their efforts better to ensure residents are receiving clear and accurate 
information regardless of who or what they perceive as the most important information 
source. 
X     X X 
Brunkard et al.(2005) 
85 Assessed Hurricane Katrina mortality data sources received in 2007, including Louisiana 
and out-of-state death certificates for deaths occurring from August 27 to October 31, 
2005, and the Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team’s confirmed victims’ 
database. We calculated age-,race-, and sex-specific mortality rates for Orleans, St 
Bernard, and Jefferson Parishes, where 95% of Katrina victims resided and conducted 
stratified analyses by parish of residence to compare differences between observed 
proportions of victim demographic characteristics and expected values based on 2000 US 
Census data, using Pearson chi square and Fisher exact tests. 
    X X  
Blair and Rezek (2008) 
86 Using an error-correction model, we find deviation from historic price pass-through 
patterns during the immediate post-Hurricane Katrina period. Although gasoline price 
pass-through patterns have largely returned to their long-run equilibrium, evidence 
indicates that asymmetry, previously not evident, may now exist 
     X  
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Vigdor (2008) 
87 Disasters and City Population Trends, The Pre-Katrina Equilibrium in New Orleans, New 
Orleans’ Share of U.S. Population, 1810–July 2005, The consequences of this failure to 
transform can be seen in Figure 3, which compares the industry mix of the pre-Katrina 
New Orleans area workforce with that of the nation as a whole and The economic 
difficulties of pre-Katrina New Orleans were also reflected in the housing market 
     X  
Brevard et al. (2008) 
88 Discussed, Natural disasters, Transportation of patients, Communication, Disaster 
Planning/methods/organization and administration, Humans. The evacuation of a hospital 
is a daunting logistical task with potentially unforeseen safety, financial, and publicity risks. 
X  X  X X X 
Hamilton (2007) 
89 According to a recent summary by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 
“Hurricane Katrina was the single most catastrophic natural disaster in U.S. history. The 
storm devastated a 90,000-squaremile area, which is roughly the size of Great Britain. The 
storm also resulted in the largest displacement of Americans in our nation’s history, 
forcing more than 270,000 into shelters after landfall. 
    X  X 
Hamilton (2007) 
90 Generator location – Where a generator set is located often makes a significant difference 
in whether it functions as designed when disaster strikes. At times of flooding, generators 
located in basements and at ground level may fail almost immediately due to the rising 
water. And if severe infrastructure damage prevents getting additional fuel, then the 
standby power system will eventually fail when the fuel runs out. 
X  X     
Elsner, Jagger and 
Tsonis (2006) 
91 We estimate that Hurricane Katrina has generated commercial structure damages of $21 
Billion, commercial equipment damages of $36 Billion, residential structure and content 
damages of almost $75 Billion, electric utility damages of $231 Million, highway damages 
of $3 Billion, sewer system damages of $1.2 Billion and commercial revenue losses of $4.6 
Billion. 
    X X X 
NIST Technical Note 
1476, Performance of 
Physical Structures in 
Hurricane Katrina and 
Hurricane Rita: A 
Reconnaissance 
Report (2006) 
92 The most extensive and obvious damage to bridges was caused by storm surge which led 
to the uplift and lateral displacement of superstructure spans. The bridge construction 
technique that was most susceptible to this type of damage. 
 
X  X   X X 
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Amdal and Swigart 
(2010)  
93 Transportation systems play a crucial role in responding to a region’s pre-disaster 
evacuation and post-disaster recovery. Their ability to perform under adverse conditions 
in times of disaster depends upon the resiliency of their fixed and moveable assets as well 
as their operational procedures before, during and after the event. 
X  X X    
Amdal and Swigart 
(2010) 
94 In recent years, transportation resiliency has become a key concept in disaster planning 
and post-disaster recovery. It is an ongoing and incremental process. The concept can be 
applied to all levels of a project; planning and programming, design, construction and 
systems operations. System wide, achieving transportation resiliency requires continual 
refinements to strategic plans and policies in light of changing post-disaster conditions. 
X  X  X   
Robert Miller, 
Hurricane Katrina: 
Communications & 
Infrastructure 
Impacts, Senior 
Research Professor, 
National Defence 
University 
 
95 Katrina as a Critical Infrastructure Collapse 
Katrina offers lessons in another sense as well. One way to think about Katrina is to see it 
as a comprehensive critical infrastructure collapse—perhaps the most widespread critical 
infrastructure collapse that any advanced country has experienced since World War II. 
Virtually all of the critical infrastructure sectors in the region were put out of commission 
at the same time. Failures in one sector had cascading effects on others. These 
simultaneous failures far exceeded the experience base and available resources of public 
officials, and led to a partial or complete breakdown in command and control and in public 
order. Widespread critical infrastructure collapse is one of the marker elements that helps 
differentiate “catastrophes” from “disasters”. 
X  X  X X X 
Bjornland (1994) 
 
96 The relationship between land use, transport demand and supply is dynamic and very 
complicated. The outcome rests partly on assumptions and policies that transport 
planning has little chance of validating. 
X X      
Bjornland (1994) 97 As a consequence of both the private and social impacts of transport and the particular 
solution given to the organizational issue, transport policy has become a political and 
ideological issue. 
X       
Bjornland (1994) 98 Transport management and transport infrastructure planning require skill, and transport 
flow modelling has rapidly increased in complexity. X  X X    
Carr, Dixon and Meye 
(2010) 
99 Corridors provide a more direct connection between the movement of people and goods 
and state-significant economic activity. X  X     
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Carr, Dixon and Meye 
(2010) 
100 Corridor-level analysis encourages a more complete investigation of non-transportation 
strategies, such as land use planning and zoning, for addressing transportation challenges.   X     
Carr, Dixon and Meye 
(2010) 
101 Corridors, especially trade corridors, handle significant amounts of through trips in many 
states   X X    
Carr, Dixon and Meye 
(2010) 
102 The rationale for conducting individual corridor analyses in the first place is to provide 
specific attention to the needs and issues in a particular corridor. X  X     
Kolbl et al. (2008)  
103 Strategic planning (SP) is taking up an increasing part of transport planning 
X       
Yarnal (2007) 
104 Vulnerability is defined as a function of exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity. 
Physical vulnerability results from exposure, and social vulnerability emanates from social 
factors that place people in highly exposed areas, affect the sensitivity of people to that 
exposure, and influence their capacity to respond and adapt. 
    X   
Townsend (2006) 
105 Hurricane Katrina was the most destructive natural disaster in U.S. history. 
The methods that had been employed successfully for the 243 previous major disaster 
declarations since January 2001 proved inadequate for Hurricane Katrina’s magnitude. 
       
Townsend (2006) 106 The Federal response suffered from significant organization and coordination problems 
during this week of crisis.      X X 
Townsend (2006) 107 The lack of communications and situational awareness had a debilitating effect on the 
Federal response. 
 
     X X 
Townsend (2006) 108 Federal departments and agencies continued to have difficulty adapting their standard 
procedures to this catastrophic incident. X     X X 
Townsend (2006) 109 The Federal government’s problems responding to Hurricane Katrina illustrate greater 
systemic weaknesses inherent in our current national preparedness system: the lack of 
expertise in the areas of response, recovery, and reconstruction.  
X     X X 
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Townsend (2006) 
110 The storm demonstrated the need for greater integration and synchronization of 
preparedness efforts, not only throughout the Federal government, but also with the State 
and local governments and the private and non-profit sectors as well 
     X X 
Townsend (2006) 111 Our current system for homeland security does not provide the necessary framework to 
manage the challenges posed by 21st Century catastrophic threats. The system clearly has 
structural flaws for addressing catastrophic events 
      X 
Townsend (2006) 112 During the Federal response to Katrina, four critical flaws in our national preparedness 
became evident: Our processes for unified management of the national response; 
command and control structures within the Federal government; knowledge of our 
preparedness plans; and regional planning and coordination.  
      X 
Townsend (2006) 113 At the most fundamental level, part of the explanation for why the response to Katrina did 
not go as planned is that key decision-makers at all levels simply were not familiar with the 
plans. 
This lack of understanding of the “National” plan not surprisingly resulted in ineffective 
coordination of the Federal, State, and local response. 
X     X X 
Townsend (2006) 114 The final structural flaw in our current system for national preparedness is the weakness 
of our regional planning and coordination structures X     X X 
Townsend (2006) 115 The highly bureaucratic supply processes of the Federal government were not sufficiently 
flexible and efficient, and failed to leverage the private sector and 21st Century advances 
in supply chain management. 
X     X X 
Townsend (2006) 116 FEMA’s lack of a real-time asset-tracking system – a necessity for successful 21st Century 
businesses – left Federal managers in the dark regarding the status of resources once they 
were shipped. 
 
X     X X 
Townsend (2006) 117 The coordination of Federal assets within and across agencies was poor.  X     X X 
Townsend (2006) 118 Third, Federal, State, and local officials responded to Hurricane Katrina without a 
comprehensive understanding of the interdependencies of the critical infrastructure 
sectors in each geographic area and the potential national impact of their decisions 
X     X X 
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Townsend (2006) 119 Logistics and Evacuation 
Lesson Learned: The Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with State and 
local governments and the private sector, should develop a modern, flexible and 
transparent logistics system. This system should be based on established contracts for 
stockpiling commodities at the local level for emergencies 
X  X   X X 
Townsend (2006) 120 Critical Challenge: Critical Infrastructure and Impact Assessment 
Lesson Learned: The Department of Homeland Security, working collaboratively with the 
private sector, should revise the National Response Plan and finalize the Interim National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan to be able to rapidly assess the impact of a disaster on 
critical infrastructure. 
X     X X 
Townsend (2006) 121 We must use this knowledge to inform Federal response and prioritization decisions and 
to support infrastructure restoration in order to save lives and mitigate the impact of the 
disaster on the Nation. 
     X X 
Hurricane Katrina: A 
Nation Still 
 
 
122 Response at all Levels of Government Was Unacceptable 
X     X X 
Hurricane Katrina: A 
Nation Still 
Unprepared 
 
123 The effect of the long-term failures at every level of government to plan and prepare 
adequately for a catastrophic hurricane in the Gulf of Mexico was evident in the 
inadequate preparations before Katrina’s landfall and then again in the initial response to 
the storm. 
    X X X 
Hurricane Katrina: A 
Nation Still 
Unprepared 
 
124 Among the many factors that contributed to these failures, the Committee found that 
there were four overarching ones: 
1. Long-term warnings went unheeded and government officials neglected their duties to 
prepare for a forewarned catastrophe; 
2. Government officials took insufficient actions or made poor decisions in the days 
immediately before and after landfall; 
3. Systems on which officials relied on to support their response efforts failed; 
4. Government officials at all levels failed to provide effective leadership. 
These individual failures, moreover, occurred against a backdrop of failure, over time, to 
develop the capacity for a coordinated, national response to a truly catastrophic event, 
whether caused by nature or man-made. 
     X X 
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Urbina and Wolshon 
(2003) 
125 Contra flow, or reverse laning as it is also commonly known, involves the reversal of traffic 
flow in one or more of the inbound lanes (or shoulders) for use in the outbound direction 
with the goal of increasing capacity. In 1998 Florida and Georgia DOTs had plans in place 
to reverse the flow on their interstate freeways to expedite evacuation. Today, eleven of 
the 18 hurricane threatened states plan to use some type of contra flow evacuation 
strategy. 
While contra flow is widely viewed as the best way to increase outbound flow during 
evacuations, it is not universally considered to be the cure to evacuation problems. 
X      X 
Fritz at al. (2008) 126 Hurricane Katrina (23-30 August 2005) was the costliest and one of the five deadliest 
hurricanes to ever strike the United States. The total number of fatalities directly related 
to the forces of Katrina exceeded 1000 in Louisiana and 200 in Mississippi. 
 
    X X  
Case Study – 1995 Kobe Earthquake 
Risk Management 
Solutions ( 1995) 
127 Japanese Central Govt: provided 458 billion for first three years to re-construct basic 
infrastructure, public facilities and housing. 
Funding levels increased to carry out more research earthquake highlighted several 
structural shortcomings, which were addressed by Japanese Central Government and 
Engineering community, adopting several new laws and key code amendments Japanese 
Central Government developed new strategies to encourage businesses to implement risk 
reduction measures and undertake business continuity planning. 
In response, Japan’s central government has been developing new strategies that 
encourage businesses to implement risk reduction measures and undertake business 
continuity planning. The autumn 2005 upgrade of the RMS Japan Earthquake Model will 
include high-resolution, third-generation modelling advances that will enhance individual 
risk underwriting capabilities in Japan and allow businesses to better assess the cost 
effectiveness of alternative risk reduction strategies. 
     X X 
Risk Management 
Solutions ( 1995) 
128 The 1995 earthquake was the most significant seismological event in Japan since the 1923 
Great Kanto Earthquake. (Page 10)     X  X 
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Risk Management 
Solutions ( 1995) 
129 The earthquake illustrated the importance of hazard mitigation for complex urban 
environments dependent upon a sophisticated array of transportation, communication, 
and infrastructure systems. (Page 10) 
    X  X 
Risk Management 
Solutions ( 1995) 
130 It also illustrated how the degree of damage clearly differs depending upon a combination 
of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability and the need for more probabilistic approaches to 
risk assessment. (Page 10) 
  X X X  X 
Risk Management 
Solutions ( 1995) 
131 The 1995 earthquake also illustrated several structural shortcomings which Japan’s central 
government and engineering community moved quickly to address, adopting several new 
laws and key code amendments in the first years after the earthquake. (Page 11) 
    X X X 
Risk Management 
Solutions ( 1995) 
132 In response, Japan’s central government has been developing new strategies that 
encourage businesses to implement risk reduction measures and undertake business 
continuity planning. (Page 12) 
    X X X 
Scawthorn and Yanev 
(1995) 
133  Illustrated the importance of hazard mitigation for complex urban environments 
dependent upon a sophisticated array of transportation, communication, and 
infrastructure systems. 
X X X X X X X 
Baba et al. (1996) 
134 Flaws in Japanese emergency services, preparation and execution of plans, medical care. 
Medical services must be serviced for at least one week. 
The Great Hanshin earthquake exposed serious flaws in the Japanese emergency services. 
A worldwide strategy for earthquakes needs to be drawn up for disaster relief efforts to be 
effectively carried out.  
    X X X 
Tierney and Goltz 
(1997) 
135 The extent of the damage to the highway and rail transportation systems and the volume 
of debris in the streets created major traffic congestion and blocked emergency vehicle 
access  
X   X X X X 
Samata, Ohuch & 
Matsudab (1997) 
136 The 1995 Hyogoken-Nanbu earthquake caused severe damage in the reinforced concrete 
underground subway structures, which have never been experienced in the past.’ 
 
   X   X 
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Risk Management 
Solutions (2005) 
137 Post-earthquake land readjustment projects used central government funds to widen 
roads, add parks and open spaces, and construct other public facilities. In doing so, each 
property owner in the project area received a new parcel that was proportionately smaller 
than the original parcel. Where streets were added or realigned, an owner’s new parcel 
was not necessarily in the original location. (Page 6) 
X  X X   X 
Chang (2000) 
138 On 17 January 1995, a devastating earthquake struck the Hanshin region of western Japan. 
Although a moderate earthquake in terms of magnitude .Mw. 6:9., it caused an estimated 
10 trillion yen in damage (US$100 billion at exchange rates at the time) and cost over 6000 
lives. Most of the loss was suffered in Kobe, a port city of 1.5 million people located some 
25 km west of Osaka. (Page 53) 
    X  X 
Scawthorn and Yanev 
(1995) 
139 On Tuesday 17 January, at 5.46 a.m. local time, a 7.2 magnitude [Japan Meteorological 
Association (JMA) Mw6.9] earthquake struck the Kobe-Osaka region of Japan. The region 
is Japan's second-most populated and industrial area, after Tokyo, with a total population 
of about 14.1 million. Preliminary estimates are that approximately 5100 deaths have 
occurred, with about 26000 persons injured, 300000 initially homeless and more than 
100000 buildings badly damaged or destroyed. 
 
The economic loss of the 1995 event may be the largest loss ever caused by a natural 
disaster in modern times. The direct damage caused by the shaking is estimated at over 
¥13 trillion (U.S. $130 billion). (Page 146) 
X    X  X 
Scawthorn and Yanev 
(1995) 
140 Significant damage was observed to a wide variety of structures, including buildings, 
bridges, rail and highways. The largest concentration of damaged large buildings was 
observed in the Sannomiya area of Kobe's central business district. In this area, most of 
the commercial buildings sustained some structural damage, and collapses occurred on 
virtually every block. (Page 148) 
X    X  X 
Scawthorn and Yanev 
(1995) 
141 Steel bridges and other structures sustained significant damage. (Page 152) 
X      X 
Scawthorn and Yanev 
(1995) 
142 One of the most far-reaching aspects of the Kobe earthquake was the severe damage to 
the transportation and other lifeline systems. (Page 153) X  X X    
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Scawthorn and Yanev 
(1995) 
143 Kobe is part of the main transportation corridor between the central and southern parts of 
Japan's main island of Honshu. (Page 153) X  X X   X 
Scawthorn and Yanev 
(1995) 
144 Earthquake damage to highways, bridges and rail systems as described above left the city 
streets as the only land access along this corridor, resulting in major congestion and 
greatly impeded relief efforts. (Page 153) 
X   X X X X 
Scawthorn and Yanev 
(1995) 
145 Many of these surface streets were also unusable, blocked by debris from collapsed 
structures. (Page 153)  X  X X  X 
Scawthorn and Yanev 
(1995) 
146 Use of alternative road or rail lines added hours to normally short trips. (Page 153) 
X   X   X 
Scawthorn and Yanev 
(1995) 
147 Rail and highway damage- The Hanshin Expressway, built in the 1960s and primarily of 
non-ductile, reinforced concrete construction, was virtually destroyed over more than 20 
km. While some differences do exist, the major rail and highway concrete structures are 
similar in many respects to US and other construction -- earthquakes can result in the loss 
of major transportation lines and large bridges, which no region can afford. (Page 157) 
X X  X   X 
Wisner (1998) 148 Mortality in the Great Hanshin Earthquake (Kobe and surroundings, January 1995) was 
very heavily concentrated in older age groups. Twenty-three per cent of casualties were 
aged 75 years or older. Another 30 per cent were between 60 and 74 years. In other 
words, more than half of the casualties (53 per cent) were over 60. These elderly people 
tended to live in old wooden houses that collapsed and, in many cases, burned. (Page 27) 
    X  X 
Tierney and Goltz 
(1997) 
149 A total of 6,279 persons died as a result of the earthquake; nearly 90% of the deaths 
occurred as a direct result of building collapse, and the remainder were due largely to the 
fires that broke out following the earthquake. The greatest loss of life occurred in the 
cities of Kobe (4,484), Nishinomiya (1,107) and Ashiya (453). An estimated 34,900 people 
were injured (Hyogo Prefecture, 1996). (Page 1) 
    X X X 
Tierney and Goltz 
(1997) 
150 Over 136,000 housing units were destroyed in the earthquake or subsequently 
demolished, and more than 300,000 persons lost their homes (Hyogo Prefecture, 1996). 
Utility services were disrupted throughout the impact region. More than 1.3 million 
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households were without water, 2.6 million lost electricity, 860,000 were without natural 
gas, and 300,000 lost their phone service (Gol11tz, 1996). Economic losses were extensive. 
The synthetic shoe industry centered in fire-ravaged Nagata Ward suffered enormous 
damage. The Port of Kobe, Japan's largest container facility and the sixth largest cargo port 
in the world, was effectively shut down. Direct physical damage resulting from the 
earthquake is expected to exceed $100 billion (Chang, 1996). (Page 1) 
Tierney and Goltz 
(1997) 
151 The response-related demands the earthquake presented would have been extremely 
daunting even under the best of circumstances. (Page 1) 
 
    X  X 
Tierney and Goltz 
(1997) 
152 The extent of the damage to the highway and rail transportation systems and the volume 
of debris in the streets created major traffic congestion and blocked emergency vehicle 
access. (Page 1) 
X    X  X 
Tierney and Goltz 
(1997) 
153 Disruption of communication systems and the sheer magnitude of the damage to 
structures and roadways made early situation assessment difficult. (Page 1) X    X  X 
Tierney and Goltz 
(1997) 
154 Firefighting efforts were severely hampered by the sheer number of fires that started 
(over one hundred in the city of Kobe following impact), water shortages that developed 
due to breaks in the water distribution system, inability to use fire hydrants, blocked and 
debris-filled roads that prevented access to fires, and the need to divert fire service 
resources for search and rescue (Scawthorn and Cowell, 1995; United Nations Centre for 
Regional Development, 1995). (Page 1) 
X X X X X  X 
 
2.12 Research Gaps 
 
Transportation networks comprise road, water, rail, air and space and provide space 
for CI network installation. The true nature of the effectiveness of the road network 
needs to be quantified and measured against other parameters that will improve the 
present strategic transport decision-making processes and provide understanding of 
real-life threatening situations prior to a disaster. This research will enable 
formulation of good decision-making guidelines to improve safety and 
community resilience and also improve the efficiency of critical transport 
infrastructure located within transport networks. 
 
Past research has addressed important areas in transport planning using techniques 
contributing to assessment of transport infrastructure vulnerabilities. The findings 
have highlighted that decision making has been a major factor during extreme events 
that contributed towards CI failures and community resilience. The current research 
will address this gap by creating a decision-making process involving land use 
development, transport corridor planning and traffic management. 
 
The review of strategic transport planning and decision-making processes undertaken 
as part of this research identified many studies and investigations carried out in the 
field of CIP. These protection mechanisms are related to upgrades in software, 
providing physical protection to CI and revising or upgrading policies and strategy 
documentation. In most cases, the studies identified one stream of protection 
mechanisms. Further investigation via a literature review uncovered no other reported 
work linking strategic transport planning and decision making to risks to public and 
infrastructure safety. 
 
The review identified that there are no formal process to accommodate elimination of 
the causes of failure in strategic transport planning decision making. There is a gap in 
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knowledge linking strategic transport planning and ensuring that processes are 
available for decision making. The current research aims to fill this gap. Therefore, 
the study utilises current research findings and links strategic transport planning and 
decision-making processes. 
 
Building resilience of transport infrastructure through better land use planning was 
investigated. Land use planning is a major partner in strategic transport network 
planning. When new land use changes are approved for residential or commercial 
developments, depending on their geographic location—adjacent to or remote from 
existing residential developments—there may be the need to provide connectivity to 
existing critical transport infrastructure. Transport infrastructure is one of the main CI 
systems that contributes to the resilience of a community in the event of a disaster. If 
correct decision making is not carried out at strategic transport planning stages, this 
creates limitations to transport infrastructure capacities and has a cascading effort on 
CI systems. There is a gap in transport decision making in relation to land use 
developments. 
 
Transport system upgrades or additional network improvements are needed to 
provide for urban expansion. Transport planning and coordination should be 
considered at all levels of government (national, state and local) and at the 
international level. Proper strategic planning will improve connectivity between these 
levels of transport system networks. The transport system has its own complexities. 
Governments and countries rely on their transport systems for promoting goods and 
services for economic gain. The tools used by urban decision makers must be reliable 
and accurate to ensure proper decisions. It is recognised that it is important to 
understand the total dynamics of adjacent transport networks and connections before 
any decisions are taken to approve major developments, which will alter travel 
patterns and affect the network. There is a gap in holistic strategic transport planning 
in present-day practices. 
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In most countries, road and transport infrastructure is considered a national priority. 
Transportation helps shape an area’s economic health and quality of life. Not only 
does the transportation system provide for the mobility of people and goods, it also 
influences patterns of growth and economic activity by providing access to land. The 
Federal Highway Administration and Federal Transit Administration report (2007) 
report stated that ‘the performance of the system affects public policy concerns like 
air quality, environmental resource consumption, social equity, land use, urban 
growth, economic development, safety, and security’. Transport system upgrades or 
additional network improvements are needed to provide for urban expansion. 
Transport planning and coordination should be considered at all levels of government 
(national, state and local) and at international level. The Federal Highway 
Administration and Federal Transit Administration report (2007) report further stated 
that ‘Transportation planning plays a fundamental role in the state, region or 
community’s vision for its future’. Transport infrastructure provides for community 
amenity and safety. There is a gap in practice in integrating these into road design 
practices. 
 
Rapid development of cities worldwide, which in turn accelerates rapid urbanisation 
and land use planning, influences traffic-related risks to society as a whole. 
Congested roads cause traffic congestion, road safety issues and environmental 
pollution during peak times and hazardous events. Dora and Phillips’ (2000) report 
stated that ‘the risk of accidents varies, depending on the type of road, the traffic mix, 
the time of day and climatic conditions, and the speed and mass of vehicles involved’. 
Pedestrian Safety (2013) stated that ‘Road traffic crashes kill about 1.24 million 
people each year. More than one fifth of these deaths occur among pedestrians and 
each year, more than 270 000 pedestrians lose their lives on the world’s roads’. 
Australia’s National Road Safety Strategy 2011–2020 (2011) stated that ‘On average 
four people die and 90 people are seriously injured on Australian roads every day and 
crashes kill about 1,400 Australians and hospitalise another 32,500. And the total 
estimated cost to society is $27 billion’. Victoria’s Road Safety Strategy 2013–2022 
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(2013) report stated that in Victoria, ‘280 people a year or more than five people a 
week are dying on our roads’ and added that ‘road trauma costs Victoria over $3.0 
billion dollars a year’ and ‘serious injuries costs Victoria $2.4 billion a year’. These 
figures show that road-related accidents and the cost associated with them are high. 
This research makes the connection between land use zoning changes and the related 
impact on the road network and community, by assessing road accident data through 
case study analysis. 
 
The OECD (2010) report Improving Reliability on Surface Transport Networks 
identified that transport network reliability is important and defined it as ‘the ability 
of the transport system to provide the expected level of service quality, upon which 
users have organised their activities’. The transport system is designed to cater to the 
community needs and provide accessibility to goods and services and also provide 
‘escape routes’ during disasters. Nicholson and Du (1997) identified that the travel 
pattern of movement in a network may change dramatically following a disaster 
because of people evacuating an area or entering it to render assistance. Transport 
networks need to be improved and new networks need to be planned and constructed 
to cater to the growing urban population and to improve the social status of people. 
Economies in developed countries depend heavily upon their transport systems. 
Nicholson and Du (1997) further stated that these dependencies are likely to increase 
because of a trend towards just-in-time production methods, which involve reducing 
the space and investment associated with storage and reliance on fast and reliable 
transportation system. The COAG report has estimated that economic costs of 
congestion in the city of Sydney were $3.5 billion in 2005 and will rise to $7.8 billion 
in 2020 (Edwards & Smith 2008). The major externality costs were found to be 
congestion ($4.9 billion), accidents ($1.4 billion), environmental pollution ($1.3 
billion) and road damage ($0.7 billion). The focus of all cost recovery studies—road 
damage—was found to be the least important when pricing to internalise all social 
costs, being only 9% of total external costs. However, this is the most important cost 
in rural areas (Cox 1997). The research analysis presented here provides an insight 
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into a typical decision-making process and the gaps. 
Freeways and highways provide a high level of connection between major urban and 
rural cities with high posted travel speeds of 100–110 km/h. These transport corridors 
can accommodate traffic volumes of more than 25,000 vehicles a day in one 
direction. Medium-level transport corridors provide for connectivity between towns 
and activity centres. Road networks play an important role by connecting cities, 
townships and countries, providing services such as gas, water, sewerage, electricity, 
telecommunication and fibre optic cables. Berdica (2002) stated that ‘the road 
transportation system is one of our most important lifelines’. Transport networks 
consist of roadways, waterways, railways and airports. Jenelius and Mattsson (2006) 
stated that ‘reliable transport services are necessary for a well-functioning labour 
market that allows the employees to commute in an efficient way’. These transport 
corridors provide accessibility to communities at all times, but networks should be 
designed to provide for other important situations, such as evacuation purposes 
during disaster events. Transport corridor planning needs to integrate the design that 
is required to provide extra widths or extra lanes to the network, to provide for these 
needs. This research will identify constraints through road design and road hierarchy 
to show the present-day traffic volumes and capacities. 
 
A natural hazard, such as an earthquake, bushfire or storm or a man-made hazard, can 
create an increasing demand on the road network and its performance. During these 
demand times, the road network provides for people’s evacuation, emergency service 
accessibility, essential service supplies and deployment of service personnel. During 
hazardous events, many road-related transport infrastructure systems and other CI 
systems fail within the road reserves, thus increasing the risk to society. CI 
infrastructure failures can cause road blockages and impede the road network. At this 
stage there are two main areas to consider. One is the failure of CI systems and their 
resiliency, and the other is the ‘road network’ itself. The road network should be 
designed to cater for these demands in ‘identified’ hazardous areas. This is not seen to 
be captured in strategic transport planning and road design, which is one of the main 
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gaps, thus failing to provide resilience to transport infrastructure. 
 
Decision making takes place at every step of transport planning and it happens every 
day. This is another ‘gap’ in strategic transport planning: planning and decisions 
taken on a daily basis are holistic or strategic, but mainly involve network ‘segment’ 
management. Strategic transport planning needs to extend beyond network segment 
planning to encompass the total network tributary of the transport network. The 
qualitative calculations carried out to identify traffic congestion and economic 
impacts should extent to capture impacts on society, the environment and economy 
and on the transport network. All these must be assessed together, not separately, in 
strategic transport planning. Thus, CI and transport networks have a direct connection 
with land use planning. The gap is that strategic transport planning needs to be 
holistic and needs to capture the total network, key transport infrastructure and key 
decision makers to arrive at a comprehensive planning process. 
 
Decision making plays an important part in saving lives and protecting all types of 
infrastructure. Many decisions are taken before, during and after a disaster to mitigate 
its impact. An informed decision-making process has proven to be very productive 
and to save many lives, but throughout their lives, humans experience circumstances 
requiring them to make decisions involving probability information. These 
circumstances often require rapid responses and the outcomes of these decisions can 
have life-changing consequences (Andrzejewska et al. 2013). It is important that 
decisions are made holistically and strategically. 
 
2.13 Summary of the Literature Review 
 
Table 2-4 presents a summary of findings of the comprehensive literature review. The 
table captures in detail the gaps identified by previous researchers; the majority areas 
of impact and responsibility have been identified. For each gap, the source of the 
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literature and the area of responsibility as reported by the researchers are captured. 
Table 2-4 provides a starting point for the work presented in this thesis. The plan for 
the research is presented in the next chapter on research methodology. And Table 2-5 
provides a summarised version of key areas and important items identified in Table 2-
4. 
 
Table 2-5: Summary of Key Areas identified in Table 2-4 
 
Main Area Summary of items Reference to Table 
2.4 item numbers 
Land Use 
Development in 
high risk areas 
needs to be 
restricted 
The relationship between land use, transport demand and supply is dynamic 
and very complicated and is depending upon a combination of hazard, 
exposure, and vulnerability and the need for more probabilistic approaches 
to risk assessment. Encouraging adaptive and avoidance measures through 
market signals and government policies will help to which mitigate risk levels 
and reduce vulnerability. Primary reason is lack of access to transport. 
1 / 61/ 62/ 74/96 
/129/130 
Access & 
Evacuation 
‘Evacuation is a complex topic that can be influenced by an enormous 
number of interacting factors.’ And it is an extreme response to an extreme 
threat where the potential for mass loss of life exists. The primary hindrance 
to the evacuation is the limited number of routes leading out of the city. 
Understanding the time required for evacuations is essential for all those who 
must evacuate to do so safely. Traffic modelling techniques and Contra flow 
(Operations) could be improved in assisting in decision making processes. Not 
planning for proper evacuation of motorists, transit dependent persons and 
elderly would lead to a medical and humanitarian crisis. Transportation 
systems play a crucial role in responding to a region’s pre-disaster evacuation 
and post-disaster recovery. Their ability to perform under adverse conditions 
in times of disaster depends upon the resiliency of their fixed and moveable 
assets as well as their operational procedures before, during and after the 
event. In recent years, transportation resiliency has become a key concept in 
disaster planning and post-disaster recovery. The relationship between land 
use, transport demand and supply is dynamic and very complicated. The 
outcome rests partly on assumptions and policies that transport planning has 
little chance of validating. Corridors provide a more direct connection 
between the movement of people and goods and state-significant economic 
activity. 
1/2/3/14/15/17/20/28/3
7/38/39 /40 /54/56 
/59/93/94/96 /99  
/119/144/146/152 
Importance of 
future further 
Research 
Research must also continue to identify better ways to address issues of 
safety, efficiency, Table 2-5, n exchange and post-storm re-entry during 
evacuations. Need ways to identify areas of extreme vulnerability and 
address these vulnerabilities before disasters re-occurs. The need to identify 
and promote “best” practices, or even “effective” practice because the 
types, scales, and characteristics of the hazards, populations, and 
transportation networks and resources are so variable across the country and 
examine the trade-offs among different modes using a higher precision  
monitoring the performance of transportation facilities and services. 
The need to develop and adequately fund new knowledge institutions to 
tackle real-world environmental and transport resilience problems. Identify 
spatial solutions concepts to integrate landscape ecology theory in future 
infrastructure planning for the natural landscape and the people who will live 
in this region. 
There is a need to improve existing infrastructure standards and theory to 
4/30/32/41/45/46/65/70
/77/86/92/100/102/121/
125/131/140/141 
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mitigate damage to infrastructure due to environmental hazards.  
Improve investigation into existing corridor-level analysis and integrate it with 
non-transportation strategies, such as land use development.  
Ways to use this knowledge to inform Federal, State, Local & private sector to 
improve decision making processes to improve resilience to infrastructure to 
mitigate the impact of the disasters. 
Professional 
Industry 
involvement 
‘To meet the need for faster and more efficient evacuations, disaster-
planning agencies are presently seeking to more activity involve 
transportation professionals in the evacuation planning and preparedness 
process to develop strategies to effectively use and manage the 
transportation infrastructure when the need arises’. 
 
5/30/32/36/42/45/46/49
/98/99/100/101/102/118
/121 /125/131/146 
Transport and other 
Infrastructure 
One complicating factor is that transportation infrastructure is neither 
planned nor designed to accommodate evacuation-level demand; building 
enough capacity to move the population of an entire city in a matter of hours 
is simply not economically, environmentally, or socially feasible. 
10/71/72/76/90/95/120/
131/135/136/140/141/14
2/143/147 
Social Impact The effectiveness of an evacuation is also greatly affected by human 
behaviour and socioeconomics. Vulnerability is defined as a function of 
exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity. Physical vulnerability results 
from exposure, and social vulnerability emanates from social factors that 
place people in highly exposed areas, affect the sensitivity of people to that 
exposure, and influence their capacity to respond and adapt. 
12/63/75/79/80/85/87/8
8 
/104/130/138/139/148/1
49 
Strategic Planning 
and Strategies 
Strategic planning (SP) is taking up an increasing part of transport planning. 
The need for greater integration and synchronization of preparedness efforts, 
not only throughout the Federal government, but also with the State and 
local governments and the private and non-profit sectors as well. The current 
system does not provide the necessary framework to manage the challenges 
posed by 21st Century catastrophic threats. The system clearly has structural 
flaws for addressing catastrophic events. The need for a unified management 
of the national response; command and control structures within the Federal 
government; knowledge of our preparedness plans; and regional planning 
and coordination. Be able to develop new strategies that encourage 
businesses to implement risk reduction measures and undertake business 
continuity planning.  
16/47/103/110/111/112/
122/123/124/132/151 
Policies Encouraging adaptive and avoidance measures through market signals and 
government policies, and protecting areas such as wetlands which mitigate 
storm damage will help limit damage from hurricanes. 
31/32/74/81/83/124/129
/ 
Decision Making Need effective planning to evacuate transit dependent residents.  
At the most fundamental level, part of the explanation for why the response 
to Katrina did not go as planned is that key decision-makers at all levels 
simply were not familiar with the plans. This lack of understanding of the 
“National” plan not surprisingly resulted in ineffective coordination of the 
Federal, State, and local response.  
The need for greater integration and synchronization of preparedness efforts, 
not only throughout the Federal government, but also with the State and 
local governments and the private and non-profit sectors as well. 
Further, the findings of this analysis suggest that storm specific facts were the 
most important consideration in the evacuation decision-making process. 
Thus, public officials and the media should be more cognizant of the 
information they are giving residents and should coordinate their efforts 
better to ensure residents are receiving clear and accurate information 
regardless of who or what they perceive as the most important information 
source. 
 
57/84/110/113/ 
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Federal / State /and 
Local Government 
Responsibilities 
Responsible State and local agencies should develop and deploy systems to 
provide information to evacuees and emergency managers during the course 
of evacuations on the status of traffic, shelters, fuel, and other services along 
evacuation routes. Have greater engagement in planning by local officials 
and other stakeholders because of their ability to better relate to the issues 
being faced. 
State and local agencies should work with the special needs communities to 
develop systems whereby those requiring specialized transportation or 
sheltering services during evacuations can make those needs known to 
emergency managers and operators of transportation and sheltering services 
before evacuations. 
Local governments have been blamed for poor planning and not providing 
adequate transportation to shelters of last resort. A major failure of the plans 
for evacuating the low mobility population was the lack of communication. 
Sheltering requirements for all segments of the population and evacuees by 
all modes of transportation should be more directly integrated into the 
evacuation planning process. The need to communication, coordination, 
and prior planning among local, State, and Federal officials. Care and 
Protection of Animals (Sheltering) 
Post-disaster recovery is all about urban planning. A focus of multi-state 
efforts at improving transportation capabilities across boundaries. Not 
planning for proper evacuation of motorists, transit dependent persons and 
elderly. 
18/21/22/23/24/25/26/2
7/29/33 
/34/48/50/52/53/54/55 
/59/66/68/69/106/107/1
08/109/110/112/114/115
/117/118/122/123/124/1
33/134/154/153 
Private Sector The disasters demonstrated the need for greater integration and 
synchronization of preparedness efforts, not only throughout the Federal 
government, but also with the State and local governments and the private 
and non-profit sectors as well. 
The need to discusses current public and private sector actions that impact 
damage costs and consider ways to mitigate future damage costs and 
government financial exposure. The need to coordinate State and local 
governments and the private sector, develop a flexible systems and working 
collaboratively with the private sector, to revise the emergency response plan 
and finalize the interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan to be able to 
rapidly assess the impact of a disaster on critical infrastructure. 
71/72/73/78/97/110/119
/120/137 
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 Chapter 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces the research methodology used in this study. The research 
process, research questions and the approaches used are described. 
 
Table 2-5 presents a summary of findings which the literature clearly listed the gaps 
in strategic planning. Further analysis of these indicated that there are four major 
categories of gaps as shown below: 
 
• Land use development 
• Transport corridor planning and traffic management 
• Decision making based on risk and resilience 
• Road design. 
 
The methodology developed in this chapter focusses on the first three categories; road 
design, which is a part of infrastructure design, is considered beyond the scope of this 
research. 
 
3.2 Research Questions and Research Methodology Adopted 
 
Table 2-5 indicated the findings of the previous researches and the methodology 
adopted in addressing some of the major issues. Research questions are formulated 
considers the previous approaches adopted by the researches. 
To address the gaps identified in the review of the literature, the following research 
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questions have been formulated: 
• What are the elements of strategic transport planning where decisions made 
could affect resilience of infrastructure and communities? 
• What are the gaps in decision making at land use planning stages that affect 
resilience? 
• What are the gaps in decision making at transport planning and traffic 
management that affect resilience? 
• How can we develop a decision-making framework capturing the above gaps? 
• How can we prioritise the gaps in the decision-making process? 
 
3.3 Research Methodologies Adopted 
 
The overall research methodology adopted in this research is summarised in Figure 
3.1. A major challenge posed is capturing the required data, ensuring reliability of the 
data, and validating the data by using more than one source. Following the approach 
for conducting case study-based research proposed by Yin (2009), three approaches 
were considered: 
1. using multiple sources to triangulate the evidence 
2. organising the data collected in a structured approach 
3. leaving a clear evidence base of the data captured. 
 
3.3.1 Case Study Selection 
 
Case studies were selected based on the availability of the data and relevance to the 
area being investigated. The case studies included two that were selected from the 
literature: Hurricane Katrina and the Kobe earthquake. Two further case studies 
involved land use approvals: land use zone change in the Geelong region; and 
development approvals in high-risk areas, the Breamlea bushfire case study and 
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Victorian bushfires. The final two case studies covered traffic management: road 
capacity in Geelong; and a traffic corridor analysis in West Geelong for both normal 
operating conditions and emergency evacuation scenarios. 
 
The step-by-step process followed in the research is depicted in Figure 3.1 and 
outlined here: 
Step 1.  Identifying the gaps in strategic planning that affect resilience of 
transport infrastructure using published work was completed through 
analysis of published work and government publications. This 
included analysis of two case studies: Hurricane Katrina and the Kobe 
earthquake. 
Step 2.  A review of land use approval processes in Australia was conducted to 
identify the gaps in the process that affect resilience of transport 
infrastructure and community during a disaster. Three case studies 
were analysed to further expand the gaps. Finally the identified gaps 
were validated using a questionnaire survey conducted among local 
government practitioners. 
Step 3.  Analysis of traffic management issues during a disaster was conducted 
using a transport corridor analysis with two case studies: transport 
corridor analysis and intersection analysis using five key locations in 
Geelong and three corridors in Geelong West. 
Step 4.  Consolidation of the gaps in decision making and creation of a method 
to rank them based on risk. 
Step 5.  Identification of areas of improvement in regard to strategies and 
policies needed to reduce the risk and improve resilience, based on 
case studies. 
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Figure 3-1: Overall research framework 
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3.4 Identification of Gaps from Case Studies and Published Work 
 
Table 2.2 presented the main gaps identified through the analysis of the published 
work. Analysis of the case studies validated the identified gaps and further expanded 
the database of gaps in practice. 
 
3.5 Review of Land Use Approval Processes 
 
At this stage, all planning and approval processes at local, state and federal levels 
were analysed and summarised. It was identified that the process adopted in land use 
zone change can lead to many issues relating to the safety of the network and the 
community. An in-depth analysis of the land use zone change process was undertaken 
to understand the gaps in decision making during the process. 
 
All land use changes in Geelong during 2000–13 were analysed to understand the 
breadth of the issue. One case study was analysed in detail to confirm the gaps. Zone 
changes and traffic assessment prior to development approval was undertaken. The 
land use approaches that affected the resilience of the community during the 
Victorian bushfires were analysed. The gaps affecting the resilience during the 
bushfire hazard were identified. The toll taken by the bushfires was captured as an 
indication of the criticality of the issues identified. 
 
The second case study, on a bushfire threatening the Victorian town of Breamlea, was 
conducted to demonstrate the impact of strategic planning decision making on the 
resilience of a community during bushfires. 
 
Outcomes of the above studies were consolidated into a list of gaps observed during 
strategic decision making during land use approvals. The gaps identified during the 
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analysis of land use approval processes were compiled into a questionnaire for local 
government and the findings were used to validate the outcomes of the analysis of 
case studies. 
 
3.6 Traffic Management 
 
The principles of traffic management in local government areas were captured in 
detail through analysis of existing practices and published work. Road classes and 
hierarchy according to Geelong’s Road Management Plan (RMP) were identified. 
 
Five key road intersections were identified to represent major road hierarchy classes 
of Category 3, 4 and 5 and these were used for analysis. Each intersection was 
analysed using existing traffic volumes and designed traffic volumes. The traffic 
volumes were captured using classified data using tube counts. Functionality of the 
nodes was compared with design capacities. 
 
Transport network analysis was conducted on three selected networks to understand 
traffic movements during normal and disaster evacuation scenarios. SIDRA traffic 
modelling was used to understand the following: 
• level of service (LoS) 
• lane blockages 
• degree of saturation (DoS) 
• travel speed 
• network performance. 
 
Critical nodes were identified for four alternative routes and all nodes were observed 
under disaster scenarios. Emergency travel speeds were also captured. Road 
categories were compared with current traffic volumes to understand the accuracy of 
the road classifications. Signal timing and transport infrastructure were examined in 
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the context of the road classifications. 
 
3.7 Local Government Practitioner Survey 
 
A questionnaire survey was developed to capture the opinions of local government 
practitioners operating in disaster-prone areas. As the gaps related to strategic 
planning decisions often intersected by input received from the local government, a 
decision was made to recruit respondents from local government areas affected by 
disasters. Of the local governments in Victoria, 21 responded to the survey. The 
responses received allowed triangulation of data from case studies using another 
source for the same data. 
 
3.8 Decision Making Based on Risk 
 
Typical decision-making scenarios were reviewed for implementation to address the 
identified major gaps in strategic planning. A framework where the decisions are 
based on the definitions of an ideal case and a base case, was proposed as the most 
suitable as this offers the flexibility of adapting the method to different environments 
and areas of jurisdiction. A risk-based framework was proposed to identify the impact 
of the gaps. Both qualitative and quantitative risk ranking methods were proposed. 
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3.9 The Overall Research Program 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Research process framework 
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3.10 Summary 
 
The research methodology presented here used analysis of case studies both from 
published work as well as those sourced from local government areas in Victoria, 
Australia. Further, a questionnaire survey of local government areas affected by 
disasters was conducted to capture the opinion of local government practitioners on 
gaps in strategic planning that affect the resilience of transport infrastructure. 
Triangulation of data as proposed by Yin (2009) was achieved using expert opinion 
and multiple case study observations for the area of land use planning. 
 
Case study analysis, published work and transport modelling using SIDRA software 
were used to validate and confirm the gaps in decision making in the area of traffic 
and transport planning. Outcomes of the two major studies, combined with published 
work, led to finalisation of the gaps in strategic decision making in transport 
infrastructure. 
 
A decision making and risk management framework was developed considering the 
published work and also the current processes adopted in local government. Chapters 
4, 5 and 6 present the major research program undertaken. 
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Chapter 4: LAND USE DEVELOPMENT PLANNING 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter is presented to provide an understanding of present and past gaps in 
planning systems. The review of published case studies highlighted major issues 
pertaining to land use development planning processes. Land use development 
planning is carried out in every country and state. Residential growth decisions 
increase urbanisation, thus affecting travel patterns and society as a whole. The Land 
Use and Development Report (2017) stated that ‘Victoria’s planning system is 
controlled through the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (the Act) and the 
Planning and Environment Regulations 1988. When considering urbanisation and 
land use development, practices are still evolving. Urbanisation is having a major 
impact on decision-making processes. Cities expand rapidly as a result of policy 
changes. Therefore, the case studies analysed here identify the important elements 
that affect society, transport networks and transport infrastructure. Decision making 
in regard to land use development approval policies creates present-day transport 
scenarios as well as safety issues. Informal land use development practices are seen 
as the main problem that is causing traffic congestion, reducing road safety and 
contributing to environmental pollution. 
 
Strategic transport planning and land use development should be integrated to achieve 
the best outcome for transport networks and land use planning. Both these elements 
are analysed together in some countries to an extent. It is important to understand the 
processes and decision making to improve integration between authorities. As shown 
in Figure 4-1, the key objectives of planning is important and should be considered 
during transport network and land use planning processes. 
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Figure 4-1: Objectives of the Planning and Environmental Act 1987 
(Greaves 2017) 
 
Transport planning is the responsibility of state and federal transport authorities and it 
follows set strategies and policies. Integration of policies between authorities is not a 
frequent practice; this breakdown of coordination leads to many difficulties in 
administration and implementation of required critical transport infrastructure. In a 
holistic planning scheme, it is important to ascertain the true dynamics within cities 
and how authorities could provide transport-related infrastructure during land use 
development processes. The frequency of natural disasters has increased immensely 
and the impacts are felt worldwide. During and after a disaster there are issues in 
relation to transport and land use planning that are highlighted for all the wrong 
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reasons. 
 
Land use development and transport system upgrades and transport network 
improvements are required to facilitate urban expansion. Transport planning should 
be considered at all levels of government (national, state and local) and at the 
international level. Strategic planning will improve connectivity between transport 
networks and improve its performances. Governments and countries rely on their 
transport systems for promoting goods and services for economic gain. It is 
recognised that it is important to understand the total dynamics of adjacent transport 
networks and connections before any decisions are made to approve major 
developments, which will change travel patterns and affect the network. Decision 
makers need to make informed decisions and use appropriate tools to ensure 
decisions are reliable and accurate. Ad-hoc residential and commercial developments 
planned without giving proper consideration to transport infrastructure and transport 
planning create issues. 
 
Allowing land use development in high-risk areas is a threat to lives and property. 
Land use development policies and practices needs to be reviewed periodically to 
reflect urbanisation, transport network performance and management of evacuations 
during disaster events. 
 
4.2 Land Use Planning Policies in Victoria 
 
Land use planning in Victoria has been developing since 1929. The scope of this 
research includes Victorian planning policies and processes. A list of selected land 
use planning policies is provided in Appendix 2. Planning in Victoria covers the use, 
development and protection of land in the present and long-term interests of all 
Victorians. State planning policies are concerned with issues such as urban 
consolidation and neighbourhood character, whereas local planning policies are 
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concerned with issues of regional or local significance. There are two main types of 
planning: strategic planning and statutory planning. Strategic planning provides the 
broad policy frameworks for specific land use developments. The Melbourne Plan 
and Melbourne 2030 are the state’s most significant strategic planning policy 
documents. Statutory planning includes developing and amending planning schemes 
and processing applications for planning permits. 
 
4.2.1 The Planning Scheme Contains Two Policy Sections 
 
The State Government and the Minister for Planning are responsible for the State 
Planning Policy Framework (SPPF), which sets out state planning policies (e.g., 
metropolitan development, settlement, environment, housing, economic development, 
infrastructure, subdivision, gaming, design and built form). The Local Planning 
Policy Framework (LPPF) is prepared by local councils and approved by the Minister 
for Planning. It is expected that all planning decisions will align with SPPF. A full list 
of items is provided in Appendix 3. 
 
4.3 Land Use Development Approval Process in Victoria, Australia 
 
In Victoria, the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (the Act) is the legislative basis 
of the planning system; the purpose of the Act is to ‘establish a framework for 
planning the use, development and protection of land in Victoria in the present and 
long term interests of all Victorians’. This legal document gives permission for a use 
or development on a particular piece of land. Every municipality in Victoria has a 
planning scheme that sets out its objectives, strategies and policies and controls for 
land development and protection. Planning decisions influence a community’s needs 
and requirements, such as access to work, schools, shopping and visiting. As shown 
in Table 4-1, over 50,000 permits are issued in Victoria each year and 300–400 
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planning scheme amendments are approved per year. 
Table 4-1: Number of planning applications in Victoria 
 Applications Amendments 
Victoria Melbourne 
Metropolitan 
Rural / Regional  
2004 – 2005 53260 33271 19989 332 
2005 – 2006 50667 32117 18550 432 
2006 - 2007 49587 31289 18298 405 
 (Pearson 2008) 
 
4.4 Victorian Planning Scheme Amendments 
 
Changing a planning scheme is referred to as an amendment. A decision to amend the 
scheme will be made by the full council, a committee of council or by a senior 
council officer under delegation. The process begins when a council seeks the 
Minister for Planning’s authorisation to prepare an amendment. The council must 
consider both the SPPF and LPPF, significant effects on the environment, and the 
social and economic effects of the amendment. Amendments to a scheme have 
significant planning implications and affect the wider community. 
 
4.4.1 Components of the Victorian Planning Scheme Framework 
4.4.1.1 State Planning Policy Framework 
 
The SPPF gives effect to a state government’s land use policies. The framework 
prepared by the Victorian State Government sets out state planning policies (e.g., 
metropolitan development, settlement, environment, housing, economic development, 
infrastructure, subdivision, gaming, design and built form). A council can only 
introduce a local policy that is consistent with the state policy, and every planning 
scheme includes the SPPF. 
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4.4.1.2 Local Planning Policy Framework 
 
Each local council prepares an LPPF and seeks approval from the Minister for 
Planning. The LPPF should be aligned with SPPF and contain a Municipal Strategic 
Statement (MSS) and local planning policies. This sets out the council’s vision for its 
municipality and the local policies to achieve the vision. The LPPF must be 
consistent with the SPPF and contains two parts: the MSS and local planning policies. 
A council can change an existing policy or introduce a new policy through an 
amendment to the planning scheme. This process takes time and resources. 
 
4.4.1.3 The Municipal Strategic Statement 
 
The MSS is the foundation of the strategic planning framework for planning 
decisions in a municipality and contains a council’s strategic planning, land use and 
development objectives and strategies for achieving these objectives. The MSS is 
consistent with the current ‘Council Plan’ and a council can change the strategic 
direction expressed in the MSS through a planning scheme amendment. 
 
4.4.1.4 Zones 
 
The zones are listed in the planning scheme and each zone has a purpose and set of 
requirements; it contains information on land use, subdivision of land, construction of 
new buildings and other changes to the land. 
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4.4.1.5 Overlays 
 
An overlay addresses environmental and built form matters. Not all land has an 
overlay, and some land may be affected by more than one overlay. If an overlay 
applies, the land will have some special feature such as a heritage building, 
significant vegetation or flood risk. The purpose and decision guidelines in the 
overlay and schedule are very important and must be considered when a council 
makes decisions about a planning permit application. Overlays and schedules give 
effect to a strategic direction in the MSS. For example, a council can use: 
• the Heritage Overlay to manage change in a heritage precinct identified in a 
heritage study, which applies to heritage places of natural or cultural 
significance and describes the requirements that apply 
• the Design and Development Overlay to impose a height or set back 
requirement to ensure that new development is compatible with the existing 
built form and landscape character identified in an appropriate study 
• the Development Contributions Plan Overlay to impose a levy to pay for 
improved drainage in a catchment based on an appropriate study 
• the Vegetation Protection Overlay to require a planning permit before 
significant vegetation can be removed. 
 
4.4.1.6 Particular Provisions 
 
The particular provisions in the planning scheme may also apply to land use and 
development. These provisions cover a range of matters including subdivision and a 
public open space contribution; easements, restrictions and reserves; advertising sign 
controls; car parking; and uses with adverse amenity potential. The particular 
provisions are the same in all planning schemes. 
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4.4.1.7 General Provisions 
 
General provisions provide technical aspects of the planning scheme: the 
administration of the planning scheme; uses, buildings, works, subdivision and 
demolition exempt from a planning permit requirement; existing uses and 
continuation rights; decision guidelines; referrals of applications; and applications on 
land owned by the responsible authority. The general provisions are the same in all 
planning schemes. 
 
4.5 Victorian Municipal Council Responsibilities and Planning 
Permit Process 
 
Under the Act, a council has two key roles: planning authority and responsible 
authority. As the planning authority, a council is required to set out a strategic policy 
framework for the municipality and initiate changes to the planning scheme. As the 
responsible authority, a council is responsible for administering the planning scheme 
and making decisions on planning permits. The council has the ultimate responsibility 
for the strategic direction of municipality and planning decisions. 
 
4.5.1 Planning Permit Process 
 
Every municipality has a planning scheme that sets out the SPPF and LPPF, which 
includes MSS, local policies and zone and overlay provisions that control the use and 
development of land. 
 
A planning permit is a legal document that gives permission for a use or development 
on a particular piece of land. A council must take into account both SPPF and LPPF 
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when making a decision. To obtain a permit, an application must be made to the 
council and if the council agrees with the proposal, it will grant a planning permit 
(see Figure 4-2). The permit contains written conditions and usually has endorsed 
plans that show what is to be built and how the land can be used. The proposed use or 
development must satisfy all conditions on the planning permit and should comply 
with endorsed plans. This means that the use or the buildings and works must be 
exactly as shown on the endorsed plans. 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Planning permit flow path framework 
 
4.5.2 The Decision 
 
The decision about an application can be made by a council planner under delegation; 
by a committee of council planners under delegation; by a committee of council; or 
by the full council. Development applications may raise issues of policy, in which 
case the council (or its delegate) is required to consider the merits of any objection as 
well as the merits of the proposed development and any changes proposed by the 
applicant to address the reasonable concerns of objectors. The decisions must be 
consistent with policy and be transparent, fair and reasonable given the relevant 
planning considerations. 
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Referral authorities are notified about certain types of applications that may affect 
their interests. VicRoads, for example, is a referral authority if the application 
involves new access to a main road. The council must comply with a direction from a 
referral authority. The application may also need to be sent for comment to other 
council departments or external experts or agencies for specialist comment such as 
engineering services, urban design and heritage advice. 
 
In deciding whether or not to recommend that a planning permit be granted, the 
following matters should be considered and addressed in the council planner’s report: 
• the planning scheme, in particular the SPPF, the MSS and local policies, the 
zone and overlay provisions, the decision guidelines and incorporated 
documents 
• the reasons for objections and an assessment of their planning merits 
• the views of referral authorities and comments from other council departments 
• significant environmental, social and economic effects and impact on amenity 
• any relevant strategic plan, policy statement, code or guideline and adopted 
amendment. 
 
4.5.3 Delegation 
 
The Act enables a council to delegate many of its planning powers. Effective 
delegation and decision making relies on clear policy expressed in the planning 
scheme and communication between the council administration and councillors. 
 
4.5.4 Minister for Planning 
 
The Victorian Minister for Planning is responsible for developing the SPPF in the 
planning scheme and the overall responsibility for its operation in Victoria. The 
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Minister authorises councils to prepare an amendment, then considers the 
amendment, submissions, panel report, council report and advice from the department 
before deciding to approve an amendment adopted by a council. 
 
4.5.5 The Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal 
 
The Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) functions in accordance 
with the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998; it operates under its 
own legislation independently of government and is administered by the Department 
of Justice. A council’s decision about a planning permit application may not be final. 
An appeal to VCAT is called an application; both applicants and objectors can 
request VCAT to review a council’s decision on a planning permit application. 
VCAT independently reviews decisions made by councils about planning permit 
applications and other planning matters. VCAT takes into account the same planning 
considerations that the council was required to consider when it made its decision and 
makes its own assessment of the relevant planning considerations and the planning 
merits of the proposal. After considering all submissions the tribunal may agree with 
the council’s assessment and conclusion, and affirm the council’s decision; 
alternatively, it may overturn the council’s decision and its decision is final unless 
there is a question of law that can be taken to the Supreme Court. Legal advice is 
essential before following this course of action. 
 
4.5.6 Geelong City Council’s Land Use Planning Processes (Victoria, Australia) 
 
Geelong City Council in Victoria uses a similar framework to assess planning permits 
and planning scheme amendments. The amendment is prepared, reviewed by an 
independent panel to ascertain the validity of the proposed changes and then made 
available to all stakeholders. The panel considers all stakeholder inputs before 
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deciding on the final approval (see Appendix 4). 
 
4.5.7 Major Gaps in Decision Making and Land Use Planning 
 
Pearson (2008), the Victorian Auditor-General at the time, stated that, ‘Planning 
decisions affect the lives of all Victorians and they can have a significant impact on 
local communities, the environment, key industries and the broader economy’. 
Pearson further stated that proper planning processes are essential to prevent 
inappropriate land use and development and that all decision-making process should 
comply with the Planning and Environmental Act 1987 and identified the following 
findings in the 2008 review, Victoria’s Planning Framework for Land Use and 
Development. 
 
Planning schemes and permits are major legislative mechanisms for controlling land 
use and development. Planning schemes are statutory documents that set out 
objectives, policies and provisions for the use and development of land in the area to 
which they apply (usually a municipality). Pearson (2008) stated that ‘Victoria’s 
planning system has been subject to continuous reform since the early 1990s. As part 
of these reforms, the Act was amended in 1996 to introduce the Victoria Planning 
Provisions (VPP) and establish new format planning schemes with a strategic and 
performance-driven focus to reduce administrative costs and increase efficiency of 
the planning system’. He further stated that Victoria’s existing framework for 
controlling land use and development is complex and unclear and that existing 
arrangements do not allow for comprehensive measurement and monitoring of the 
overall performance of the planning system, or measurement of the effectiveness and 
efficiency of advisory and statutory support services primarily provided to councils. 
 
Greaves (2017) stated that ‘first residential zones review began in 2007 and revised 
zones came into effect in 2013; three ministerial committees reviewed the zones, with 
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little change to the first committee’s recommendations. Recommendations were 
either not adopted or not implemented until 2013. The report added that ‘government 
strategic planning objectives and policies are continually changing. Melbourne 2030 
was a 30-year plan released in 2002 and replaced by Plan Melbourne in 2014, 
following a 2008 audit of Melbourne 2030. 
 
This thesis captured the review of Pearson’s (2008) report, Victoria’s Planning 
Framework for Land Use and Development by Greaves (2017), the present Victorian 
Auditor-General. His report, entitled Victoria’s Planning System for Land Use and 
Development (March 2017), reviewed what has been achieved following production 
of the 2008 Victoria’s Planning Framework for Land Use and Development report. 
The gaps were stated as: 
• Key stakeholders in this planning were not fully effective in their management 
and implementation of the planning scheme. 
• The planning scheme remains overly complex. 
• Much more work is needed to realise the intent of the planning system. 
• There is a lack of clear prioritising, time frames, actions or resources to 
support the implementation of recommendations by the planning department. 
• There is poor project governance and oversight. 
• In practice, ‘best practice principles’ are not met. 
• Large numbers of planning controls are repetitive, outdated, conflicting and 
ineffective. 
• Planning controls do not effectively support the intent of state policy planning 
objectives. 
• Clearly much more work is required if the system is to realise its intent. 
• Successive governments, state planning departments and local councils have 
conducted many reviews of Victoria’s planning system since 2008 and many 
of these have been inefficient. One reason is changes in government and 
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government policies. In addition, planning departments are inadequate in 
their prioritisation, implementation and review of recommendations. 
• Planning schemes are difficult to navigate and costly to administer, which 
affects the timing of decision making. 
• ‘Risk based assessment processes and efficiency indicators have not been 
fully incorporated into planning scheme’ (p. 22). 
• There are current weaknesses in the policy (p. 28). 
• The vague policy objectives often fail to provide meaningful guidance. 
• The examples are out of date (policy objectives, strategies, policy guidelines, 
poor alignment of policy objectives and planning controls). 
• There are gaps in alignment between overarching strategic plans and state and 
local policies. 
• There has been a failure to provide clear direction and guidance on critical 
planning issues. 
• ‘The planning system provides little clarity and guidance on a number of key 
planning challenges’. 
• The VPP reduced the number of planning zones from over 200 to 30, but 
these changes have increased the complexity of schedules, variations and 
overlays to support them. 
• ‘The claimed purpose is to give ‘clarity’ and local effect to state housing 
policies, zones and overlays, but in some cases these variations are in direct 
contrast to the intent  of the zones and lead to the inconsistent application of 
the residential zones across the State’. 
 
Other main gaps identified ranged from recommendations from previous reviews of 
controls not being implemented to controls not being consistent with state planning 
policies. There were 57,000 planning permit applications in the 2015–16 period 
alone. This clearly shows that after almost 10 years, land use planning in Victoria still 
has not reached its intended capacity. It has again failed to address the importance of 
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identifying land for improvement to provide safe passage during emergency 
situations. Inclusion of transport infrastructure for emergency evacuations and future 
transport demands is still to be reviewed and achieved. 
 
Greaves (2017), in Victoria’s Planning System for Land Use and Development stated 
that ‘the overall purpose, role and content of the planning system have not been 
holistically reviewed since it’s last major reform in 1996’. The report further stated 
that ‘Risk-based assessment processes and efficiency indicators have not been fully 
incorporated into the planning system’. 
 
4.6 Land Use Zone Changes within the Geelong Region (2000–13) 
 
The current review of land use planning and approval processes indicated that a major 
gap exists in changing the land use from a low-density area to a high-density zone. In 
an attempt to understand this, most land use zone changes that took place in the City 
of Greater Geelong (CoGG) during 2000–13 were reviewed (see Appendix 5). As 
shown in Figure 4-6, Residential 1 Zone (R1Z) can be changed into any of the other 
zones. 
 
Each suburb within the council region had planning zone changes. Each zone can be 
rezoned to many zones. Appendix 6 shows probable zone changes through a planning 
process. 
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Figure 4-3: Total combinations of zone changes 
 
B1Z    B1Z Commercial 1        TZ  TZ Township  
B2Z    B2Z Commercial 1        PU Z   PU Z Public Use    
B4Z    B4Z Commercial 1           RI Z   R1 Z Residential 1      
PCRZ     PCR Z Public Conservation & Resource 
PPRZ    PPR Z Public Parks & Recreation  
MUZ    MU Z   MIXED USE        RZ   RZ Rural 
RD Z    RD Z  Road Zone        RL Z  RL Z Rural Living 
FZ    FZ   FARMING        SU Z  SU Z Special Use 
IN2 Z    IN1 Z INDUSTRIAL 1          LDRZ   Low Density Residential 
IN2 Z    IN2 Z INDUSTRIAL 2            
 
Figure 4-3 highlights the fact that any type of land could be rezoned at any given time 
to another use. The Rural Zone (RZ) and Farm Zone (FZ) could be changed to 
residential (R1Z), which would increase traffic generation and movements. The land 
could then be rezoned from R1Z to other zones of use. The effects of these changes 
are felt when decisions are made to make these zone changes in areas that are not 
compatible with amenity or safety factors such as developed areas or urban areas, 
where there are existing issues of transport constraints. These transport issues could 
range from congestion on roads to road-related accidents and economic losses. 
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4.7 Case Study 4-1—Land Rezoning to Accommodate an Activity 
Centre (Shopping Centre) in West Geelong, Victoria, Australia 
 
4.7.1 Introduction 
 
The objective of this land use development highlights why it was selected, in relation 
to how traffic analysis affected the area and the gaps in decision making during the 
land use development process from the perspective of traffic engineering consultants. 
Further, it highlights the gaps in traffic engineering assessments that tend to differ 
between traffic consultant reviews and the fact that road-related accidents that took 
place after the development were not considered and are still not part of the planning 
decision-making process. This is new knowledge bringing to notice the effect of land 
use planning on the surrounding land and the amenity of the community. This 
development was approved as it was considered to provide a missing commercial 
opportunity or shopping centre within the area. The economic benefits and social 
benefits of having a development of this nature and size were considered more 
favourable than not having one. 
 
4.7.2 The Reason for Selection of this Case Study 
 
Four traffic engineering consultants were engaged in this land use development and 
rezoning process. It is a rare event for multiple traffic engineering consultants to be 
involved in one land use development rezoning application. Two consultants prepared 
the initial traffic reports for the developer, one consultant peer reviewed the report 
and the fourth peer reviewed the previous three reports to produce the ‘independent 
panel’ report. Standard practice is that one traffic consultant prepares a report for the 
council, who reviews the report and makes its recommendations. Because of ongoing 
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amenity and safety concerns raised by residents during the planning process, the 
council decided that it should be reviewed by an ‘independent panel’. 
 
4.7.3 The Land Use Rezone Proposal 
 
The proposal was to rezone land from Industrial 1 Zone (IN1Z) to Mixed Use Zone 
(MUZ), R1Z and Business 4 Zone (B4Z). The proposal required a planning scheme 
amendment (rezoning) and a planning permit application to proceed under the 
Planning and Environmental Act 1987. The proposal was considered by the 
developer to be consistent with the SPPF and LPPF, in that it would encourage the 
consolidation and development of activity centres for a wide range of commercial and 
community users. Figure 4-4 shows the proposal for the study area and Figure 4-5 
shows the traffic volumes that would be using these roads, presented as a percentage, 
prepared by the traffic engineering consultants for this development. 
 
 
Figure 4-4: Land rezoning for proposed shopping centre development 
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Figure 4-5: Traffic generation estimates by consultants 
 
Accepted practice is that the council should assess the application and decide on one 
of three options: to abandon the amendment; change the amendment to suit the 
development proposal; or refer to an independent panel to review the application. In 
this instance, the council decided to ask an independent panel to review the proposal 
and prepare a report. There are existing conditions such as Design and Development 
Overlay 14 (DDO 14) and an Environmental Audit Overlay for the site. DDO 14 
applies to a building height of 7.5 m. The main concerns raised by residents were 
economic, health, amenity and heritage impacts, traffic movement and safety issues, 
inconsistency with urban design guidelines, traffic impacts on the road network, lack 
of open space and appropriateness of zone and land use. The developer was 
responsible for all new infrastructures, including services, signals, road works and 
intersection treatments. 
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Table 4-2: Traffic impact assessment process and comparison 
 
[C1 = consultant for developer, C2 = consultant for developer, C3 = consultant performing the peer 
review for Council, C4 = consultant performing the peer review for the independent panel] 
 
The four traffic reports identified the following in their respective traffic reports. Key 
selective gaps are selected. 
 
4.7.4 Traffic Accident Data 
 
Table 4-3 summarises the accidents that were captured at different distances from the 
planned development (see Appendix 7 for the full dataset). 
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Table 4-3: Traffic accident data analysis (*data 2011 up to June 30) 
 
 
 
Two of the four consultants discussed traffic accidents close to the development site. 
C1 identified two accidents (1997–2001) and C4 identified four accidents (2000–
2004). 
 
Figure 4-6 shows all road-related accidents that occurred between 2005 and 2011. 
The radius shows different distances from the planned shopping centre (shown in red) 
and a shopping centre developed prior to this (shown in blue). Within each circle, the 
accident type and when and where it took place are shown. 
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Figure 4-6: Accident data showing Definitions for Classifying Accidents (DCAs) and radius 
 
This is further highlighted in the following tables. This captures road-related 
accidents before and after the development (shown in red). 
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Table 4-4: Pedestrian related and vehicle–vehicle accident analysis 
 
 
Table 4-5: Accident numbers–before and after development 
 
 [Total accident numbers according to distance from the development; *=accident data up to June 
2011; DCA types shown in Appendix 7] 
 
When Table 4-4 and Table 4-5 were analysed the following were identified. 
• The total pedestrian related accidents within 1000m increased from 13 
accidents to 20 accidents. 
• The total vehicle - vehicle related accidents within 1000m increased from 71 
accidents to 158 accidents. 
• The total serious and other related accidents within 1000m increased from 79 
accidents to 172 accidents. 
As seen from above information, all the four consultants produced their respective 
reports according to current practice. However, all of the reports failed to take into 
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consideration the impact of this rezoning and related accidents. Traffic volume 
increases are shown in Appendix 9. Accidents according to their severity are shown 
in Appendix 10. Traffic volumes are shown in Appendix 11, and Appendix 12 
provides the Definitions for Classifying Accidents (DCA). 
 
4.8 Victorian Bushfires 
 
A second case study was conducted to understand the gaps that allowed development 
approvals in high-risk areas and capacity demands on the road network. 
 
4.8.1 Specifications of Bushfires in Victoria 
 
The 2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission—Interim Report (2009) stated that 
bushfires are devastating, that fires are deadly and that in each summer period they 
will crop up somewhere in Australia; this could be in grasslands or areas close to the 
urban fringe. When the weather conditions are dry with low humidity and high 
temperatures, the nation is on alert for bush fires. These environmental effects 
contribute towards bushfires, which cause destruction to infrastructure and loss of 
lives. Bushfires can be categorised as grassfires or forest or wildfires. As shown 
Table 4-6, bushfires affect all regions of Australia and the threat exists every summer. 
The densities of people per hectare have increased immensely compared with the 
1850s (see Table 4-6) and homes are situated within ‘peri-urban’ areas close to nature 
reserves and forests. Another reason for the increase in population densities is the 
high level of urbanisation taking place. 
 
Bushfires impact the lives of many and destroy townships. The 2009 Victorian 
bushfires were deadly and widespread across Victoria, similar to the 1939 Victorian 
bushfires (Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission Interim Report 2009). 
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 Figure 4-7 shows the extent of the bushfires in 1939 which killed 71 people. The fires 
were wide spread from the west of the State of the east. 
 
Figure 4-7: 1939 Victorian bushfires 
 
Figure 4-8 shows the extent of the bushfires in 1983 which killed 47 people. The fires 
were wide spread from the west of the State of the east. 
 
 
Figure 4-8: 1983 Victorian bushfires 
 
Figure 4-9 shows the extent of the bushfires in 2003 which killed 1 person. The fires 
were mainly contained to non-populated areas and located within State forest areas. 
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Figure 4-9: 2003 Victorian bushfires 
 
Figure 4-10 shows the extent of the bushfires in 2009 which killed 173 people. The 
fires were wide spread within the State. These were the most destructive bushfires, 
which destroyed 78 townships and over 2000 homes. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-10: 2009 Victorian bushfires 
(2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission–Interim Report 2009) 
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Table 4-6: Number of years in which each state was affected by bushfires (1851–2014) 
 
[NSW = New South Wales, NT = Northern Territory, Qld = Queensland, SA = South Australia, 
Vic = Victoria] 
 
For Table 4-6 and Figures 4-11 and 4-12, data were gathered by summarising various 
2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission reports including Volume I: The Fires 
and the Fire-Related Deaths, Fire in Victoria, Bushfires in Our History 1851–2009 
and Bushfire History—Major Bushfires in Victoria from February 1851 to February 
2007. Between 1851 and 2014, Victoria was affected in 42 years by bushfires, 
representing a greater than 25% probability of a bushfire year occurring during this 
period. 
 
Because of this threat, there should be proper land use development practices and 
road network planning to provide safety during these deadly events. Many lives are 
lost due to these devastating bushfires. As shown in Figure 4-12, Victorian bushfires 
are the most damaging. 
 
 
Figure 4-11: Number of times bushfires have impacted townships (1851–2014) 
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Figure 4-12: Victorian bushfire deaths (1851–2011) 
 
4.8.1.1 Bushfire Threat 
 
The 2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission’s interim report (Volume I: The 
Fires and the Fire-Related Deaths 2009), stated that weather is a major factor 
affecting the spread of a fire: the four elements are air temperature, relative humidity, 
wind speed and direction and atmospheric stability. The report further stated that 
wind is one of the critical factors affecting the shape, direction, rate of spread and 
behaviour of a fire, as shown Figure 4-13. The stronger the wind, the faster and 
further a fire will spread. 
 
 
Figure 4-13: The effect of wind strength on fire shape 
(2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission–Interim Report 2009) 
 
During a bushfire hazard, infrastructure may be destroyed and may fail as a direct 
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effect of the hazard; this may include damage to electricity or telephone poles, road 
bridges and other transport infrastructure, private and other property damage, loss of 
human lives and loss of wildlife and livestock. Figure 4-14 shows the effects of a 
bushfire including cascading effects on CI. 
 
Figure 4-14: How a hazard impacts on the society, environment and CI 
 
After the initial direct impact, secondary impacts occur after a time lag; these 
secondary impacts are forced upon the community, infrastructure and the 
environment and it is difficult to quantify the monetary value of the resulting losses. 
Most risk assessment and management processes identify initial impacts at a macro 
level. This process identifies the size of the hazard and the extent of the affected area 
and manages the rescue efforts. During CIP planning stages, it is necessary to identify 
infrastructure failures and social needs at the micro level. For example, during an 
evacuation situation, authorities use the existing road network to carry out the 
necessary evacuations of affected people and to provide access to services to counter 
the threat. Because of secondary impacts of the hazard, the road network will be 
affected by blockages caused by fallen trees and power poles, debris on the roads, 
burning roadside trees and broken bridges, which create issues for the evacuation 
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process. 
4.8.1.2 Peri-Urban 
 
This century, Australian living patterns have changed markedly; many more people 
now tend to live close to nature. Many authors call this peri-urban living, where 
communities choose to live close to forest boundaries or within them. The rural–
urban interface is described as the areas where houses and buildings are built among 
trees and other vegetation and is also referred to as peri-urban development. These 
types of living standards have reduced any clear barriers between forest boundaries 
and houses. Firebreaks and buffer zones have become ‘obsolete’. The studies of Chen 
(2006) and McAneney (2005) have shown that this type of living is not good for 
communities. Balcombe (2006) considered that the most significant bushfire risks in 
Australia generally occur where populated areas meet areas of bushfire risk—in the 
rural–urban interface. This situation has become worse because of population density 
increases in these areas. 
 
4.8.1.3 Property Damage 
 
Properties are destroyed during bushfires because of many contributing factors. 
Ahern and Chladil (1999) indicated that the mean and maximum distance of houses 
being damaged varies, as shown in Table 4-7. 
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Table 4-7: Distances from the vegetation boundary to the houses lost 
(Hobart and Otway’s bushfires–results and analysis) 
 
(Ahern & Chladil 1999) 
As shown in Figure 4-15, ember attack during a fire creates further damage to 
property. 
 
 
Figure 4-15: Mechanism of bushfire attacks 
(Blanchi, Leonard & Leicester 2006) 
 
This brings us to an initial discussion about peri-urban living and land use 
development, and raises many questions. Is this land suitable for future residential 
use? If not, do we have an opportunity to improve the road network and road 
transport infrastructure to provide for safer living and evacuation during hazards? 
 
Balcombe (2006) also suggested that there is a good opportunity to address these 
issues at the planning inception stages of housing developments. Local government 
councils are responsible for local structural plans and rezoning of land. These 
councils should develop strategies to prevent future peri-urban developments in high-
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risk bushfire areas and provide ways to remove existing developments from these 
areas. This study highlights the importance of having proper process to manage land 
use development practices through strategies and policies. 
 
 
4.8.1.4 Economic Losses 
 
With bushfires come economic losses to communities and expenses relates to loss of 
property, recovery and improvements, as shown in Figure 4-16. McAneney (2005) 
showed that the annual average number of houses lost is estimated at 83 homes and 
when this is combined with current asset values for home and contents, the ‘annual 
average damage’ is valued at AU$33.5 million. 
 
  
Figure 4-16: Annual number of domestic dwellings lost to bush fires since 1926 
(McAneney 2005) 
 
4.8.1.5 Network 
 
Balcombe (2006) stated that the road systems within these peri-urban developments 
did not cater for, nor were they designed to carry higher traffic volumes. The road 
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systems in these developments should be designed to carry higher traffic volumes 
during an evacuation and to have the capacity for emergency vehicles to enter 
affected areas. 
 
4.8.1.6 Deaths 
 
Tables 4-8 demonstrate the severity of Australian bushfires, which become a threat 
during summer months. Table 4-9, shows that the 2009 Victorian bushfire was only 
second to cyclone Mahina in severity, which killed more than 400 people. 
 
Table 4-8: Bushfires in Australia involving major house loss (>100 losses per event, since 1939) 
 
(Leonard 1999; Ellis 2004) 
 
Table 4-9: Deaths from Australia’s natural disasters 
 
(Cameron et al. 2009) 
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4.8.2 Post-disaster Analysis of Bushfires in Victoria 
 
Table 4-10 shows the factors that were identified by respective Country Fire 
Authority (CFA) chiefs during their management and review of Victorian bushfires. 
It highlights a similar pattern of ‘non-compliance’. During the period 1999–2009, 
some of the items that are highlighted as important were never actioned and therefore 
were captured during the following fire season. This is not a good outcome for land 
use development management or planning. These issues need to be addressed via 
strategies and policies rather than ad-hoc actions. 
 
Table 4-10: Post-disaster review findings on Australian bushfires 
 
 
In reference to Table 4-10, the post-disaster review findings for Australian bushfires 
clearly demonstrate gaps in processes and policies. Major gaps identified through the 
analysis of bushfire case studies are shown in the table, with one notable finding 
being that there are many recommendations, yet almost none have been implemented. 
After the 2009 Victorian Bushfires, a Royal Commission was appointed to analyse all 
the gaps and it identified improvements to strategies, policies, infrastructure 
maintenance practices, communication procedures, work practices and processes. 
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Gap 1 
Bushfires occur periodically in Australia. Many authorities use ‘existing bushfire 
prevention strategies and policies’ to mitigate bushfire risks and carry out required 
action plans ‘before, during and after’ fires. After a bushfire, a review is carried out to 
ascertain what worked and to identify any issues. During this reviewing process, 
many recommendations are highlighted. The summary of all past bushfire 
recommendations in Figure 4-17 highlights that recommendations are the same for 
most bushfires. Therefore, the existing ‘gap’ is not properly implementing 
recommendations into policies and action plans. 
 
Gap 2 
Many residential developments have begun occurring in peri-urban areas, which are 
at high risk from natural hazards. Councils’ structure plans identify these areas for 
future residential growth. One ‘gap’ identified in this assessment is that councils fail 
to stop these developments in high-risk areas through policies, strategies and structure 
plans. 
 
Gap 3 
Responsibilities for all aspects of bushfire management are fragmented and are 
distributed to a few selected authorities to perform during such hazards. Because of 
inadequate overall control of these actions, many required processes are either not 
carried out on time or at all. This has resulted in many deaths and property damage. 
 
Gap 4 
New developments occur in peri-urban areas and are coordinated through private 
consultants. Councils fail to provide strategies and policies for these new 
developments. For example, road alignments that run into a residential development 
only address a few criteria during the design stages: for example, consideration of a 
low speed, narrow road section and justification of this on the basis of existing 
standards, which take into consideration the number of dwellings and so on. What 
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this process fails to consider is that during a disaster event, this road alignment may 
be inadequate for evacuations and for emergency services to enter the area at the 
same time. 
 
Gap 5 
Communication issues are identified in the recommendations. The same technical 
problems occur during every bushfire and many lives are lost because of this 
important item. The responsible authorities fail to understand the required technical 
capacities and difficulties, and to resolve them. 
 
Gap 6 
Evacuation takes place voluntarily and through responsible authorities. During these 
evacuations, people are asked to leave high-risk areas, but are not given a safe place 
to stay and fail secure their properties during the disaster. Strategic planning fails to 
identify areas for evacuation and to allocate adequate facilities to residents. 
 
Gap 7 
Emergency services fail to address these issues and be accountable for the necessary 
works. These services should be in a position to request required emergency access 
through proper design changes to the road alignment. 
 
145 
 
Figure 4-17: Bushfire event and post-disaster review findings 
 
4.9 Case Study 4-2: 7 February 2009 Black Saturday Bushfires, 
Victoria 
4.9.1 Introduction 
 
Analysis of specific case study indicates some further gaps in decision-making 
processes. Bushfire is a natural occurrence in Australia during the summer months. 
Australian living patterns have changed, with communities choosing to live close to 
or within forest boundaries. Chen and McAneney (2004) and Balcombe (2006) 
highlighted that this type of peri-urban living brings high risk to communities. 
McAneney (2005) showed that annually, an average of 83 homes are damaged with 
an estimated annual average damage cost of AU$33.5 million. 
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 Figure 4-18: ‘Black Saturday’ bushfires of 2009 
(The Australian ‘Black Saturday’ Bushfires of 2009, 23 November 2009) 
 
The Black Saturday bushfires were considered the worst bushfires to hit Victoria in 
recorded history. Wind speeds reached over 100 km/h, the Fire Danger Index value 
was 328, with a ‘fire intensity’ of 80,000 kW/m. The fires killed 173 people and 
hospitalised many more. Approximately 2,000 homes and buildings in 78 townships 
were destroyed. Residents trying to evacuate were trapped by burning trees alongside 
winding roads and damaged CI systems blocking roads. The Australian Government 
contributed $200 million towards rebuilding damaged community CI and supporting 
community programs. The 2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission—Interim 
Report (2009) stated that three agencies are responsible for suppressing fires in 
Victoria: the CFA, Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE) and the 
Metropolitan Fire Brigade. 
 
The CFA and DSE attended a large number of fires on 7 February 2009, as 
summarised in Table 4-11. Many factors contributed to the massive bushfires that 
caused the devastation summarised above. Low rainfall was one factor. The 2009 
Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission—Interim Report (2009) highlights the 
following.  
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 Figure 4-19: January 2009–Victorian rainfall 
 
 
 
Figure 4-20: February 2009–Victorian rainfall deciles  
 
Figure 4-19 Show the rainfall in January 2009 and Figure 4-20 shows February 2009 
rainfall map. The two figures clearly shows that Victoria was experiencing drought 
conditions in 2009. 
 
Similarly Figure 4-21 show the Victorian annual mean temperatures between 1910 
and 2008. It shows an increase in the temperature. 
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 Figure 4-21: Victorian annual mean temperature (1910–2008) 
  
Figure 4-22, show the wind direction patterns which resulted in many deaths. 
 
Figure 4-22: Wind change on 7 February 2009 
(2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission—Interim Report 2009) 
 
Table 4-11: Bushfire incidents attended by CFA and DSE 
 Responsible 
Agency 
Incidents responded Grass, Scrub, tree, vegetation 
or plantation fires 
CFA 632 199 
DSE 117  
(2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission—Interim Report 2009) 
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The Royal Commission investigated 15 fires: the Delburn, Bunyip, Kilmore East, 
Horsham, Coleraine, Pomborneit–Weerite, Churchill, Murrindindi, Redesdale, Narre 
Warren (Harkaway, Coral Drive and Golf Club Road fires), Upper Ferntree Gully, 
Bendigo and Beechworth–Mudgegonga fires. The fire indices and devastation are 
captured in Table 4-12. 
 
 
Figure 4-23: Average fire intensity on 7 February 2009 
(2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission—Interim Report 2009, p. 47) 
Kw/m - Kilowatts per meter 
FFDI -Forest Fire Dander Index  
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Table 4-12: Impact of fire 
 
 
As shown in Figure 4-24, two of the contributing factors were high winds speeds and 
the maximum Fire Danger Index. 
 
 
Figure 4-24: Fire conditions and the impact on people 
 
Kilmore East recorded the highest wind speeds and highest Fire Danger Index, which 
contributed to the 119 deaths and 232 casualties. The Murrindindi fire caused the 
second highest number of deaths, at 40. 
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4.9.2 Road-related Deaths 
 
During the 2009 Victorian bushfires and similar to previous bushfires, the post-fire 
assessment of deaths indicated that people are still making decisions with respect to 
their own safety. The results show that approximately 14% of the deaths occurred as 
people were trying to evacuate during the hazard, and died on the road or nearby. The 
policy of evacuation was not clear and has been identified as an area needing 
improvement. There were three types of people: those who decided not to evacuate; 
those who could not evacuate; and those who did evacuate. People who did evacuate 
still faced issues, and some died. In the other two groups, some died even when they 
were prepared, and others died leaving too late. People made decisions based on their 
knowledge about the surrounding situation and the road network, which did not 
facilitate their safety. 
 
Of the fatalities among people evacuating, 10% occurred as the person was trying to 
evacuate on foot and 4% died while using a vehicle. Community fatalities could be 
categorised into three areas; did not evacuate, could not evacuate and evacuated. 
Some 20% intended to stay and defend their properties and 14% died because of poor 
preparation. A few died being well prepared; 38% made no preparations to stay or 
leave and 58% of these died. Figure 4-25 was prepared to assess deaths and where 
they took place. 
 
Some community members could not evacuate for the following reasons: they could 
not find transport, the roads were congested or blocked, there were road drainage 
issues or debris on their road, their vehicle failed or they undertook poor evacuation 
planning or poor decision making to evacuate. The road network is critical during 
disaster evacuations. Road alignment, road width and vegetation along the road 
reserve contribute towards the hazard during a bushfire. Vegetation catches fire; there 
is smoke that obscures visibility for motorists and road alignment compounds the 
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difficulties. 
 
Figure 4-25: 2009 Victorian bushfire death analysis 
(Prepared using 2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission—Interim Report 2009) 
 
4.9.3 Analysis of the 2009 Fires 
 
The Royal Commission investigated 15 fires: the Delburn, Bunyip, Kilmore East, 
Horsham, Coleraine, Pomborneit–Weerite, Churchill, Murrindindi, Redesdale, Narre 
Warren (Harkaway, Coral Drive and Golf Club Road fires), Upper Ferntree Gully, 
Bendigo and Beechworth–Mudgegonga fires. The following information on each of 
these fires was sourced from the 2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission—Interim 
Report (2009).  
 
4.9.3.1 Delburn Fire Impact 
Fire intensity is shown as Kilowatts per meter (kW/m), which is the energy that is 
released per meter of fire edge. As shown in Figure 4-23, the Victorian bushfires, 
recorded the FDI which was at the highest. And the Forest Fire Dander Index (FFDI) 
states the rate of spread of the fire.  
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 The first fire in the Delburn area (Ashford’s fire) was reported on 28 January at 4 pm. 
The temperature that day reached 45.1°C and the Fire Danger Index (FDI) was 52. 
On the following day, two more fires erupted (Creamery Road fire and Darlimurla 
fire). At around 7 pm, the Ashford’s and Creamery Road fires joined. As shown, 
these fires erupted in four different areas and three of them joined together. The three 
fires cut many north-oriented roads including Mirboo North–Trafalgar Road and 
Strzelecki Highway to the north and south-west. No deaths or casualties were 
recorded. On 30 January, the fires came within ½ km of the Boolara Township. The 
fires destroyed 44 houses and burnt 6,534 Ha of land. The fire was contained on 3 
February. 
 
 
Figure 4-26: Delburn fire 
(2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission—Interim Report 2009) 
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Figure 4-27: Delburn fire–distances to townships and roads 
(2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission—Interim Report 2009) 
 
4.9.3.2 Bunyip Fire Impact 
 
Within the Bunyip State Park, there were 17 reported fires between 2 and 4 February. 
The recorded maximum temperature was 44.6°C with low humidity of 8% and wind 
speeds reached 57 km/hr with a Fire Danger Index of 110. There were no deaths but 
there were two casualties; 31 houses were destroyed and 26,200 Ha of land burnt. 
The Princes Freeway was affected near the township of Drouin West. The other 
townships, Neerim Junction, Tonimbuk, Jindivick and Longwarry, were within 2–4 
km from the fire front. On 15 May, the fire was declared safe. 
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Figure 4-28: Bunyip fire 
(2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission—Interim Report 2009) 
 
 
Figure 4-29: Bunyip fire extent 
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 Figure 4-30: Bunyip fire and road network 
(Source: CFA Annual Report 2009) 
 
4.9.3.3 Kilmore East Fire Impact 
 
This fire spanned four local government areas (Shires of Nillumbik, Mitchell, Yarra 
Ranges and Whittlesea). The maximum recorded temperature was 42.5°C, with wind 
speeds up to 72 km/h. The first fire was identified on 7 February at 11.19 am and was 
contained on 16 February. This fire is considered the worst of the fires as it killed 119 
people, injured 232 more, destroyed 31 houses and burnt 125,383 Ha. Most of the 
north–south and east–west highways, such as the Melba Highway, Whittlesea–Yea 
Road, Whittlesea–Kinglake Road, Healesville–Kinglake Road and Heidelberg–
Kinglake Road were cut off by the bushfire. 
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 Figure 4-31: Kilmore East fire 
(2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission—Interim Report 2009) 
 
4.9.3.4 Horsham Fire Impact 
 
There were no deaths or casualties, but 13 houses were destroyed and 2,346 Ha burnt. 
The Horsham Township was lucky to escape the fire, which moved southward, away 
from the township. The fire effectively cut off the southern connector roads from the 
township. From the origin of the fire to Horsham Township, the direct distance is ~6 
km. If the fire had moved in an easterly direction, it would have reached Horsham 
Township in 7.5 minutes, as its travelling speed was 50 km/h. 
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 Figure 4-32: Horsham fire 
(2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission—Interim Report 2009) 
 
4.9.3.5 Coleraine Fire Impact 
 
The Fire Danger Index was 100, there were wind speeds of 40 km/h and the wind 
changed direction to the east at 12.55 pm. The direction of the moving fire is shown 
as a ‘red’ arrow. There were no fatalities, but one injury; one house was destroyed 
and 713 Ha of land burnt. The fire came to within 2.5 km of the township. The fire 
cut many north-oriented roads, such as Coleraine–Edenhope Road, Coleraine–
Balmoral Road and one of the main roads (Glenelg Highway) to the west within 10 
minutes of it starting. Glenelg Highway continues past the town (as Casterton Road 
and Whyte Street) in a south-east direction and becomes Hamilton Road. 
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 Figure 4-33: Coleraine fire 
(2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission—Interim Report 2009) 
 
4.9.3.6 Pomborneit–Weerite Fire Impact 
 
There were no fatalities or injuries to humans and no houses were destroyed, but the 
fire burnt 1,008 Ha of land. 
 
 
Figure 4-34: Pomborneit–Weerite fire 
(2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission—Interim Report 2009) 
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4.9.3.7 Murrindindi Fire Impact 
 
There were 40 deaths and 73 injuries, 538 houses were destroyed and 168,542 Ha 
burnt. The road alignment is windy and surrounded by trees and vegetation within the 
road reserve. Fire destroyed properties within a 35-km range. 
 
 
Figure 4-35: Murrindindi fire radius 
(2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission—Interim Report 2009) 
 
Figure 4-36: Murrindindi fire and townships 
(2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission—Interim Report 2009) 
161 
4.9.3.8 Churchill Fire Impact 
 
There were 11 deaths and 35 injuries, 145 houses were destroyed and 25,861 Ha 
burnt. Fire affected the townships of Koornalla, Callignee North, Callignee, Callignee 
South, Le Roy, Jeeralang North and Balook. Other townships were within 4 km of the 
fire front. The blue arrows show the direction of the fires. 
 
 
Figure 4-37: Churchill fire radius 
(2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission—Interim Report 2009) 
 
4.9.3.9 Redesdale Fire Impact 
 
There were no deaths and one injury; 14 houses destroyed and 7,086 Ha of land 
burnt. 
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 Figure 4-38: Redesdale fire radius 
(2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission—Interim Report 2009) 
 
4.9.3.10 Upper Ferntree Gully Fire Impact 
 
The Narre Warren fires were too close to urban residential developments. Key routes 
were affected, as were people. The road network shown here includes standard 
freeway roads. The bushfires were too close and cut off the routes to these high-order 
roads. 
 
 
Figure 4-39: Harkaway fire 
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Figure 4-40: Lynbrook–Coral Drive fire 
 
 
Figure 4-41: Upper Ferntree Gully Fire 
(2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission—Interim Report 2009) 
 
4.9.3.11 Bendigo Fire Impact 
 
There was one fatality and 41 injuries, with 58 houses destroyed and 341 Ha of land 
burnt. 
 
Figure 4-42: Bendigo fire 
(2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission—Interim Report 2009) 
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4.9.3.12 Beechworth–Mudgegonga Fire Impact 
 
There were two fatalities and 12 people injured; 38 houses were destroyed and 33,577 
Ha of land burn. Rosewhite, Kancoona South and Kancoona were also within the fire 
perimeter. All of the highlighted towns were within 4–6 km of the fire front. 
 
 
Figure 4-43: Beechworth–Mudgegonga fire 
(2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission—Interim Report 2009) 
 
4.9.4 Summary of Case Study 4-2: 7 February 2009 Black Saturday Bushfires, 
Victoria 
 
This case study highlights the fact that the bushfires in this period affected 78 
townships and killed 173 people. The fires that erupted moved at very high speeds 
and affected townships, destroying buildings and livestock—killing many people in 
the process. The impact of a bushfire is deadly. As shown in the above reviews, some 
fires came to within a few kilometres of residential areas and in some cases, the fire 
front was a few kilometres from the urban fringe. The road network was winding and 
ran through forest vegetation. The roadside vegetation was not maintained or 
removed because of gaps in policy. The 2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission 
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Report (2009) highlighted approximately 64 recommendations; its actions remain 
uncompleted. 
 
4.9.4.1 Gaps in Decision Making Identified 
 
• As observed by Chen and McAneney (2004) and Balcombe (2006), peri-
urban living brings high risk to communities. This is a major gap to be 
addressed in land use development planning. 
• McAneney (2005) study showed that annually, an average 83 homes are 
damaged with an estimated annual average damage cost of AU$33.5 million. 
Building construction techniques need to be linked to land use planning. 
• The policy of evacuation was not clear and has been identified as needing 
improvement. The analysis results in Section 4.9.3 show that approximately 
14% of deaths occurred on the road or nearby during attempts to evacuate 
during the hazard. 
• The road alignment, road width and vegetation along the road reserve 
contribute towards the hazard during a bushfire. 
• People make decisions on the basis of knowledge about the surrounding 
situation and the road network. However, the road network was not designed 
for evacuation. 
• Road-related deaths as identified in Figure 4-25 were due to road blockages 
and damage to roads, which should have been addressed during the land 
development stages. 
• The inability of some community members to evacuate was caused by the 
following: they could not find transport, the roads were congested or 
blocked, there were road drainage issues, they experienced vehicle failure, 
there was debris on the road and they displayed poor evacuation planning and 
poor decision making to evacuate. 
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• Poor evacuation planning was in part because of making decisions with less 
information about the situation. 
• Fires cut exit roads and trapped people. The lack of redundancy provided 
during the design of road networks is a major issue. 
• Some fires, such as the Kilmore East fire, spread across four local government 
areas. This complicated decision making with regard to firefighting and 
evacuation planning. This was the worst fire, as it killed 119 people and 
injured 232 people. 
• The Murrindindi fire was the second worst fire, killing 40 people and injuring 
73. The winding road alignment surrounded by trees and vegetation within 
the road reserve prevented safe passage for evacuees. 
• Road reserve vegetation contributed to road fatalities, because of smoke. 
• The distance between the fire front and the township at one point was less 
than 2.5 km because of peri-urban living. 
 
4.10 Case Study 4-3: Bushfire Threat to the Breamlea Township 
 
Another important gap identified is development approvals in high-risk bushfire 
areas. This case study demonstrates issues in these areas. 
 
4.10.1 Introduction 
 
Breamlea Township (approximately 142 Ha) is a small township located 
approximately 30 km south of Geelong (Breamlea Foreshore Master Plan and 
Management Plan 2009). This unique town is set atop a foreshore sand dune. The 
coastal topography is formed from high sand dunes that form a ridge at the back of 
the beach from near Point Impossible to the lava flows at Black Rocks. This dune 
system has caused Thompson Creek to meander to the west and discharge near Point 
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Impossible and has also caused the development of extensive salt and freshwater 
marshes in the poorly drained area to the north of the dunes; it is bordered on all sides 
by environmentally sensitive swamp lands and coastal foreshore. 
 
4.10.2 Demographics 
 
The Breamlea Township is a popular tourist destination area during summer months. 
It has 259 (55%) permanent residents, 104 occupied residential properties, a caravan 
park with 165 sites, Bancoora Lifesaving Club and a recreation reserve. Results of a 
survey conducted for the Bellarine Peninsula Community Service Plan 2006–2016 (p. 
32) revealed that 9.26% of the population is aged over 65 years, 71% of the 
respondents travel by car to work daily and 32% identified the need to improve roads. 
 
4.10.3 Impact 
 
During a bushfire, wind speeds and wind direction changes affect the shape of the fire 
front, the rate of spread and the behaviour of the fire. During the 7 February 2009 
Victorian bushfires, a south-westerly wind changed direction and the long, narrow, 
cigar-shaped fire was pushed into a fire front several kilometres wide, which killed 
173 people (2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission, Volume II: Fire 
Preparation, Response and Recovery, Chapter 1 Victoria’s Bushfire Safety Policy 
2009, p. 35). The draft updated Breamlea Community Fire Management Plan 
(BCFMP) study report organised by the CoGG stated that Breamlea’s weather 
patterns are somewhat similar to typical fire weather patterns for south-eastern 
Australia. Similar fire weather patterns were observed during 16 February 1983 Ash 
Wednesday Bushfires, which killed 75 people; these fires continued to occur 
approximately 30 km from Breamlea Township. The 2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal 
Commission Report (2009) listed Breamlea Township as one of the most bushfire-
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prone townships in the state. 
 
 
Figure 4-44: Regional Location of Bellarine 
 
 
Figure 4-45: Regional location of Breamlea 
(Bellarine Peninsula Land Use & Residential Lot Supply Report 2005) 
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4.10.4 Planning Responsibilities 
 
The CoGG MSS sets out planning directions for the municipality and its planning 
schemes provide the structure to this township. The Breamlea and foreshore areas are 
managed by multiple state authorities. The foreshore and dune area is managed by the 
CoGG; Parks Victoria manages the majority of the salt marsh area; and Barwon 
Water manages the foreshore towards Black Rock (Bellarine Peninsula Land Use & 
Residential Lot Supply Report 2005, p. 23). 
 
As shown in Figure 4-46, the residential area is surrounded by vegetation and has 
only one winding road connection in and out of the settlement. 
 
 
Figure 4-46: Breamlea planning map   
 
As shown in Figure 4-47, the township is surrounded by vegetation one side and the 
waters to the south. This restricts any free accessibility into or out of this area. 
 
170 
 
Figure 4-47: Breamlea geographical map 
(Bellarine Peninsula Land Use & Residential Lot Supply Report 2005) 
 
Figure 4-48: Excerpt from Breamlea Land Management Plan 
(Draft Report–Breamlea Foreshore Master Plan and Management Plan Update, August 2009) 
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Figure 4-48, identifies all agencies who are responsible for land management and 
states each agency’s works and actions. 
The Breamlea Foreshore Master Plan and Management Plan identified the CoGG 
planning schemes, overlays, planning acts, action plans and strategies outlined in 
Table 4-13. 
 
Table 4-13: CoGG planning schemes, overlays, planning acts, action plans and strategies 
Breamlea planning Schemes and 
Overlays 
Breamlea 
Planning Acts 
Breamlea Action 
Plans 
Breamlea 
Strategies 
The majority of public open space 
at Breamlea including the 
foreshore is zoned Public 
Conservation and Resource Zone 
(PCRZ). 
Aboriginal 
Heritage Act 
2006 
Victorian Coastal 
Strategy 2008 
Thompson Creek 
Estuary Opening 
Environmental Significance 
Overlays (ESO2) – covers wetland 
areas along Thompson Creek and 
is designed to protect sensitive 
flora and habitat values associated 
with the creek. 
Coastal 
Management 
Act 1995 
Central West Victoria 
Regional Coastal 
Action Plan (2003) 
Breamlea 
Holiday Park 
Future Strategy 
(2009-2014) 
Environmental Significance 
Overlays (ESO1) – Conserve and 
protect areas of flora and fauna 
habitat, geological and natural 
interest 
Crown Land 
(Reserves) 
Act 1978 
Siting and Design 
Guidelines for 
Structures on the 
Victorian Coast(1998) 
Draft Updated 
Breamlea 
Community Fire 
Management 
Plan (2005) 
The residential area of Breamlea is 
the Township Zone (TZ)  
Heritage Act 
1995 
Central West Victoria 
Estuaries Coastal 
Action Plan(2005) 
Biodiversity 
Strategy (2003) 
Breamlea Recreation Reserve is 
zoned as Public Park and 
Recreation Zone (PPRZ) 
 Corangamite Wetland 
Strategy (2006) 
Bellarine 
Peninsula 
Strategic Plan 
(2006) 
Design and Development Overlay 
(DDO14) -which requires a permit 
for buildings above 7.5m in 
height. 
  Domestic 
Animal 
Management 
Plan (2008) 
The Barwon Water Black Rock 
Sewerage Treatment Plant is 
zoned Public Use Zone – Service 
and Utility (PUZ1). 
   
Heritage Overlay (HO57)    
 (Draft Report–Breamlea Foreshore Master Plan and Management Plan Update August 2009) 
 
Figure 4-48 is taken from the Breamlea Foreshore Master Plan and Management 
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Plan and shows all agencies with management responsibilities. This small township 
has approximately 10 different authorities with respective responsibilities for 
managing this township, who need to integrate their works accordingly. The City of 
Geelong and Surfcoast Shire are two Victorian local councils. Some are state 
authorities, which action state priorities. 
  
4.10.5 Impact on Residential Dwellings 
 
The BCFMP report identified that small residential allotments and houses that are 
located close to trees and overhanging branches would be exposed to direct flame 
contact and ember attack in this area. In Breamlea, most of the houses are constructed 
close to existing trees and foliage. Many are constructed close to overhanging 
branches, which could allow direct flame contact and expose these buildings to ember 
attack, which is the primary mode of house destruction. 
 
4.10.6 Water Supply During a Bushfire Event 
 
The BCFMP report summarised the findings in a report commissioned by the CFA 
and conducted by Fire Methods Pty Ltd on 10 February 2005 into the capacity of the 
water supply system to fire hydrants in Breamlea Township. The report showed that 
the township’s existing water hydrant capacity complies with the subdivision 
guidelines (flow rate of 270 L/min) and that hydrant flow is capable of providing 
water from the mains to control a single structure fire. However, water supplies 
would not be adequate to supply water during a bushfire event; several fire hydrants 
are not easily accessible to brigade vehicles because of poor maintenance of the area; 
and existing water supply mains would not be able to provide water during prolonged 
and extensive firefighting events. 
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4.10.7 Fuel Management During a Bushfire Event 
 
The BCFMP report stated that assessment of three sample sites showed that the 
average fuel load of vegetation in the study area was an estimated 27 t/Ha. 
 
4.10.8 Fire Brigade Capacity During a Bushfire Event 
 
The BCFMP report stated that the CFA Brigade responsible for Breamlea is the 
Connewarre Brigade. Support services are from the nearby suburbs of Barwon Heads, 
Grovedale and Ocean Grove. It was found that Connewarre Brigade has an 
approximately 7-minute road travel response time. This turnout allowance time might 
range from 12–20 minutes, which is acceptable according to rural CFA standards. 
Therefore, it was estimated that the arrival time to Breamlea would be 12–20 minutes. 
In addition to the CFA, accessibility is required for services such as the police, State 
Emergency Service and medical services (ambulances). The study also highlighted 
that bushfires are successfully attacked or controlled within the first 20 minutes of 
ignition. It would take almost 20 minutes for the ground crews to arrive at Breamlea. 
 
 
Figure 4-49: Breamlea Land Management Plan map 
(Breamlea Community Information Guide–January 2015 V4) 
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4.10.9 Road Design, Access and Evacuation 
 
Direct access to Breamlea is similar to the access infrastructure facilities in 
Marysville in the Central Highlands of Victoria, with only one way in and one way 
out (Figure 4-49). During the Black Saturday bushfires, most of the residents died in 
Marysville Township. The BCFMP study identified similarities such as small 
winding roads and vegetation along roadsides. In Breamlea, most access roads are 
winding and are unsealed with steep gradients up onto the sand dunes. To control a 
bushfire, rapid access for firefighting vehicles requires have wider roads, a clearance 
height of approximately 4 m, appropriate road surface condition, accessibility to the 
slopes and access to water and resources. The 2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal 
Commission Report stated that roads act as fuel breaks and more importantly allow 
access and egress during bushfires for authorities and residents (2009 Victorian 
Bushfire Royal Commission, Volume II: Fire Preparation, Response and Recovery, 
Chapter 7: Land and Fuel Management, p. 232). 
 
The BCFMP report identified that the following issues restrict firefighting vehicle 
accessibility to the town: 
• the single-access road into Breamlea Township 
• narrow roads, most of which are unsealed 
• obstructed access caused by vegetation overhanging along main roads 
• poor accessibility to fire hydrants 
• lack of facilities to create formal designated ‘Fire Refuge Areas’ within or 
adjacent to Breamlea Township. 
 
The BCFMP report highlighted the fire management issues in Figure 4-50. The report 
further identified that roadside vegetation, single-access winding roads, steeply 
graded streets and high fuel loads pose an immense threat to firefighters. 
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Figure 4-50: Fire prevention and potential impact of fire 
(BCFMP report) 
 
4.10.10 Breamlea Traffic Management 
 
The resilience of a township depends on many factors. The transport sector is one 
important element that is highly used during disaster events. There are no public 
transport connections into Breamlea Township. School bus pick up and drop off 
occurs near the caravan park. There are seven streets in the township of which 
Horwood Drive represents the longest segment of roadway, at approximately 1.6 km. 
Blyth Street runs parallel to Horwood Drive and is disconnected in the middle, 
connecting back to Horwood Drive at Scott Street (68 m), Green Street (50 m), 
Whittington Street (114 m) and Vagg Street (190 m). These four small streets are 
sealed with kerbing to one side; Blyth Street is unsealed and winding. 
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4.10.11 Pre-Disaster Review of Evacuation Plan Analysis for a ‘Randomly 
Selected Property’ (#101) in Breamlea 
All the streets in the township are affected by trees growing within the road reserve 
and in the clear zones. Three properties on Horwood Drive (# 97–101) have access to 
Scott Street via the recreation reserve, along an unconstructed dirt track that becomes 
muddy during the winter months. Figure 4-51 shows the point of origin of the fire or 
the continuation of the fire front from the west (red hazard icon) and the arrows 
depict the direction of travel of the fire. Figure 4-52 shows the estimated time taken 
to reach property #101 according to the ‘speed of travel’ of the fire front. 
 
 
Figure 4-51: Breamlea area and the direction of fire 
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Figure 4-52: Fire movement and evacuation speed 
 
Table 4-14: Estimated evacuation times 
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Table 4-15: Bushfire travelling speeds and times 
 
 
Table 4-16: Evacuation time to Torquay Road vs. bushfire travelling times at different speeds 
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4.10.12 Summary of Case Study 4-3—Bushfire Threat to Breamlea Township, 
Geelong, Victoria 
 
As shown in this study, there are many responsible agencies with their own respective 
management responsibilities. To date, not many major changes have been carried out 
to the road network surrounding the town. This is mainly because residents prefer to 
retain the natural ambience of the area. As seen in Tables 4-14 4-15 and 4-16, the 
travel time of bushfires has an impact on during an emergency situation. Road 
carriageway widths contribute to congestion along these roads and paths. There is a 
need to review the existing road network to improve the safety of residents in this 
suburb. The only positive is that the probability of a bushfire occurring is remote; 
however, if it does occur, the devastation is expected to be huge and catastrophic. The 
whole township may suffer from a single bushfire. 
 
4.11 The Questionnaire to Local Governments of Victoria, Australia 
 
After compiling the outcome of the case studies, a questionnaire was developed to 
capture the input of local government practitioners. The process for preparing the 
questions was as follows: 
• A review was carried out of past natural disasters and key areas were 
identified that affect transport infrastructure and community resilience. 
• A review was carried out of existing strategies and policies in relation to the 
above areas. 
• A review of Victorian bushfire impacts was performed through case studies, 
as presented in this chapter. 
• Impacts, gaps in practices and resource constraints were identified. 
• All 79 Victorian local government councils were selected. 
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• A questionnaire survey was developed to capture the opinions of local 
government practitioners operating in disaster-prone areas and other areas of 
Victoria. 
• Each question was rated from ‘5’ being the most important to ‘1’, being the 
lowest importance. 
• The questionnaire was sent out to the 79 local councils and 21 responses to 
the survey were received from councils an areas prone to disasters. 
• The responses received allowed triangulation of data from case studies using 
another source of the same data. 
 
The replies were tabulated (see Table 4-17) and the ratings highlight the gaps in 
strategy, policy and planning by federal, state and local governments. The full 
questionnaire is provided in Appendix 13. The average ratings for importance given 
by the local government representatives are presented in the table. 
 
4.11.1 Analysis of the Questionnaire to Victorian Local Government 
Practitioners 
 
Table 4.17 captures the opinions on five distinct topic of local government 
practitioners: 
1. the average of ratings given by local government practitioners 
2. whether the impact is before, during or after a disaster 
3. the area of impact 
4. two areas: the group with accountability and responsibility; and what type of 
document is required, such  as a policy, strategy or planning mechanism (the 
ratings were applied by the researcher based on the previous analysis of 
planning processes) 
5. the group with ultimate responsibility and the type of document. 
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1.16 
Decisions made at planning 
stages impact the resilience of 
transport infrastructure. 
3.69 o   X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
g
y   
1.17 
Pre-planning required to 
provide resources to clear 
blocked roadways during a 
disaster. 
3.63 o   X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
1.18 
 Disaster evacuation lead 
decision maker need to 
understand the nature of the 
impact. 
4.19 
 o    X  X  X  5 4    4 Fe
de
ra
l 
       
Pl
an
ni
ng
  
1.19 
Informal land use development 
within high risk areas are seen 
as one of the main problems, 
creating high risk to 
communities worldwide during 
disasters. 
3.88 o   X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
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1.20 
Land use development 
decisions impact communities. 
 
4.5 o     X     5 5 5 4 3 3 Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
 
Lo
ca
l  
Po
lic
y 
 
   
1.21 
Any land use developments, 
such as, residential 
developments should not be 
approved in high risk areas. 
3.31 o   X X  X    5 4 4 5 4 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
    
Po
lic
y 
 
   
1.22 
Bushfires are frequent 
occurrences in Australia during 
summer months. Peri-urban 
living brings high risk to 
communities. 
3.94 o   X X X X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
 
    
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
1.23 
Awareness of disaster impacts 
are limited due to short falls in 
research about the impending 
disaster. 
2.81 o   X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
1.24 
Disaster evacuation decision 
making depends on the type of 
disaster, magnitude of disaster, 
4.31 o        X  5 5 5 4 4 5 Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
 
Lo
ca
l  
   
Pl
an
ni
ng
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geographical location, 
community impacted, available 
resources to counter the threat, 
and available time. 
1.25 
Transport infrastructure should 
be designed to accommodate 
the present and future traffic 
demands. 
4.25 o   X X  X X   5 4 4 4 5 3 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
1.26 
Transport infrastructure is one 
of the main critical 
infrastructure systems that 
contribute to the resilience of a 
community in the event of a 
disaster. 
3.94 o   X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
1.27 
Limitations to transport 
infrastructure create a 
cascading effect on 
environmental and other critical 
infrastructure systems. 
 
3.94 o   X X  X    5 5 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
 
    
St
ra
te
gy
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1.28 
Having alternative exit routes 
for evacuation is a good 
practice. 
 
4.31 o   X X X X X   5 5 5 4 5 5 Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
 
Lo
ca
l 
  
St
ra
te
gy
 
Pl
an
ni
ng
  
1.29  
There is a need for accurate 
traffic volume estimates prior to 
disasters within high risk areas. 
 
3.56 o   X X  X    5 5 5 5 4 5 Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
 
 
Pl
an
ni
ng
  
1.30 
Transport network expansion 
and transport infrastructure are 
required for urban sprawl. 
 
4.13 o   X X X X X X  5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
 
    
St
ra
te
gy
 
 
1.31 
There is a need for transport 
infrastructure protection 
methods and planning. 
 
3.94 o   X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
1.32 
Resilience of transport 
infrastructure reduces the 
impact and magnitude of the 
disaster on community. 
3.75 o   X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
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1.33 
Transport corridors are key 
components of transport 
infrastructure. 
 
4.31 o   X X X X  X  5 4 4 5   Fe
de
ra
l 
  
Po
lic
y 
  
1.34 
Transport corridor planning 
need to address future demands 
on the network due to land use 
planning and developments. 
4.44 o   X X  X X   5 5 3 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
 
  
Po
lic
y 
 
   
1.35 
New transport corridor links 
needs to be identified through 
transport corridor planning to 
provide for gaps in the existing 
network. 
4.13 o   X X X X X X  5 5 5 5 4 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
 
Lo
ca
l  
Po
lic
y 
 
  
1.36 
A major gap identified in the 
current transport corridor 
planning process is the lack of 
consideration for evacuation 
scenarios during a disaster. 
3.63 o   X X  X    5 5 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
 
    
St
ra
te
gy
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1.37 
Critical infrastructure is 
periodically subject to 
degradation due to natural and 
artificial disasters, accidents 
and maintenance and repairs. 
3.88 o   X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
1.38 
Road reserves provides for 
critical infrastructure. 
 
 
3.69 o   X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
1.39 
Any impact on the road system 
/ network will have a cascading 
impact /effect on critical 
infrastructure which will in turn 
impact the society. 
3.69 o   X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
1.40 
Road blockages due to fallen 
debris and transport 
infrastructure capacities are not 
anticipated or considered 
during pre-disaster planning 
stages. 
2.75 o   X X  X    5 5 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
 
    
St
ra
te
gy
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1.41 
There is a need to manage road 
network to improve road safety 
to all road users. 
4.4 o   X X  X X   5 5 3 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
 
  
Po
lic
y 
 
   
1.42 
Inability to evacuate due to 
road alignment, road width and 
road capacities. 
 
3.19 o   X X  X X   5 5 5 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
 
Lo
ca
l  
  
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
1.43 
Lack of emergency access is an 
issue during a disaster. 3.75 o   X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
1.44 
Poor road design and 
maintenance creates 
congestion, bottle necks and 
increase the incidents of road 
accidents, create disruptions to 
emergency vehicle accessibility 
and evacuations. 
4 o   X X X X X X  5 5 4 4 5 5 Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
 
    
St
ra
te
gy
 
Pl
an
ni
ng
  
 
Q
ue
st
io
n 
N
um
be
r a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 im
po
rt
an
ce
 
ra
tin
g 
IMPORTANCE RATINGS 
INDICATED BY LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS OF 
VICTORIA, AUSTRALIA 
Av
er
ag
e 
ra
tin
g 
of
 i
m
po
rt
an
ce
 g
iv
en
 b
y 
th
e 
Lo
ca
l G
ov
er
nm
en
t e
xp
er
ts
 
Analysed and Rated by Author 
WHEN IT 
SHOULD 
BE 
MONITOR
ED 
Cr
iti
ca
l I
nf
ra
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
Tr
an
sp
or
t I
nf
ra
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
Re
sil
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 
La
nd
 U
se
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t D
ec
is
io
ns
 
Tr
an
sp
or
t P
la
nn
in
g 
Ro
ad
 D
es
ig
n 
Di
sa
st
er
 R
es
ili
en
ce
 P
la
nn
in
g 
an
d 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
Co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
an
d 
Co
or
di
na
tio
n 
Ke
y 
Re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y 
Ra
tin
gs
 o
f F
ed
er
al
[F
], 
St
at
e[
S]
 a
nd
 L
oc
al
[L
] 
Go
ve
rn
m
en
t  
Re
qu
ire
m
en
t –
 P
ol
ic
y[
P]
, 
St
ra
te
gy
[S
] o
r P
la
nn
in
g 
[P
L]
 FINAL KEY NEEDS 
& 
REQUIREMENTS 
Pr
e 
– 
Di
sa
st
er
 
Du
rin
g 
– 
D
is
as
te
r 
Po
st
 –
 D
is
as
te
r 
Performance Rating (5-1) 
[5 = Highest, 1 = lowest] 
[Rated by Author] F
ed
er
al
 
St
at
e 
 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
St
ra
te
gy
 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 
IMPACTED AREA F S L P Str PL       
1.45 
There is not enough study to 
predict the patterns of the 
disaster; for instance how the 
bushfire or the flood penetrates. 
2.44 o   X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
1.46 
There is a need for more 
understanding of the required 
time for evacuation at different 
disaster types is required. 
3.75 o   X X  X    5 5 5 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
 
Lo
ca
l  
  
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
1.47 
There should be ways to 
enhance the public awareness 
of the safe behaviours during 
different types of disasters and 
teaching them safe methods of 
evacuation. 
 
3.88 o   X X  X    5 5 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
 
    
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
1.48 
Community understanding of 
the threat or disaster is limited. 
 
 
 
3.38 o   X X  X    5 5 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
 
    
St
ra
te
gy
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1.49 
There is a need for professional 
training for state or local 
agencies and voluntary groups 
who are responsible for 
evacuation during disasters. 
3.75 o   X X  X    5 5 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
 
    
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
1.50 
There is a need for people to 
have insurance cover for life 
and property damages for 
different types of disasters. 
4.4 o        X  5 5 4 5 4 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
 
  
Po
lic
y 
 
   
1.51 
There is a need to enforce 
insurance companies to have 
comprehensive cover life and 
property damages for different 
types of disasters. 
3.31 o   X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
2.01 
There is a need for coordination 
and harmony between the 
police / medical services during 
disaster. 
 
 
4  o  X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
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2.03 
There is a need for transport 
infrastructure to be designed to 
accommodate the traffic 
demand during disaster 
conditions and particularly the 
demand during evacuation. 
3.94  o  X X  X    5 5 5 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
 
Lo
ca
l  
  
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
2.04 
The need exist to plan public 
transport system to operate 
efficiently during a disaster. 
 
3.56  o  X X  X    5 5 5 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
2.05 
There should be facilities to 
transport animals during the 
disasters to safe shelters. 
 
3.56  o  X X  X    5 5 5 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
2.06 
The interactions among 
different modes of transport 
including passenger cars, 
pedestrians and road freight 
should be monitored and 
3.75  o  X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
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analysed. 
2.07 
There is lack of access to road 
transport network during 
disaster. 
 
3.25  o  X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
2.08 
There is lack of access to 
alternative escape roads 
available for road users during 
the disaster. 
 
3.31  o  X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
2.09 
Disaster evacuation lead 
decision makers need to 
understand the nature of the 
impact. 
3.88  o  X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
2.10 
Road network plays an 
important role by connecting 
cities, townships, countries and 
provide lifelines during disaster 
evacuations. 
4.25  o  X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
 
Q
ue
st
io
n 
N
um
be
r a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 im
po
rt
an
ce
 
ra
tin
g 
IMPORTANCE RATINGS 
INDICATED BY LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS OF 
VICTORIA, AUSTRALIA 
Av
er
ag
e 
ra
tin
g 
of
 i
m
po
rt
an
ce
 g
iv
en
 b
y 
th
e 
Lo
ca
l G
ov
er
nm
en
t e
xp
er
ts
 
Analysed and Rated by Author 
WHEN IT 
SHOULD 
BE 
MONITOR
ED 
Cr
iti
ca
l I
nf
ra
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
Tr
an
sp
or
t I
nf
ra
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
Re
sil
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 
La
nd
 U
se
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t D
ec
is
io
ns
 
Tr
an
sp
or
t P
la
nn
in
g 
Ro
ad
 D
es
ig
n 
Di
sa
st
er
 R
es
ili
en
ce
 P
la
nn
in
g 
an
d 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
Co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
an
d 
Co
or
di
na
tio
n 
Ke
y 
Re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y 
Ra
tin
gs
 o
f F
ed
er
al
[F
], 
St
at
e[
S]
 a
nd
 L
oc
al
[L
] 
Go
ve
rn
m
en
t  
Re
qu
ire
m
en
t –
 P
ol
ic
y[
P]
, 
St
ra
te
gy
[S
] o
r P
la
nn
in
g 
[P
L]
 FINAL KEY NEEDS 
& 
REQUIREMENTS 
Pr
e 
– 
Di
sa
st
er
 
Du
rin
g 
– 
D
is
as
te
r 
Po
st
 –
 D
is
as
te
r 
Performance Rating (5-1) 
[5 = Highest, 1 = lowest] 
[Rated by Author] F
ed
er
al
 
St
at
e 
 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
St
ra
te
gy
 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 
IMPACTED AREA F S L P Str PL       
2.11 
Residents evacuating a bushfire 
get trapped due to fallen trees 
or roadside burning trees. 
 
 
4  o  X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
2.12 
Real-time traffic information is 
required to provide all road 
users during the disaster (e.g. 
Variable message signs 
providing information about 
travel times and level of 
congestion). 
 
3.69  o  X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
2.13 
Traffic facilities (e.g. signals) 
are not efficiently working 
during the disaster. Therefore, 
evacuation is not optimised. 
 
 
 
3.19  o  X X  X X   5 5 5 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
 
Lo
ca
l  
  
St
ra
te
gy
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2.14 
There is a need for 
comprehensive media coverage 
to provide information to the 
public during the disaster, 
providing information on safe 
routes / areas. 
4.5  o  X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
2.15 
There is a need to provide 
facilities for people with special 
needs including elderly and 
people with disabilities during 
the disaster evacuation. 
4.25  o  X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
2.16 
Water, gas, electricity and 
telecommunication services are 
interrupted during the disaster. 
 
4.06  o  X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
3.01 
Relief coordinating 
organisations should understand 
the impact of critical 
infrastructure failures on 
community during and after a 
4.25   o X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
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disaster. 
3.03 
Limitations to transport 
infrastructure creates long 
queues, traffic congestion, 
accidents and blockages, 
restricts access to emergency 
vehicles and create high risk to 
society during disasters. 
 
3.88   o X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
3.02 
In the event of a disaster, 
transport infrastructure is 
expected to play a vital role in 
providing safety to 
communities during the process 
of evacuation. 
4.25   o X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
3.04 
Public transport system does 
not operate efficiently after the 
disaster. 
 
3.31   o X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
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3.05 
There should be facilities to 
transport animals during the 
disaster and provide shelter for 
them after the disaster. 
3.63   o X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
3.06 
There are problems in 
transporting the injured patients 
after disaster. 
3.13   o X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
3.07 
Road layout, alignment, dead – 
end streets and width of roads, 
road capacities become an issue 
during a disaster. 
4   o X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
3.08 
There is a need for media 
coverage to provide 
information to the public after 
the disaster. 
4.06   o X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
3.09 
There is a lack of media 
coverage to provide 
information to the public, 
where to find help, required 
2.5   o X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
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resources after the disaster. 
3.10 
There is a need to provide 
facilities for people with special 
needs including elderly and 
people with disabilities after 
evacuation. 
3.94   o X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
3.11 
There is lack of adequate 
shelters and facilities for people 
after evacuation. 2.63   o X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
3.12 
Water, gas, electricity and 
telecommunication services are 
interrupted during and just after 
disaster. 
3.56   o X X  X    5 4 4 4 5 4 Fe
de
ra
l 
      
St
ra
te
gy
 
  
 
 
Figures 4.53–4.56 summarise the findings from the questionnaire. 
P- Policy R-Risk  LU-Land Use Planning 
TM- Traffic Management RD- Road Design 
 
 
Figure 4-53: Overall ratings of the questionnaire 
 
As shown above, for all phases of the analysis—pre-disaster, during the disaster and 
post-disaster—land use planning, traffic management and road design were ranked 
highest by the local government practitioners. Land use planning in high-risk areas 
was a major issue. 
 
Figure 4-54: Pre-disaster ratings of the questionnaire 
187 
 When pre-disaster reviews were analysed, as in Figure 4-54, land use planning was 
the most important area considered when discussing the hazards and developments in 
high-risk areas. Policy was not considered a priority prior to the hazard, because it 
was not seen as important or even considered. 
 
 
Figure 4-55: During disaster ratings of the questionnaire 
 
As shown in Figure 4-55, traffic management and policy were highlighted as the two 
most important items during the hazard. Traffic management was seen as important 
because it was responsible for saving lives, providing resources and evacuating 
people to safety. However, policy is recognised at this stage for all the wrong reasons, 
including that there are gaps in policy. 
 
Post-disaster reviews identified road design gaps and redundancy as transport 
infrastructure deficiencies (see Figure 4-56). Traffic management was considered a 
high priority along with road design. 
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Figure 4-56: Post-disaster ratings of the questionnaire 
 
4.12 Summary 
 
This chapter focused on land use planning practices which affect the disaster 
resilience of transport infrastructure and communities. First, the land use approval 
process in Australia was analysed to understand where the responsibilities are located 
within the system for different aspects of approvals. Afterwards, three case studies 
were analysed to understand the gaps in land use approvals which affect the resilience 
of communities. Finally a questionnaire survey was conducted among 21 disaster 
prone local government areas to capture the detailed information. Findings can be 
summarised as follows. The relationship between the existing literature, the land use 
management policies and the local government surveys are presented in Table 4-18. 
 
As shown in Table 4-18, the triangulation was limited to the scope of this theses. If 
required, this could be triangulated using other areas, such as Environmental impacts 
and the impact on infrastructure.  
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Table 4-18: Triangulation  
Item/ Question 
Number 
(Reference) 
 
LAND USE DEVELOPMENT & PLANNING 
 
Literature 
Review* 
Local 
Government 
Survey 
 
Case study 
1.20 
(Appendix 23) 
Impact of land use development decisions on 
communities S 4.5 
Case Study 
4-2 
1.01  
(Appendix 23) 
Need for Federal, State and Local policies to 
prevent land use development and construction 
within hazardous areas. 
 
S 
 
4.44 
 
 
Case Studies 
4-2 & 4-3 
1  
(Table 2.4) 
Being situated below sea level (e.g. New Orleans). HK   
1.21  
(Appendix 23) 
Not approving the land use developments (e.g. 
residential developments) in high risk areas. 
 
S 
 
3.31  
1.22  
(Appendix 23) 
Frequent occurrence of bushfires in Australia in 
summer and the high risk of peri-urban living to 
communities. 
 
S 
 
3.94  
1.19 
(Appendix 23) 
Informal land use development in high risk areas 
which create high risk to communities during 
disasters. 
 
S 
 
3.88  
47  
(Table 2.4) 
Identifying areas which are at risk of bushfires for 
the purpose of emergency management planning, 
land use planning and building regulation. 
 
BF  
Case Studies 
4-2 & 4-3 
52  
(Table 2.4) 
Carefully managing road access during fire events. 
 
 
BF 
 Case Studies 4-2 & 4-3 
56  
(Table 2.4) 
Mitigating the negative effects of bushfire including 
tragic loss of human lives and homes through 
management eliciting many social and scientific 
challenges. 
 
 
BF 
 Case Studies 4-2 & 4-3 
60 
(Table 2.4) 
Efficient land use planning, development controls 
and building standards to reduce the risk to people 
and property from bushfire. 
 
 
BF 
 
Case Studies 
4-2 
& 4-3 
* Note: 
S = SURVEY 
L = LAND USE DEVELOPMENT & PLANNING (L) 
HK = LITERATURE REVIEW – HURRICANE KATRINA 
SURVEY = LOCAL GOVERNEMT SURVEY 
BF = LITERATURE REVIEW – VICTORIAN BUSHFIRE 
KE =LITERATURE REVIEW – KOBE EARTHQUAKE  
 
190 
4.12.1 Major Gaps in Land Use Approval Process 
 
Three major areas in which decisions can have a significant impact on community 
and transport infrastructure resilience were identified as: 
• Land use zone change 
• Development approvals in high-risk areas 
• Limitations in the analysis of transport modelling to understand the impacts of 
new developments. 
 
A review of land use planning and approval processes enabled identification of the 
responsible authorities for each of the identified gaps in practices. Analysis of case 
studies indicated that a major gap exists in decision making associated with changing 
the land use from a low-density to a high-density housing zone. In an attempt to 
understand this, a review of most land use zone changes that took place in Geelong 
for the years 2000–13 was undertaken and the outcomes confirmed this gap in 
practice. 
 
A second major area of importance identified was development approvals in high-risk 
areas. Often the approval process does not consider a disaster scenario, although this 
has been identified as an issue in many previous reports on disasters. To confirm this 
and identify the issues, two case studies were analysed: the Black Saturday bushfires 
and the bushfire threat to the Breamlea Township in Geelong. 
 
The Black Saturday bushfires case study indicated that the 2009 Victorian Bushfire 
Royal Commission Report (2009) highlighted 64 recommendations; while a number 
of these relate to land use development approvals in high-risk areas, these still have 
not been addressed. 
 
The Breamlea case study highlighted the dangerous situation that residents could face 
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in the event of a bushfire burning through the township. The road network would not 
cope with a hazardous situation like a fast-moving bushfire. Major issues that should 
have been addressed in strategic transport planning for Breamlea Township include: 
• road capacities, vegetation along roads, emergency vehicle access difficulties, 
road alignment, unsealed roadways and congestion during summer fire 
danger periods because of tourism 
• water availability for fire control; poor access to hydrants 
• the time for a bushfire to reach the safety line was estimated at 194.11 sec at a 
wind speed of 50 km/h wind speed and 96.88 sec at a wind speed of 100 
km/h; the time for people to evacuate the area was estimated at 164 sec at a 
rate of 50 km/h—this is without any obstructions or delays on the road, 
which has not been considered in development approvals 
• the first fire truck to enter Breamlea from the Connewarre CFA Brigade 
would take approximately 12–20 minutes; it is expected that bushfires would 
generate or travel from the Torquay area towards Breamlea, passing Point 
Impossible Road and because of the short time frame, residents of Breamlea 
need to be aware and ready to leave at short notice. 
 
The questionnaire survey to local government practitioners clearly indicated that the 
gaps are in the areas of land use planning, traffic management and road design. 
Chapter 5 addresses traffic management in detail. 
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Chapter 5: TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Traffic management is one of the main elements in transport network management. It 
improves transport network mobility, accessibility and efficiency. Transport networks 
connect activity centres such as schools, places of work, shops and other amenities 
that are used on a daily basis. These transport networks experience high pedestrian 
and congestion levels during morning and evening peak times, which are known to be 
associated with lower travel speeds. Freeways and highways provide a high standard 
of connection between major urban and rural cities with high posted travel speeds of 
80–110 km/h. 
 
Transport network performance is measured via different approaches including 
robustness, performance, reliability, capacity, delays and queues, travel times and 
travel distances, safety, ease of accessibility and mobility in terms of LoS, blockages 
and congestion, intelligent transport systems (ITS) and driver comfort. These 
parameters tend to influence changes in travel decisions, which also depend on 
factors such as road pricing, mix of modes, heavy vehicle percentages, ITS 
coordination of traffic signals and information. Posted speed limits, road crossing 
facilities, major traffic control items such as traffic signals and stop and give way 
signs also affect traffic movements and travel decision making. 
 
5.2 Chapter Description 
 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to analyse the performance of selected 
transport networks and key intersections. The case study analysis process is shown in 
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the Figure 5–1. 
 
 
Figure 5-1: Traffic management case study review process framework 
 
The case studies highlight transport network intersection and network performance. 
These are evaluated through the integration of ‘disaster time evacuation’ scenarios 
and further expanded by reviewing four selected evacuation routes during a disaster 
scenario. 
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5.3 Traffic Management 
 
Traffic management is defined and described in a range of ways including network 
management, road management, intersection management, interchange and road 
crossing design, activity centre traffic management, local area traffic management, 
parking management, traffic operations, traffic impacts caused by land use 
developments, road environmental safety and traffic control, communications 
systems and ITS. 
 
The Guide to Traffic Management, Part 1 (2009) stated that the development and 
maintenance of the transport network is faced with several challenges: 
• continuing growth in vehicle ownership and usage 
• increasing traffic congestion in urban areas 
• trends towards larger (and more efficient) freight vehicles 
• continuing concern for safety improvements 
• increasing concern about environmental impacts. 
 
5.3.1 Road Classification Systems 
 
The transport network is classified according to road hierarchy and divided into two 
main areas: administrative and functional systems (Table 5-1). The administrative 
classification identifies the legislative responsibilities and the functional 
classification, the likely traffic function on the road. These road hierarchy 
classifications vary between Australian states and can range from four to six or more 
hierarchy types. In Australia, freeways and motorways are in the highest category, 
followed by arterial roads, collector roads and local streets as the final three main 
categories. These are further divided into urban and rural systems, and again are 
classified according to road surface type: sealed or unsealed. All freeways, 
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motorways and arterials are managed by the state’s road authority. Other road 
categories are managed and maintained by respective local councils in Australia. The 
Road Safety on Local Government Roads report (2010) stated that in Victoria, 91% of 
local government-managed roads are local roads and 9% are declared main roads; the 
overall route length of the transport network is 811,000 km. 
 
Table 5-1: Road classifications 
 
 
Local government councils are responsible for Road Management Plan (RMP) 
development, which establishes a management system for all public road functions 
that are the responsibility of the council to meet community expectations’. The RMP 
is prepared in accordance with relevant legislation and codes of practices; the 
legislative basis for this is as follows: 
• Local Government Act 1989 
• Local Government (Best Value Principles) Act 1999 
• Road Management Act 2004 
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• Road Management Act 2004 Regulations 
• Ministerial Code of Practice. 
 
One of the key responsibilities of local councils is to ensure that a ‘road is required 
for public traffic, it is kept open for public use and may carry out work on the road’, 
City of Greater Geelong’s Road Management Plan (CoGG’s RMP). This is to 
maintain roads at an acceptable and safe level for all road users. The road definitions 
used in the CoGG RMP are shown in Table 5-2. 
 
Table: 5- 2: Road definitions 
 
 
5.4 Traffic Performance Measurements 
 
Traffic volume, traffic density, travelling speed and travel time play important roles 
in traffic management. The definitions of these variables are presented in Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5-4 presents the mathematical relationship between traffic volume and density. 
Traffic volume and density depend on the speed of vehicles, spacing and headway 
and dictate traffic movements. When density and volume increases this reduces the 
travel speeds of vehicles. 
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Table 5-3: Basic traffic variables and relationships 
Volume 
 
Volume (sometimes called ‘flow’ or ‘flow rate’ and here designated by the symbol ‘q’) is the 
number of vehicles per unit time passing a given point on a road. Volume may relate to a lane, 
a carriageway or a road and, in the case of a road, may include traffic in either one or both 
directions. In traffic flow analysis, a volume usually relates to only one direction of flow. 
The unit of time used in relation to a volume may vary according to the application. Volumes 
expressed as vehicles per second (veh/s) or vehicles per hour (veh/h) are typically used in 
traffic flow analysis, while daily or annual volumes may be appropriate in other contexts, such 
as analyses of traffic growth over time.  
Density 
 
Density (also known as ‘concentration’) (‘k’) is the number of vehicles present within a unit 
length of lane, carriageway or road at a given instant of time. Density is usually expressed as 
vehicles per kilometre (veh/km) or, where appropriate for analysis purposes, vehicles per 
metre (veh/m).  
Speed 
 
Speed (‘v’) is the distance travelled by a vehicle per unit time and is typically expressed as 
either meters per second (m/s) or kilometres per hour (km/h).  
Headway 
 
A headway is the time interval separating the passing of a fixed point by two consecutive 
vehicles in a traffic stream. The average headway (‘h’) of the stream over a given time interval 
is the arithmetic mean of the series of headways occurring over that interval. Headway is 
usually expressed in the units of seconds per vehicle (s/veh).  
Spacing 
 
A spacing is the distance between the fronts of two consecutive vehicles in a traffic stream at a 
given instant of time. The average spacing (‘s’) of the stream over a given length of lane or 
carriageway is the arithmetic mean of the individual spacing’s occurring over that length at 
that instant of time. Spacing is usually expressed in the units of meters per vehicle (m/veh). 
Queuing When travel speeds are reduced, queuing occurs on roads. In Guide to Traffic Management, 
Part 1 (2009, Page 23), it states that, “In many traffic situations, particularly at intersections, 
conflicts between different traffic streams and/or fluctuations in flow can result in the 
formation of queues of vehicles”. And further adds that, The behaviour of a queuing system, as 
reflected in queue lengths and delays, may vary over an analysis period for one of two reasons 
(Guide to Traffic Management, Part 1 (2009, Page 26): Over the period, there is variation in the 
average arrival rate and/or the average service rate. Both rates remain constant over the 
analysis period but the average arrival rate equals or exceeds the average service rate (i.e. the 
utilisation factor, ρ, is greater than or equal to one). 
Delays In Guide to Traffic Management, Part 1 (2009, Page 33), it identifies the, “delays experienced 
by minor flow traffic in gap acceptance situations with random arrivals in both the major and 
minor traffic streams”. The proportion of minor traffic stream units that will be delayed at the 
gap acceptance point (e.g. at the stop line) is: 
 
 
Capacity 
(C) 
 
In Guide to Traffic Management, Part 1 (2009, Page 34), it states that, “ An important value for 
road traffic applications is the theoretical maximum rate at which minor traffic stream vehicles 
can cross or be absorbed into the major traffic stream in a gap acceptance situation. This 
maximum rate is known as the theoretical absorption capacity”. 
 
In Guide to Traffic Management, Part 1 (2009, Page 32), it further states that, “It is observed 
that the absorption capacity is a theoretical upper limit, which may not be achieved in 
practice. It is common practice in traffic analysis to define a practical absorption capacity as 
Cp”. And the formula for practical absorption capacity is as follows. 
 
Level of 
Service 
(LOS) 
In Guide to Traffic Management, Part 3 (2009, Page 26) it states that, “Level of service is a 
qualitative measure describing operational conditions within a traffic stream, and their 
perception by motorists and/or passengers. A level of service definition generally describes 
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 these conditions in terms of factors such as speed and travel time, freedom to manoeuvre, 
traffic interruptions, comfort and convenience, and safety”. And states that, “ In general, there 
are six levels of service (Table 5-6), designated A to F, with level of service A representing the 
best operating condition (i.e. free flow) and level of service F the worst (i.e. forced or 
breakdown flow)”. 
 q = the volume of the conflicting major traffic stream, in veh/s 
 T = the size of the critical gap (or critical lag), in s/veh 
C = the theoretical absorption capacity in veh/s (multiply by 3,600 for veh/h) 
TO = The follow-up headway in s/veh 
Where the factor  is typically taken to be in the range 0.80 to 0.85 
 (Source: Guide to Traffic Management Part 2: Traffic Theory, Austroads Publication No. AGTM02/08 
2008) 
 
 
Table 5-4: Mathematical relationships 
 
 (Source: Guide to Traffic Management Part 2: Traffic Theory, Austroads Publication No. AGTM02/08 
2008) 
 
When all three elements are considered, as shown in Figure 5-2, (Guide to Traffic 
Management, Part 1 2009, p. 8), at point A with very few vehicles on the road, 
density and volume are close to zero, which allows drivers to travel at desired speeds. 
From point A to B, traffic conditions are described as ‘free flow’ with very little 
restriction to the stream, but conditions become quite significant beyond point B, 
where flow is considered normal and where motorists experience a lack of freedom to 
manoeuvre (e.g., change lanes, change speed) and traffic moves steadily at a 
reasonable speed, until C is reached. The traffic conditions at C become very 
unstable; speed and density changes occur with little change in volume. At point C, 
maximum achievable volume is reached and any further increases in density will 
decrease speed and volume. 
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Figure 5-2: Speed-volume–density relationships 
(Source: Guide to Traffic Management Part 2: Traffic Theory, Austroads Publication No. AGTM02/08 
2008, p. 8) 
 
Traffic between points C and D is referred to as ‘forced flow’ and when this condition 
reaches point D, traffic becomes stationary (‘bumper-to-bumper’ condition) termed 
the ‘jam density’. 
 
5.5 Graphical Relationships for Uninterrupted Flow 
 
Traffic flow is considered ‘uninterrupted flow’ or ‘interrupted flow’ as shown in 
Table 5-5. An uninterrupted flow of traffic is the ideal condition expected from a 
transport network, but in reality it does not occur. 
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Table 5-5: Graphical relationships for uninterrupted flow 
 
 
Therefore, depending on traffic volume, speed and density, the LoS changes. As 
shown in Table 5-6, LoS is a quantifiable measure that ranges from A to F. 
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Table 5-6: LoS (Level of Service) 
 
 (Source: Guide To Traffic Management Part 3: Traffic Studies and Analysis, Austroads Publication 
No. AGTM03/09 2009) 
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5.6 Factors Affecting Capacity, Level of Service and Degree of 
Saturation 
 
There are many factors, as shown in Table 5-7 that affect transport network capacity, 
Level of Service (LoS) and Degree of Service (DoS), which restrict accessibility and 
mobility on transport networks.  
The Guide to Traffic Management Part 3: Traffic Studies and Analysis, Austroads 
Publication No. AGTM03/09 2009, states that DoS of an intersection ranges from 
zero to one. One been close to saturation flow or capacity. 
 
Table 5-7: Conditions that affect capacity, LoS and DoS 
 
 
5.7 Case Study Reviews 
 
The two main case study areas are shown in Figure 5-3. The red lines indicate case 
study map boundaries. The Geelong case study area bounded by the red lines 
comprises the areas of case studies 5-2 and 5-3. 
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The five key intersections are shown in Figure 5-4: the dashed red lines show the 
study boundaries and the intersections are shown as green nodes. 
 
 
Figure 5-3: Case study boundaries 
 
 
 Figure 5-4: Case study 5-1, review of transport network intersections 
 
5.7.1 Case Study 5-1: Intersection Performance Review and Road Capacity 
Issues, Geelong, Australia 
 
Five signalised intersections were chosen (Figure 5-5) to analyse recurrent traffic 
management issues such as road traffic volumes and how they relate to the CoGG 
RMP. All selected intersections are located within Geelong, Victoria. 
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Figure 5-5: Selected intersections for case study 5-1 
 
Table 5-8: Intersection descriptions 
Intersection  Street Names Road Hierarchy Number of travel Lanes 
 
Intersection 
A 
Ryrie Street Primary Arterial - VicRoads 2 ( one traffic lane each 
) La Trobe 
 
Primary Arterial - VicRoads 2 ( one traffic lane each 
 Aberdeen 
 
Primary Arterial - VicRoads 2 ( one traffic lane each 
) Intersection 
B 
La Trobe 
 
Primary Arterial - VicRoads 2 ( one traffic lane each 
) Gordon 
 
Main Distributor -Urban 2 ( one traffic lane each 
 Intersection 
C 
Ryrie Street Primary Arterial - VicRoads 2 ( one traffic lane each 
 Moorabool 
 
Main Distributor -Urban 2 ( one traffic lane each 
 Intersection 
D 
Malop Street Main Distributor -Urban 4( Two traffic lanes each 
 Gheringhap 
S  
Main Distributor -Urban 2 ( one traffic lane each 
) Intersection 
E 
Malop Street Main Distributor -Urban 2 ( one traffic lane each 
) 
Yarra Street Secondary Distributor  2 ( one traffic lane each 
)  
This case study highlights the road hierarchy and issues pertaining to daily traffic 
volumes during normal peak times. All intersecting road combinations are based on 
the CoGG’s Municipal Road Management Plan (2009) and all of the selected 
intersections are signalised intersections. Peak hour traffic volumes provide an 
estimate of traffic volumes and road capacities. 
 
This case study reveals the daily traffic volumes and road hierarchical categories and 
reviews them against the CoGG RMP. Local roads in Geelong are managed by the 
CoGG and arterial roads are managed by VicRoads. The roads were classified 
according to a ‘functional classification’ that states the road category according to the 
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CoGG RPM and the ‘traffic volume’. This was then compared with the ‘actual traffic 
volume’. This gives a ‘snap shot’ regarding whether traffic volumes are consistent 
with the RMP values. The ‘AM and PM Peak hour traffic volume (number of 
vehicles)’ and ‘AM and PM peak hour queue length (number of cars)’ also give an 
indication of how each leg of the journey is affected during normal day-to-day AM 
and PM peak periods. 
 
Table 5-9: Road hierarchy–urban roads 
 
Source: Geelong Road Management Plan (2009) 
 
5.7.1.1 Intersection Reviews 
5.7.1.1.1 Intersection A 
 
La Trobe Terrace was carrying 34,000 vehicles per day (vpd), which was more than 
the designated traffic volume of 25,000. Ryrie Street was at near capacity, having 
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24,853 vpd, which was more traffic than the allowed volumes (see Table 5-10). This 
suggests that Intersection A was close to capacity during normal daily peak periods 
because of much higher actual volumes than were outlined in the CoGG RMP. 
Therefore, this intersection will not be able to perform well and provide for transport 
evacuations during a disaster scenario or under ‘emergency conditions’.  
 
Table 5-10: Intersection A–traffic volumes 
 
 
5.7.1.1.2 Intersection B 
 
As mentioned above, La Trobe Terrace was carrying more than its designated traffic 
volume and Gordon Avenue was carrying 14,500 vpd, which was also more than the 
designated volume (see Table 5-11). This suggests that Intersection B was close to 
capacity during normal daily periods and will not cope with any additional volume. 
This intersection will not operate well under ‘emergency conditions’. 
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Table 5-11: Intersection B–traffic volumes 
 
 
5.7.1.1.3 Intersection C 
 
Ryrie Street was at near capacity, having 24,853 vpd; Moorabool Street carried over 
10,000 vpd, again, more than the designated volume (see Table 5-12). Thus, 
Intersection C was close to capacity during normal daily periods and would not be 
able to provide for transport evacuation during a disaster. 
 
Table 5-12: Intersection C–traffic volumes 
 
 
 
208 
5.7.1.1.4 Intersection D 
 
The data in Table 5-13 suggest that Intersection D is close to capacity during normal 
daily periods, and would fail and not be able to provide for transport evacuation 
during a disaster.  
 
Table 5-13: Intersection D–traffic volumes 
 
 
5.7.1.1.5 Intersection E 
 
The data in Table 5-14 suggest that Intersection E was close to capacity during 
normal daily periods. This intersection would fail and not be able to provide for 
transport evacuation during a disaster. 
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Table 5-14: Intersection E–Traffic volumes 
 
 
5.7.1.2 Summary of Intersection Review 
 
As shown in Table 5-15, all road categories carried higher traffic volumes than 
planned, with the exception of Gheringhap Street, which is little used because of the 
adjoining land use development types. All the other roads were connected with 
business or key activity areas or were used to access them. 
 
Street name Carrying volume Functional classification  
   volume 
• La Trobe Terrace 34,000 vpd.   25,000 vpd. 
• Ryrie Street  24,853 vpd.  25,000 vpd. 
• Aberdeen Street 14,500 vpd.   25,000 vpd. 
• Gordon Avenue 14,500 vpd.  5,000 vpd-10,000 vpd. 
• Moorabool Street 10,040 vpd.  5,000 vpd-10,000 vpd. 
• Gheringhap Street 3,301 vpd.  5,000 vpd-10,000 vpd. 
• Malop Street  12,290 vpd.  5,000 vpd-10,000 vpd. 
• Yarra Street  9,289 vpd.  3,000 vpd-5,000 vpd. 
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Table 5-15: Summary of case study 5-1 
Intersection 
 
 A 
 
La Trobe 
Terrace 
Ryrie 
Street 
Aberdeen 
Street Comments 
Traffic Volumes 34,000 vpd 24,853 vpd 
14,500 
vpd 
Will not cope with any 
additional traffic 
volumes 
Congestion at 
the Intersection 14% (AM) & 15% (PM) 
La Trobe Terrace 
carries 34,000 vpd, 
which higher than the 
functional capacity. 
Intersection 
 
B 
 
La Trobe 
Terrace 
Gordon 
Avenue 
  
Traffic Volumes 34,000 vpd 14,500 vpd 
 
La Trobe Terrace 
carries 34,000 vpd, 
which higher than the 
functional capacity. 
Congestion at 
the Intersection 6.28% (AM) & 6.8% (PM) 
Will not cope with any 
additional traffic 
volumes 
Intersection 
 
C 
 
Ryrie 
Street 
Moorabool 
Street 
  
Traffic Volumes 24,853 vpd 10,040 vpd 
 
Will not cope with any 
additional traffic 
volumes 
Congestion at 
the Intersection 13.7% (AM) & 18.9% (PM) 
Ryrie Street is near 
capacity. 
Intersection 
 
D 
 
Gheringhap 
Street 
Malop 
Street 
  
Traffic Volumes 3,301 vpd 12,290 vpd 
 
Malop Street carries 
22% more than 
functional capacities. 
Congestion at 
the Intersection 4.70% (AM) & 6.3% (PM) 
Will not cope with any 
additional traffic 
volumes 
Intersection 
 
E 
 
Malop 
Street 
Yarra 
Street 
  
Traffic Volumes 12,293 vpd 9,289 vpd 
 
Will not cope with any 
additional traffic 
volumes 
Congestion at 
the Intersection 18.5% (AM) & 13.15% (PM) 
Malop Street carries 
22% more than 
functional capacities. 
 
The intersections fared worse because of the excessive traffic volumes during normal 
peak hour periods. These high traffic volumes led to congestion, which was high at 
18.79%. The difference between AM and PM peak hour congestion was around 
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5.0%. Therefore, during an emergency evacuation scenario, these transport network 
segments will experience higher congestion and queuing under excessive traffic 
volumes. As highlighted by this case study, some transport network intersections are 
affected by carrying excessive traffic volumes and are in need of re-classification 
according to the CoGG RMP. The selected intersections and the transport network 
review showed that road hierarchy classifications need to be reviewed to address 
these traffic volume discrepancies. The case study highlighted issues with the 
network during peak times. It also showed how the transport network reaches 
capacity during these peak times. The analysis of the case studies demonstrated that 
there are major gaps in road hierarchy systems at present. 
 
5.7.1.3 Which Areas Should be Considered for Improvement 
 
1. The road hierarchy systems within each state and local jurisdiction should be 
re-assessed to provide a good LoS on transport networks. 
2. There is a need to manage the transport network to improve road safety for all 
users, irrespective of transport mode. 
3. Road design and strategic transport planning should provide for road safety 
for pedestrians and other road users. 
4. The transport network management is important and the transport network 
should be maintained to a high standard through traffic management. 
5. The functional road hierarchy and road capacities need to be realigned with 
the RMP and the road hierarchy system to provide safety and accessibility 
and movement of goods and people. 
6. A review of all existing functional road hierarchies is essential to provide a 
single standard. 
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5.7.1.4 Other Areas for Improvement 
 
• Strategic planning to maintain the network is required and should be 
supported by respective state authorities and local governments. 
• Funding programs for reducing road crashes should be continued. 
• Serious road-related crashes need to be assessed to provide safety to road 
users. This needs to be supported with valid data and information. 
• Road safety programs should be provide for through continuous support from 
federal agencies. 
 
5.7.2 Case Study 5-2: Traffic Corridor Analysis, West Geelong, Australia 
 
5.7.2.1 Introduction 
 
As shown in Figure 5-3, this case study area covers ¾ of the suburb of Geelong West. 
The study area is bounded by Church Street and Midland Highway (Ballarat Road) to 
the north, Shannon Avenue to the west, Aberdeen Street to the south and Pakington 
Street to the east in Geelong West. 
 
Figure 5-6 shows the three selected corridors and Figure 5-7 shows all ‘major traffic 
control items’ along these routes. These corridors have different road hierarchies 
according to CoGG’s RMP and the key selected transport networks run in a north–
south direction. Geelong West is an old established residential suburb with 
commercial areas along Pakington Street. The population density is around 22–
28/Ha. This case study was reviewed to identify transport network constraints caused 
by traffic volumes, major traffic control items and road users. Three transport 
networks (north–south direction) were selected: Pakington Street, Corridor 1; 
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Elizabeth Street and George Street, Corridor 2; and Shannon Avenue, Corridor 3. 
 
 
Figure 5-6: The three corridors    
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 Figure 5-7: Major traffic control items 
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5.7.2.2 Characteristics of Road Corridors 
Table 5-16: Characteristics of road corridors 
 Road Hierarchy Carriageway 
Width 
Number of travel Lanes 
Pakington Street  Main Distributor 13.6 m 2 ( one traffic lane each way) 
Elizabeth Street  Secondary Distributor 7.3 m 2 ( one traffic lane each way) 
George street Local Access - Urban 6.3 m 2 ( one traffic lane each way) 
Shannon Avenue  Secondary Arterial -
VicRoads 
10.5 m 2 ( one traffic lane each way) 
Autumn Street Main Distributor 8.0 m 2 ( one traffic lane each way) 
Albert Street Local Access - Urban 5.6 m 2 ( one traffic lane each way) 
Waratah Street Secondary Distributor 12.7 m 2 ( one traffic lane each way) 
Church Street Secondary Arterial -
VicRoads 
9.7 m 4( Two traffic lanes each way) 
 
Table 5-16 provides the road categories and carriageway widths in the case study 
area. It was identified that when comparing carriageway widths, some of the higher 
category road widths are less than those of lower-order category roads: for example, 
Shannon Avenue is narrower than Pakington Street and Autumn Street is narrower 
than Waratah Street. Traffic configurations along these routes differ: Shannon 
Avenue has bus routes and is considered a ‘preferred truck route’, whereas Pakington 
Street is considered a more pedestrian zone with pedestrian-operated signals and a 
bus route. Selected corridors 1 and 3 are mainly controlled by traffic signals, whereas 
Corridor 2 is controlled by give way and stop controls. 
 
5.7.2.3 SIDRA Modelling 
 
For this case study, the SIDRA software was used to analyse all key intersections and 
transport networks. To analyse the transport networks and intersections, SIDRA 6.1 
modelling software was utilised for lane-based network modelling and then link-
based modelling. The analysis needed to capture congestion and impacts on the 
network and thus lane-based modelling was useful for identifying how upstream 
networks are affected by downstream lane queues. Capacity constraints on already 
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saturated upstream lanes were also analysed. 
 
5.7.2.4 Analysis Types for the Three Transport Networks 
 
To analyse and evaluate the performance of the corridor during a disaster, the 
following traffic measurements were used: LoS, lane blockages, DoS, travel speed 
and network performance. 
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Figure 5-8: LoS normal times 
 
218 
 Figure 5-9: LoS disaster evacuation conditions 
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Table 5-17: LoS for all corridors [normal conditions] 
 
 
5.7.2.4.1 Level of Service During Normal and Emergency Times 
 
Figure 5-8 shows the LoS for the three corridors during normal conditions and Figure 5-
9 shows the LoS during a ‘disaster scenario’. The findings indicate that all of the 
transport networks performed very poorly with LoS in the ‘F’ category. The site level of 
service shows that transport networks 1 and 3 are affected more than is transport 
network 2 (see Appendix 14 for LoS intersection outputs of SIDRA under normal traffic 
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conditions). 
 
5.7.2.4.2 Level of Service During Emergency (Disaster) Times 
 
Figure 5-10 shows the three transport networks, their intersections and the origin and 
destination (direction) of traffic flow during a ‘disaster’ scenario. 
 
 
Figure 5-10: Intersections and the evacuation traffic flow 
 
 
As shown in Figure 5-10, it was assumed that during a ‘disaster scenario’, the 
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emergency evacuation direction will be from south-east to north-west. The traffic 
volume would start to increase from the south-east corner (the red arrow shows the 
direction of traffic flow) and move along the three transport networks, which are aligned 
north–south. At each intersection the traffic volume would increase according to ease of 
travel. Some motorists would avoid major traffic control items and would prefer 
travelling via local lower-order roads. Table 5-18 shows the LoS during an emergency 
evacuation scenario. It is expected that intersections will experience a lower LoS. 
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Table 5-18: LoS for all corridors [emergency/disaster] 
 
 
Appendix 15 provides L0S intersection outputs from SIDRA under 
‘emergency/disaster’ conditions. For the three corridors and key intersections the LoS 
was ‘low’ and had an impact on the intersections under normal conditions, which 
worsened during the analysis of a disaster evacuation scenario. The extra traffic volume 
affected already congested corridors. As shown in Table 5-18, all ‘key intersections’ 
performed poorly with a rating of ‘F’. The identified key nodes were critical and 
necessary for mass evacuation. This clearly indicates that each key node had 
deficiencies that need to be addressed and rectified. The rectification is fourfold; that is, 
it could be achieved via key policies, strategies and guidelines supported by design 
standards. 
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5.7.2.4.3 Lane Blockage Probabilities 
 
In Figures 5-11 and 5-12, lane blockages are highlighted and each segment of the 
networks is affected. The figures show the normal and disaster emergency evacuation 
scenario performance of the network. 
 
 
Figure 5-11: Lane blockage probability–normal conditions 
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Figure 5-12: Lane blockage probability –emergency/disaster 
 
Table 5-19: Lane blockage probability for all corridors [normal & disaster] 
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 Lane Blockage 
Probability 
 
Overall Segment 
Performance Direction of 
Travel  
North 
Bound 
South 
Bound 
Pakingto
n Street 
1-2 Aberdeen St & Gertrude St Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
2-3 Gertrude St & Gordon Ave Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
3-4 Gordon Ave & Autumn St Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
4-5 Autumn St & Hope St Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
5-6 Hope St  & Candover St Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
6-7 Candover St  & Clarence St Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
225 
7-8 Clarence St & O’Connell St Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
8-9 O’Connell St  & Waratah St Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
9-10 Waratah St  & Waterloo Str Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
10-11 Waterloo St  & Britannia St Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
11-12 Britannia St  & Church St Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
George 
Street 
1-2 Aberdeen St & Gertrude St Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
2-3 Gertrude St & Autumn St Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
3-4 Autumn St & Elizabeth St Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
Elizabeth 
Street 
4-5 Autumn St & Hope St Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
5-6 Hope St  & Candover St Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
6-7 Candover St  & O’Connell St Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
7-8 O’Connell St  & Waratah St Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
8-9 Waratah St  & Waterloo Str Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
9-10 Waterloo St  & Britannia St Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
10-11 Britannia St  & Church St Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
Shannon 
Avenue 
1-2 Aberdeen St & Gertrude St Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
2-3 Gertrude St & Autumn St Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
3-4 Autumn St & Hope St Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
 
4-5 Hope St & Albert St Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
5-6 Albert St & Clarence St Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
6-7 Clarence St & Catherine St Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
7-8 Catherine St & Waratah St Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
8-9 Waratah St  & Britannia St  Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
9-10 Britannia St  & Church St Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
10-11 Church St & Ballarat Rd Normal   Performance Poor 
Disaster   Performance Poor 
 
In Table 5-19, the red cells indicate high blockages. Within the testing of these 
corridors, high blockages were caused by issues with lane configurations having or not 
having proper left and right turn lanes with correct turning storage lengths; and to 
merging, crossing or waiting to cross the road and also having to wait for an acceptable 
‘gap’ in the traffic stream. 
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 5.7.2.4.4 Degree of Saturation 
 
The Guide to Traffic Management, Part 3 (2009, p. 30) stated that a DoS level greater 
than 1 indicates oversaturated conditions, which contributes to long queues of vehicles. 
A lower DoS is preferred to improve traffic performance. 
 
Figure 5-13 shows that the DoS for the three transport networks under normal 
conditions was high for the two main corridors. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-13: DoS [normal times] 
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5.7.2.4.5 Travel Speed 
 
Travel speed is another critical performance indicator for corridor performance. When 
volume or density increases, travel speeds reduce. The ‘red’ numbers in Table 5-20 
indicate modelled low performance levels in an emergency/disaster scenario. Appendix 
16 provides travel speed intersection outputs from SIDRA under normal traffic 
conditions. 
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Table 5-20: Travel speed [emergency/disaster] 
 
Units- Km/Hr 
5.7.2.4.6 Network Performance 
 
Appendices 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 provide output records. 
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Table 5-21: Network performance of all corridors 
 
 
 
5.7.3 Scenario 3: Analysis of Four Emergency Evacuation Routes (During 
Emergency/Disaster) 
 
For this analysis, four emergency/disaster evacuation routes, and LOS during a disaster 
scenario were used. The identified routes are shown in Figure 5-14. 
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Figure 5-14: Evacuation routes during emergency/disaster times 
 
These four routes are expanded in Figure 5-15 and identified as per the case study to 
highlight the issues pertaining to each route and intersection, and its performance. The 
performance of key routes and key nodes were assessed. Figure 5-15 shows the routes 
(green arrows) and key intersections (circled in red). 
 
The assessment compared intersections during ‘normal’ times and during an 
‘emergency’ scenario. Tables 5-22–5-25 present the LoS performance for traffic 
movement at these intersections or nodes. LoS and intersection performance were 
analysed using SIDRA. 
Four Key Routes (Green Arrows) 
 
Figure 5-15: Key intersections along the corridors 
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5.7.3.1 LoS for Evacuation Routes 
 
Tables 5-22, 5-23, 5-24 and 5-25 identify the four evacuation routes and the intersection 
LoS levels under normal and disaster conditions. 
 
Route 1–LoS for evacuation 
Table 5-22: LoS for Evacuation Route 1 
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1 
 
 
 
1 
C1-1 Pakington 
Street 
Aberdeen 
Street 
Traffic 
Signals 
4 Normal F F F C F Performance 
 Disaster F F F D F Performance 
 C1-2 Pakington 
Street 
Gertrude 
Street 
Give 
Way 
3 Normal A NA F C NA Performance 
 Disaster NA NA NA F NA Performance 
 C1-3 Pakington 
Street 
Gordon 
Avenue 
Traffic 
signals 
3 Normal F F F NA F Performance 
 Disaster F F B NA F Performance 
 C1-4 Pakington 
Street 
Autumn 
Street 
Traffic 
signals 
4 Normal F F F D F Performance 
 Disaster F F F F F Performance 
  
2 
C2-4 Elizabeth 
Street 
Autumn 
Street 
Give 
Way 
3 Normal - NA F NA NA Performance 
 Disaster NA F F NA NA Performance 
 C2-3 George 
Street 
Autumn 
Street 
Give 
Way 
3 Normal F A NA A NA Performance 
 Disaster F NA NA NA NA Performance 
  
 
 
 
 
3 
C3-3 Shannon 
Avenue 
Autumn 
Street 
Traffic 
signals 
4 Normal F F F F F Performance 
 Disaster F F F F F Performance 
 C3-4 Shannon 
Avenue 
Hope 
Street 
Give 
Way 
3 Normal F F A NA NA Performance 
 Disaster F F NA NA NA Performance 
 C3-5 Shannon 
Avenue 
Albert 
Street 
Traffic 
signals 
3 Normal F F C NA F Performance 
 Disaster F F F F F Performance 
 C3-6 Shannon 
Avenue 
Clarence 
Street 
Give 
Way 
3 Normal E F A NA NA Performance 
 Disaster F F NA NA NA Performance 
 C3-7 Shannon 
Avenue 
Catherine 
Street 
Stop 3 Normal F F A NA NA Performance 
 Disaster F F NA NA NA Performance 
 C3-8 Shannon 
Avenue 
Waratah 
Street 
Stop 3 Normal F F A NA NA Performance 
 Disaster F F A NA NA Performance 
 C3-9 Shannon 
Avenue 
Britannia 
Street 
Stop 4 Normal F F E F NA Performance 
 Disaster C F F F NA Performance 
 C3-
10 
Shannon 
Avenue 
Church 
Street 
Traffic 
signals 
4 Normal F F F D F Performance 
 Disaster F F F F F Performance 
 C3-
11 
Shannon 
Avenue 
Ballarat 
Road 
Traffic 
signals 
4 Normal F F F E F Performance 
 Disaster F F F F F Performance 
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Route 2–LoS for evacuation 
Table 5-23: LoS for Evacuation Route 2 
LEVEL OF SERVICE (LOS) FOR KEY EVACUATION ROUTE 2 
Ro
ut
e 
N
um
be
r 
Co
rr
id
or
 N
um
be
r 
Ke
y 
In
te
rs
ec
tio
n 
 
 
Street 1 
 
 
Street 2 
Ty
pe
 o
f C
on
tr
ol
le
r 
 
Co
nd
iti
on
s (
N
or
m
al
 
Co
nd
iti
on
s &
 D
is
as
te
r 
E
ti
 C
di
ti
) LOS 
In
te
rs
ec
tio
n 
 
 
Overall 
Intersection 
Performance  
N
um
be
r o
f l
eg
s 
So
ut
h 
Ea
st
 
N
or
th
 
W
es
t 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
1  C1-1 Pakington 
Street 
Aberdeen 
Street 
Traffic 
Signals 
4 Normal F F F C F Performance 
 Disaster F F F D F Performance 
 C1-2 Pakington 
Street 
Gertrude 
Street 
Give 
Way 
3 Normal A NA F C NA Performance 
 Disaster NA NA NA F NA Performance 
 C1-3 Pakington 
Street 
Gordon 
Avenue 
Traffic 
signals 
3 Normal F F F NA F Performance 
 Disaster F F B NA F Performance 
 C1-4 Pakington 
Street 
Autumn 
Street 
Traffic 
signals 
4 Normal F F F D F Performance 
 Disaster F F F F F Performance 
 C1-5 Pakington 
Street 
Hope 
Street 
Give 
Way 
4 Normal A B A C NA Performance 
 Disaster NA F NA F NA Performance 
 C1-6 Pakington 
Street 
Candover 
Street 
Traffic 
signals 
4 Normal F F F E F Performance 
 Disaster F F F F F Performance 
 2 C2-6 Elizabeth 
Street 
Albert 
Street 
Stop 4 Normal NA F NA D NA Performance 
 Disaster NA F NA D NA Performance 
 3 C3-5 Shannon 
Avenue 
Albert 
Street 
Traffic 
signals 
3 Normal F F C NA F Performance 
 Disaster F F F F F Performance 
 C3-6 Shannon 
Avenue 
Clarence 
Street 
Give 
Way 
3 Normal E F A NA NA Performance 
 Disaster F F NA NA NA Performance 
 C3-7 Shannon 
Avenue 
Catherine 
Street 
Stop 3 Normal F F A NA NA Performance 
 Disaster F F NA NA NA Performance 
 C3-8 Shannon 
Avenue 
Waratah 
Street 
Stop 3 Normal F F A NA NA Performance 
 Disaster F F A NA NA Performance 
 C3-9 Shannon 
Avenue 
Britannia 
Street 
Stop  4 Normal F F E F NA Performance 
 Disaster C F F F NA Performance 
 C3-10 Shannon 
Avenue 
Church 
Street 
Traffic 
signals 
4 Normal F F F D F Performance 
 Disaster F F F F F Performance 
 C3-11 Shannon 
Avenue 
Ballarat 
Road 
Traffic 
signals 
4 Normal F F F E F Performance 
 Disaster F F F F F Performance 
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Route 3–LoS for evacuation 
Table 5-24: LoS for Evacuation Route 3 
LEVEL OF SERVICE (LOS) FOR KEY EVACUATION ROUTE 3 
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1 
C1-1 Pakington 
Street 
Aberdeen 
Street 
Traffic 
Signals 
4 Normal F F F C F Performance 
 Disaster F F F D F Performance 
 C1-2 Pakington 
Street 
Gertrude 
Street 
Give 
Way 
3 Normal A NA F C NA Performance 
 Disaster NA NA NA F NA Performance 
 C1-3 Pakington 
Street 
Gordon 
Avenue 
Traffic 
signals 
3 Normal F F F NA F Performance 
 Disaster F F B NA F Performance 
 C1-4 Pakington 
Street 
Autumn 
Street 
Traffic 
signals 
4 Normal F F F D F Performance 
 Disaster F F F F F Performance 
 C1-5 Pakington 
Street 
Hope 
Street 
Give 
Way 
4 Normal A B A C NA Performance 
 Disaster NA F NA F NA Performance 
 C1-6 Pakington 
Street 
Candover 
Street 
Traffic 
signals 
4 Normal F F F E F Performance 
 Disaster F F F F F Performance 
 C1-7 Pakington 
Street 
Clarence 
Street 
Give 
Way 
4 Normal A A A A NA Performance 
 Disaster NA A NA A NA Performance 
 C1-8 Pakington 
Street 
O’Connell 
Street 
Give 
Way 
4 Normal A A A A NA Performance 
 Disaster NA A NA A NA Performance 
 C1-9 Pakington 
Street 
Waratah 
Street 
Traffic 
signals 
4 Normal F F F E F Performance 
 Disaster F F F E F Performance 
 C1-10 Pakington 
Street 
Waterloo 
Street 
Give 
Way 
3 Normal A C A NA NA Performance 
 Disaster NA F NA NA NA Performance 
 C1-11 Pakington 
Street 
Britannia 
Street 
Give 
Way 
3 Normal A NA F F NA Performance 
 Disaster NA NA F F NA Performance 
 C1-12 Pakington 
Street 
Church 
Street 
Traffic 
signals 
4 Normal F F F F F Performance 
 Disaster F F F F F Performance 
 2 C2-11 Elizabeth 
Street 
Church 
Street 
Give 
Way 
3 Normal A A NA A NA Performance 
 Disaster A NA NA NA NA Performance 
 3 C3-11 Shannon 
Avenue 
Ballarat 
Road 
Traffic 
signals 
4 Normal F F F E F Performance 
 Disaster F F F F F Performance 
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Route 4–LoS for evacuation 
Table 5-25: LoS for Evacuation Route 4 
LEVEL OF SERVICE (LOS) FOR KEY EVACUATION ROUTE 4 
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4 
1 C1-1 Pakington 
Street 
Aberdeen 
Street 
Traffic 
Signals 
4 Normal F F F C F Performance 
 Disaster F F F D F Performance 
 2 C2-1 Aberdeen 
Street 
George 
Street 
Give 
Way 
3 Normal NA F F A NA Performance 
 Disaster NA F F NA NA Performance 
 3 C3-1 Shannon 
Avenue 
Aberdeen 
Street 
Traffic 
signals 
4 Normal F F D C F Performance 
 Disaster F F F F F Performance 
 C3-2 Shannon 
Avenue 
Gertrude 
Street 
Traffic 
signals 
4 Normal F F F F NA Performance 
 Disaster F F F F NA Performance 
 C3-3 Shannon 
Avenue 
Autumn 
Street 
Traffic 
signals 
4 Normal F F F F F Performance 
 Disaster F F F F F Performance 
 C3-4 Shannon 
Avenue 
Hope 
Street 
Give 
Way 
3 Normal F F A NA NA Performance 
 Disaster F F NA NA NA Performance 
 C3-5 Shannon 
Avenue 
Albert 
Street 
Traffic 
signals 
3 Normal F F C NA F Performance 
 Disaster F F F F F Performance 
 C3-6 Shannon 
Avenue 
Clarence 
Street 
Give 
Way 
3 Normal E F A NA NA Performance 
 Disaster F F NA NA NA Performance 
 C3-7 Shannon 
Avenue 
Catherine 
Street 
Stop 3 Normal F F A NA NA Performance 
 Disaster F F NA NA NA Performance 
 C3-8 Shannon 
Avenue 
Waratah 
Street 
Stop 3 Normal F F A NA NA Performance 
 Disaster F F A NA NA Performance 
 C3-9 Shannon 
Avenue 
Britannia 
Street 
Stop  4 Normal F F E F NA Performance 
 Disaster C F F F NA Performance 
 C3-10 Shannon 
Avenue 
Church 
Street 
Traffic 
signals 
4 Normal F F F D F Performance 
 Disaster F F F F F Performance 
 C3-11 Shannon 
Avenue 
Ballarat 
Road 
Traffic 
signals 
4 Normal F F F E F Performance 
 Disaster F F F F F Performance 
  
5.7.3.2 Summary of Scenario 3: Analysis of Four Emergency Evacuation Routes 
(During Emergency/Disaster) 
 
It was identified that the difficulty level depended on the selected route. This may be 
because of existing major traffic control items and/or traffic volume increases. 
Intersection performances have a direct effect on the travel behaviour of the evacuating 
motorist because during a disaster scenario, motorists need to get to safety and their 
decision making will be guided by road conditions such as queues, congestion, mix of 
235 
vehicles and speed. All key intersections identified as ‘preferred routes’ performed 
poorly, with a rating of ‘F’. 
 
5.8 Summary 
 
The selected case studies in this chapter clearly showed the importance of road 
hierarchy, and quantified the influence of daily traffic volumes on the performance of 
intersections. Intersections get impacted due to high traffic volumes, accidents and 
infrastructure constraints. This chapter analysed the performance of intersections and 
corridors in normal conditions and during ‘emergency’ evacuation times as different 
case studies. Through this comprehensive analysis, important limitations of the existing 
traffic management policies in managing isolated intersections as well as traffic 
corridors were identified. Those limitations of traffic management at the intersection 
and corridor levels are summarised as follows. The relationship between the existing 
literature, the traffic management policies and the local government surveys are 
presented in Table 5-26. 
 
Table 5-26: Triangulation 
Item/ 
Question 
Number 
(Reference) 
 
TRANSPORT NETWORK PLANNING AND 
TRAFFIC  MANAGEMENT 
 
Literature 
Review* 
Local 
Government 
Survey 
 
Case study 
1.34  
(Table  4-17) 
Improve transport corridor planning 
to address future demands of the 
network. 
S 4.44 Case Study 4-
2, 
Case Study 4-
3 & Case 
Study 5-2. 
1.41 
(Table  4-17) 
Managing traffic to improve road 
safety. S 4.4 
1.28 
(Table    4-17) 
Having alternative exit routes for 
evacuation. S 4.31 
1.25 
(Table    4-17) 
Designing transport infrastructure to 
accommodate the present and future 
traffic demands. 
S 4.25 Case Study 4-1 
1.35 
(Table   4-17) 
Identifying new transport corridor 
links through transport corridor 
planning. 
S 4.13 
Case Study 4-
2, 
Case Study 4-
3 & Case 
Study 5-2. 
1.06 
(Table   4-17) 
Strategic planning of transport 
infrastructure needs to provide 
resilience to communities at risky 
areas. 
S 4.13 
Case Study 4-
3 & Case 
Study 5-2 
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1.44 
(Table     4-17) 
Improving road design and 
maintenance plans to reduce 
congestion, bottlenecks and reduce 
disruptions to emergency vehicle 
accessibility and evacuations. 
S 4 
Case Study 4-
1 & Case 
Study 5-2 
1.31  
(Table   4-17) 
Planning efficient transport 
infrastructure protection methods. 
 
S 
 
3.94 
 
Case Studies  
4-3 & 5-2 
 1.43  
(Table     4-17) 
Improving emergency access during 
disaster. 
S 3.75 
1  
(Table 2-4) 
 
Improving the access to transport 
network at normal conditions and during 
disaster. 
 
HK 
 
2 
 (Table  2-4) 
Increasing the limited number of routes 
leading out of the city which can be used 
for evacuation 
HK 
 Case Studies 
4-3 & 5-2 
Case Studies 
4-1 & 5-1 1.29 
(Table    4-17) 
 
Accurately predicting traffic volumes 
during disasters within high risk areas. 
 
S 
 
3.56 
3.07  
(Table     4-17) 
 
Improving road layout and alignment 
and enhancing capacity during a 
disaster. 
 
 
S 
 
 
4 
Case Studies 
4-3, 5-2 & 5-3 
 
* Note: 
  
  HK = LITERATURE REVIEW – HURRICANE KATRINA 
 S = LOCAL GOVERNEMT SURVEY  
  
  
As shown in Table 5-26, the triangulation was limited to the scope of this theses. If 
required, this could be triangulated using other areas, such as Environmental impacts 
and the impact on infrastructure. 
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Chapter 6: A STRATEGIC PLANNING FRAMEWORK TO 
ADDRESS IDENTIFIED GAPS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The research presented in the previous chapters identified gaps in decision making that 
affect the resilience of transport infrastructure during a disaster. This chapter presents a 
framework for addressing these identified gaps using a systematic approach. Figure 6-1 
presents the proposed approach. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 -1: Strategic planning framework to address the gaps identified 
 
 
 
STRATEGIC PLANNING FRAMEWORK TO ADDRESS THE GAPS DECISION 
MAKING 
PRIORITISED GAPS 
GAPS IDENTIFIED THROUGH 
THE RESEARCH 
USING EXPERT 
OPINION – LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT 
RISK 
QUANTIFICATI
ON METHOD 
SCENARIO 
ANALYSIS 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO 
DECISION MAKING 
POLICY OR STRATEGY 
Local 
Government 
Questionnaire 
Survey 
(Table 6.6) 
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6.2 Identifying the Decision Maker Responsible for the Gaps 
 
Through the outcomes of the detailed review of case studies (see Appendix 23), the 
level of the responsible authority is identified. This helps with understanding the level 
of government or organisation that should be delivering improvements to address the 
gaps. The responsible authorities identified were federal, state and local governments. 
 
6.3 The Type of Required Action 
 
It was identified that the gaps could be addressed via a strategy or a policy. This was 
captured again in Appendix 23, of which Table 6-1 presents an extract. 
 
Table 6.1 Extract from Appendix 23 
 
 
Table 6-2 presents gaps between existing conditions and the ideal case and indicates the 
affected areas, which is an important step within the framework. 
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Table 6-2: Past case study findings–table identifies ‘gaps’ to each hazard analysed 
TYPE Gaps Identified in the Case Studies 
Ka
tr
in
a 
Fi
nd
in
gs
 
Ko
be
 F
in
di
ng
s 
Bu
sh
fir
e 
Fi
nd
in
gs
  
 
Reference 
Section Page  
Strategies 
and 
Policies 
Stay or Go -action 
/policies/warnings/ responsible 
authorities 
X  X Appendix 23: 
Quantitative ranking of 
findings,  Source Item 
53. 
 
379, 394 
To limit arson X  X 1.1,  4, 
State level planning X  X 2.6 , 3.3.1 29, 105 
Quantifying bushfire 
penetration 
  X  394 
Bushfire Prevention Strategies   X 4.8.2 144 
Urban Sprawl  X X Table 4-17,Item - 1.30 130 
Policy Gaps X X X  188, 239, 253, 
Critical 
Infrastruct
ure 
Water safety and shortages X X X 1.1, 2.4.2, 2.6, 
2.9.1.3,2.10.2.5, 
2.10.2.9, Table 2-4 
(Item Number 1,17,18 
,136 ,144,154), 
2.12,Table 2-5 ),  4.3, 
4.5.2, 4.8.1.1,  4.8.2, 
4.10.9, 4.10.11, Table 
4-17          ( Item 1.43, 
2.07, 2.08,  3.03, ) 
,Table  4-18  ( Item 
52),4.12.1, Table 5-26 
(item 1.43),Table 6-4, 
Table 6-5, 7.3.2 
2,3,7,19,28, 
46, 66, 67, 69, 
70, 94, 114, 
120, 139, 146, 
176, 178, 
190,192, 247, 
248,258, 
Access Routes X X X 
Access, escape routes, 
importance of access, 
inaccessible access 
X X X 
Power blackouts X X X Table 1-1,2.10.1.2, 
Table 2-4 (item 90), 
4.8.1.1, Appendix 23: 
Quantitative ranking of 
findings 
( Source Item 33,47)   
 
 
7, 59, 139,347 
,348,372,373, 
Traffic Jams - Traffic 
Management 
X X X 1.1, Chapter 2, Chapter 
3,Chapter 5, Table 5-3, 
5.6, 5.7.1, 5.7.1.3, 
5.7.2.4.4, 5.8, 7.2,Table 
7-1, 7.3.1, 7.3.3, 7.6, 
iv, 1,6, 8, 9,  
11,106, 176, 
187,192, 193,  
195, 197, 
198,199, 202, 
204, 212, 
227,236, 254,  
255,256, 258, 
260 
Port Infrastructure Protection  X  
Gas services Protection X X X 
Train services X X  
Tram services    
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Reference 
Section Page  
Research 
Fire input modelling  X X 1.1, 2.9,3.5, 4.8.1, 
Table 4-6, Figures 4-11 
and 4-12, 4.8.1.1, Table 
4-7,Table 4-8, Table 4-
9, Figure 4-15 and 4-
16,  4.8.1.6, Table 4-
10,4.9.1, 4.9.2, Figure 
4-25,4.9.3.1 to 4.10.12,   
2,6,8,38,39 
,40, 96, 102, 
105, 133, 135, 
136, 137, 139, 
140,142, 143, 
147, 150,152, 
153-179 
Predicting fire behaviours/ 
bushfire predicting technologies 
 X X 
Predicting hurricane behaviours 
/ hurricane predicting 
technologies 
X X - 2.10.1, 2.10.1.1, 
2.10.1.3, 3.3.1, Tables 
2-4 and  2-5, 
56-58, 59, 69-
99, 102, 
Risk Perception X X X 1.1, 2.3.2, 2.9, Figure 
2-17, 2.9.1, Table 2-
4(Source items 6, 
15,19-30,51,  61,64, 
66-95, 105-126) 
8, 18, 39, 40, 
51, 59,68,  
Media 
role of the media/new media 
technologies 
X X X Table 2-5, Appendix 
23: Quantitative 
ranking of findings( 
Source Item:30, 36 
 
99,343, 349 
Local 
Governme
nt 
Land Management X X X Figure 4.48 and 4.49, 
Appendix 23: 
Quantitative ranking of 
findings( Source 
Item:60) 
 
171, 172, 174,  
175, 389 
Building Management  X X 2.10.2.3, Table 2-4 
(Item 10), 2.12, Table 
2-5,  4.9.4.1, Table 4-
18, , Appendix 23: 
Quantitative ranking of 
findings( Source 
Item:43,47,55, 60) 
 
7,62, 64, 65, 
93, 99, 128,  
166, 190,   
Best Practice  X X 1.1, 2.4.5, 2.6, 4.5.7, 
Appendix 23: 
Quantitative ranking of 
findings( Source 
Item:47) 
3, 21, 27, 122, 
375 
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Reference 
Section Page  
Fire management planning/ 
planning –local / action/ 
integrated emergency planning 
 X X 4.8.2, 4.10.3, table 4-
13, 4.10.9, Appendix 
23: Quantitative 
ranking of findings( 
Source Item:48) 
141, 168, 171, 
175,  
Hurricane disaster management 
planning/planning -local/ action 
/ integrated emergency 
planning 
 X  Appendix 23: 
Quantitative ranking of 
findings( Source 
Item:6, 15, 17, 28, 36, 
37, 40, 43 ), Table 2-4 
Item -, 20-28,29,64,66-
70,72,75,77-80,82, 85, 
95, 105-109, 122- 126) 
69, 327, 334, 
336, 342, 349, 
350,  
Pre-fire information flows - X X 
Pre-hurricane information flows X X - 
Technology New technology usage X X X 2.10.2.5, 2.10.2.9,  64, 68, 
Informatio
n 
After incident information flows X X X 2.4.3, 2.4.5, 2.9,2.9.4,  
Table 2-4 (Item-4,14, 
21, 25, 36, 84) 2.12, 
4.9.3, Table 4-17 Item-
2.12, 2.14, 3.08, 3.09, 
4.12, 5.1, 5.7.1.4, 
6.4.1.1, 6.4.3, table 6-
7,7.2 
v, 19, 23,39,  
55, 69, 97, 98, 
115,  132, 189, 
193, 212, 242-
243,  250, 253,  
Weather X X X 
Causes & circumstances X X X 
Information Flow X X X 
Information technology and 
information flows 
X X X 
Communit
y 
Community Education /Groups 
/ sustainability of community 
information flows 
 X X , 2.12 ,3.5,4.9.2, 
4.9.4.1,4.10.2,4.10.3,T
able 4-13,4.11, Table 4-
17 (Item- 1.48, 1.26, 
1.32),4.12.1,5.3.1,6.4.1
.1, Table 6-7,7.3.1 
 92-95,105, 
152,166-
168,171,180,1
90,196,242-
243, 250, 256 
Social consideration  X X 
Recovery efforts  X X 
Psychological trauma  X X 
Fire Safety/ refugee safety  X X 
Public warnings 
 
 X  
Responsibl
e 
Authoritie
s (CFA and 
FEMA) 
Smoke Management - X X Chapters 2,4 15-98, 111-
191,  
Fire Breaks - X X 
Fire management business 
 
- X X 
Control 
 
X X X 
Event -response cycle/during 
   
X X X 
Equipment/Other Equipment X X X 
Essential services X X X 
Evacuation of refugees/provide 
security to properties during 
i * 
X X X 
Protective burning/Prescribed 
 
X X X 
Preparedness X X X 
Hazard behaviour identification 
 
X X X 
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Knowledge/Skills/ Methods/-
 
X X X 
Fuel management and 
d i  
 
- X X 
Disaster management 
strategies/ action/ policies 
X X X 
Communication methods / 
responsibilities / emergency 
i ti  
X X X 
Standards review X X X 
Command Structure X X X 
Hazard experience X X X 
Refinement of logistics / 
planning and fire 
d/i id t t 
  
X X X 
Local knowledge X X X 
Knowledge and information 
 
X X X 
Data Analysis X X X 
Emergency Management X X X 
Contractor Management / 
/  
X X X 
Post recovery -insurance/ 
  
X X X 
Pre-information flows X X X 
Preparation-lack of preparation X X X 
Re-location of refugees X X X 
Telecommunication planning X X X 
Training-Volunteer training X X X 
Vehicles and other equipment X X X 
Warnings - who is responsible 
for issuing warnings/-timing of 
i /  f i  
X X X 
Working practices-working 
alone 
X X X 
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6.4 Prioritisation of Gaps for Implementation 
 
Prioritising gaps is extremely important as there will be resource constraints in 
addressing all of the identified gaps. To prioritise the gaps to be addressed immediately, 
three possible approaches are proposed. 
6.4.1 Scenario Analysis 
 
Figure 6-2 presents four possible analysis scenarios. 
 
 
Figure 6-2: Four basic analysis scenarios 
 
6.4.1.1 Scenario Descriptions 
 
The analysis framework is divided into four areas as follows. 
 
i. Existing Conditions Scenario 
 
The existing geographical, environmental and land use development conditions are 
considered with the existing transport network. The information gathered would change 
according to each area and the size of the area considered, according to the identified 
hazard. 
 
ii. Ideal Case Scenario 
 
The ideal conditions scenario considers ideal land use developments associated with an 
ideal transport network that is capable of performing well during any disaster scenario. 
In this scenario, theoretically accepted parameters should be considered with respect to 
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transport network and transport infrastructure design and strategic planning. This could 
involve using wider transport networks with extra travel lanes to cater for ‘extra’ 
demands during a disaster scenario or forbidding developments in high-risk areas. In an 
ideal case, transport infrastructure would be designed to address hazards in a short 
amount of time to ensure the safety of communities and to provide protection for 
transport infrastructure. This scenario would use ‘state of the art’ technologies identified 
under ‘ITS’, ‘vehicle-to-vehicle’ communications and ‘intelligent transport 
infrastructure’, which are designed and installed in such a manner that they could be 
controlled from single or multiple locations. Ideal transport infrastructure should be 
constructed to promote safety and improve communication to motorists. 
 
iii. Base Case Scenario 
 
This is the minimum requirement for community and transport infrastructure resilience. 
In this scenario, basic elements such as having a transport network associated with land 
use practices are considered. Information is gathered to compose the basic needs to 
provide resilience to community and transport, networks and transport infrastructure. 
The difference between the existing case and the base case gives the high-priority gaps. 
 
iv. Validation Using ‘During and After’ Hazard Data 
 
This scenario is very important and varies according to many factors including transport 
network gaps, land use development risks and geographical risks that would provide 
resilience to community and transport infrastructure. During and after a hazard, many 
impacts are identified, including impacts to transport networks and transport 
infrastructure and impacts to land use development, such as buildings and homes being 
destroyed and the lives of people being severely affected. 
 
Data from these real scenarios can be used to validate/identify major gaps in decision 
making. 
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Figure 6-3: High-risk event analysis framework through scenarios 
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Figure 6-3 presents the proposed method. The gaps between existing conditions and 
the ideal condition represents the full list of gaps identified using multiple methods. 
The difference between the existing condition and the base case represents the high-
priority gaps that must be addressed immediately. 
 
These gaps can be validated using the case studies on disasters and the records for 
during and after scenarios. 
 
Figure 6-3 provides a framework process to identify and mitigate risk to transport 
infrastructure. This can be applied to other types of infrastructure. The proposed 
strategic planning framework not only enables the process, but enhances the expected 
achievable to an extent, where it could provide quantified and could be applied to any 
natural disaster scenario. This process would enable to identify any inherent gaps in 
within existing processes and there are possibilities to have a quantifiable monetary 
value attach to it. 
 
6.4.2 Prioritising of Gaps Using a Risk Quantification Approach 
 
This approach can be attempted in three stages. 
 
Stage 1: Identification of Gaps 
 
This stage involves compiling all of the identified gaps in a given area of operation as 
shown in Table 6-2. This list in fact shows the difference between existing conditions 
and the ideal case. 
 
Stage 2: Qualitative Analysis of Risk 
 
Risk is defined in the literature as summarised in Table 6.3. In a qualitative analysis, 
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this information can be incorporated using a rating of High, Medium or Low for each 
of the elements of the equations. Tables 6.4 and 6.5 present two different qualitative 
approaches to risk ranking. 
 
Table 6-3: Risk assessment equations (selected equations) 
 
 
Table 6-4: Qualitative ranking of risks caused by land use planning decisions affecting vulnerability, 
risk and resilience of transport infrastructure 
Decision Weakness (Gap) 
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n 
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m
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to
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r 
A
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Im
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ct
 
on
 
re
si
lie
nc
e 
New 
development 
in land rezoned 
from rural / 
farming to 
residential 
Not considering the need for connections 
to existing roads so that adequate 
redundancy is provided 
H M - H H H H 
Incorrect or lack of estimation of traffic at 
an emergency event H H H H H 
Not considering future potential 
developments and corresponding increase 
  
M H H M M 
Not considering future traffic signal needs 
and failure at an emergency H L M M M 
Lack of provision of emergency access M H H M H 
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Not considering resilience of street 
infrastructure at the event of an 
 
H M M M M 
New 
developments 
in land re-
zoned from 
residential to 
industrial zone 
Not considering Freight access issues H H M M H 
Not considering impact on surrounding 
residential zones during an emergency 
event 
H M M M H 
New 
Developments 
in high risk 
areas such as 
bushfire zones, 
unstable 
ground, flood 
zones 
Not considering the need for alternative 
routes at an emergency H H H H H 
Not including special conditions to protect 
transport infrastructure at an emergency H H H H H 
 
Table 6-5: Qualitative ranking of risks caused by land zone changes 
Re-Zoning and decision making impacts ((High / medium / low) 
Zone Changes 
Parameters Description 
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Zone 
Road 
Network 
Limited 
connections to 
existing networks 
H M-H M H L-M H 
High traffic 
congestions H H M H M-H H 
Limitations to 
future road width 
expansions 
H H M H-M M H 
Future traffic 
signal installation 
H H M H M H 
Amenity 
Accessibility to 
properties 
H H M H H H 
Emergency Vehicle 
Access 
H H M H H H 
Pedestrian 
Facilities 
H H M H M H 
Reside
ntial 
Zone 
Infrastructur
e 
Damages due to 
flooding /bushfires 
H H M H M-H H 
Damages due to 
Traffic related 
accidents 
H H L M L H 
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Agriculture 
and Farming 
land 
Limited future 
available land for 
farming & 
agriculture 
H H L M L L 
Residen
tial 
Zone 
Industr
ial 
Zone 
Road 
Network  
Limited 
connections to 
existing networks 
H M-H M H L-M H 
High traffic 
congestions 
H H M H M-H H 
Limitations to 
future road width 
expansions 
H H M H-M M H 
Future traffic 
signal installation 
M H M H M H 
Freight access 
Issues 
H H H H H H 
Amenity  Accessibility  H H H H H H 
Pedestrian 
facilities 
H H M H M H 
 
 
Stage 3: Risk Quantification 
 
Risk quantification requires quantifying all the elements of the equations given in 
Table 6.3. An example is provided below. 
 
Risk = Threat × Vulnerability × Consequence. 
 
Threat = Probability of occurrence of the hazard,  
which can be determined using predictive modelling of natural hazard intensities. 
 
Vulnerability = Weakness of the system,  
which is usually defined as the ratio of capacity during a disaster to the full operation 
capacity of the system during normal functionality. 
 
Consequence = Cost incurred by the gap in decision making,  
which can be estimated using information such as that given in Table 6.6. 
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 Using this method, gaps can be ranked based on their quantified risk. Although this 
approach requires substantial amounts of information, it is the most precise way of 
addressing this issue. 
Table 6-6: Costs of road crashes in Australia 
 
(Source: Guide to Road Safety 2009, p. 6) 
 
Table 6-3 identifies the relevant components of risk. Table 6-4 analyses the risk in 
terms of land use changes. Table 6-5 analyses the impact due to land re-zoning 
changes. 
6.4.3 Using Expert Opinion 
 
Table 6.7 shows the outcome of the current study’s survey of local government 
practitioners that identified the importance of gaps in decision making. This type of 
approach can be effectively used to prioritise gaps. The table provides a summary of 
information in Table 4-17 and illustrates the importance of highly-rated factors. 
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Table 6-7: Quantitative ratings of present views 
 
Stages of Disaster 
Local 
Government 
Survey 
Averages 
1. Pre Disaster   
Land use development decisions impact communities. 4.50 
There should be policies to Federal, State and Local policies in place prevent land 
use development and construction within hazardous areas and areas with high 
potential/risk of damage during disasters (e.g. bushfire and flood) such as 
wetlands. 
4.44 
Developing strategic planning policies to protect critical infrastructure is 
important. 4.44 
Transport corridor planning need to address future demands on the network due 
to land use planning and developments. 4.44 
There is a need to manage road network to improve road safety to all road users. 4.44 
There is a need for people to have insurance cover for life and property damages 
for different types of disasters. 4.44 
Having alternative exit routes for evacuation is a good practice. 4.38 
There should be planning for different types of disasters and the potential 
evacuation strategies and the facilities needed for each disaster type. 4.31 
Disaster evacuation decision making depends on the type of disaster, magnitude 
of disaster, geographical location, community impacted, available resources to 
counter the threat, and available time. 
4.31 
Transport corridors are key components of transport infrastructure. 4.31 
Transport infrastructure should be designed to accommodate the present and 
future traffic demands. 4.25 
Disaster evacuation lead decision maker need to understand the nature of the 
impact. 4.19 
Strategic planning of transport infrastructure need to consider providing resilience 
to communities within high risk areas. 4.13 
Transport network expansion and transport infrastructure are required for urban 
sprawl. 4.13 
New transport corridor links needs to be identified through transport corridor 
planning to provide for gaps in the existing network. 4.13 
Poor road design and maintenance creates congestion, bottle necks and increase 
the incidents of road accidents, create disruptions to emergency vehicle 
accessibility and evacuations. 
4 
2. During Disaster   
There is a need for comprehensive media coverage to provide information to the 
public during the disaster, providing information on safe routes / areas. 4.5 
Road network plays an important role by connecting cities, townships, countries 
and provide lifelines during disaster evacuations. 4.25 
There is a need to provide facilities for people with special needs including elderly 
and people with disabilities during the disaster evacuation. 4.25 
Water, gas, electricity and telecommunication services are interrupted during the 
disaster. 4.06 
There is a need for coordination and harmony between the police/medical 
services during disaster. 4.00 
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Residents evacuating a bushfire get trapped due to fallen trees or roadside 
burning trees. 4.00 
3. Post Disaster   
Relief coordinating organisations should understand the impact of critical 
infrastructure failures on community during and after a disaster. 4.25 
In the event of a disaster, transport infrastructure is expected to play a vital role in 
providing safety to communities during the process of evacuation. 4.25 
There is a need for media coverage to provide information to the public after the 
disaster. 4.06 
Road layout, alignment, dead – end streets and width of roads, road capacities 
become an issue during a disaster. 4.00 
 
6.5 Summary of Gaps and Ratings 
 
This chapter presented a strategic planning decision process to address strategic 
planning gaps identified in the research. A systematic process for ranking or 
prioritising of gaps was presented. Development of a full risk ranking process was not 
explored as input parameters vary significantly. Risk ranking of all gaps was 
considered beyond the scope of this research. 
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Chapter 7: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides responses to the research questions, summarises the research 
findings presented in the thesis, provides concise conclusions from the work and 
presents recommendations for future research. 
 
The outcomes will enable responsible authorities to address gaps in their strategic 
planning processes that affect resilience of transport infrastructure. The contribution 
to knowledge comes from the identification of major sectors of strategic transport 
planning that influence disaster resilience of communities; gaps in practices that 
reduce that resilience; the responsible authorities who can address the gaps; and the 
development of a systematic approach to address the identified issues. 
 
7.2 Addressing of Research Questions 
 
The thesis adopted the following research methods to address the research questions: 
• analysis of the literature to understand previous work in which gaps have been 
identified in the strategic planning decision-making process 
• identification of three key sectors of decision making that affect resilience: 
land use development; traffic and transport planning; and road design 
• identification of the responsible authorities for the three sectors 
• identification of actions required for strategy, planning or policy development 
• analysis of case studies from two major sectors selected for this research: land 
use development; and traffic and transport planning 
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• identification of gaps in decision making from the analysis of case studies 
sourced from local government information 
• triangulation of data using multiple sources 
• capturing of expert knowledge from local government authorities in disaster-
prone areas 
• delivery of a questionnaire survey developed based on the literature review 
and case study analysis 
• analysis of questionnaire survey responses and validation of identified gaps 
• traffic and transport modelling to demonstrate normal functionality of the road 
network and its capacity under disaster scenarios 
• validation of gaps in transport and traffic management that affect disaster 
resilience 
• confirmation and consolidation of the list of gaps in transport and traffic 
management. 
 
The research questions outlined in Chapter 3 are shown in Table 7.1, which also 
identifies the respective chapter in which each question was addressed. 
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Table 7.1: Research questions and the summary of response 
 Research Questions Where addressed 
1. What are the elements of Strategic 
Transport Planning where decisions 
made could affect resilience of 
infrastructure and communities?  
Literature Review – chapter 2 
2. What are the gaps in decision making at 
land use planning stages which affect 
resilience?  
Literature review, analysis of 
case studies and response from 
local government experts, - 
chapters 2 and 4 
3. What are the gaps in decision making at 
transport planning and traffic 
management which affect resilience?  
Literature review, analysis of 
case studies and traffic and 
transport modelling – chapters 2 
and 5F 
4. How can we develop a decision making 
framework capturing the above gaps? 
Literature Review & analysis of 
decision making processes – 
chapters 2 and 6. 
5. How can we prioritise the gaps within 
the decision making process?  
Risk based prioritisation of 
actions – chapter 6 
 
7.3 Summary of Findings of the Research 
 
Summaries of the findings of the thesis are provided in the following sections. 
 
7.3.1 The Literature Review 
 
It was identified that decision making in strategic transport planning is a key area that 
affects disaster resilience of communities; there are no models or frameworks in the 
literature that demonstrate the connections between strategic transport planning, land 
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use development planning and traffic management. 
 
Case studies published by previous researchers were analysed and used to identify 
gaps in strategic transport planning decision making that affect the resilience of road 
networks and the community during disasters. Two well-explored case studies, 
Hurricane Katrina and the Kobe earthquake, were examined through an analysis of 
published work. 
 
The research questions were developed to address the gaps in knowledge identified in 
the literature review chapter. Table 2.2 captured previous research findings in regard 
to land use development practices, transport corridor performance and community 
resilience. 
 
This analysis also captured affected areas of responsibilities including strategic 
transport planning; land use development; transport corridor planning; road design; 
risk and resilience; other strategic planning gaps; and state and local government 
 
The scope of the current research was restricted to land use development and traffic 
and transport planning, considering that these are the areas in which most of the 
issues were observed. 
 
7.3.2 Land Use Development Planning 
 
Land use zone changes created many issues for road and land use planning 
authorities. Further, the impact of land use zone changes on communities and road 
infrastructure and networks was in ongoing problem that needed addressing; there 
were no clear processes to identify parameters to validate impacts. 
 
Land use development planning and traffic management were key elements in 
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strategic transport planning that ensured resilience of transport infrastructure and 
transport networks and facilitated community resilience during extreme events. There 
were many similarities between the findings of this research and those of past 
researchers as well as recent Victorian Auditor-General’s findings (Greaves 2017), 
confirming that these gaps remain ongoing issues that need to be addressed. 
 
Three major areas in which the decisions made can have a significant impact on 
community and transport infrastructure resilience were identified as: 
• Land use zone changes 
• Development approvals in high-risk areas 
• Limitations in the analysis of transport modelling to understand the impacts of 
new developments. 
 
A review of land use planning and approval processes indicated that a major gap 
exists in decision making associated with changing land use from a low-density to a 
high-density residential zone. In an attempt to understand this, a review of land use 
zone changes that took place in Geelong in the period 2000–13 was undertaken, and 
the outcomes confirmed this gap in practice. The major gaps identified were 
presented in tables. 
 
A second major area of importance identified was development approvals in high-risk 
bushfire areas. Often the approval process does not consider a disaster scenario 
although this has been identified as an issue in many previous reports on disasters. To 
confirm this and identify the issues, two case studies were analysed: the Black 
Saturday bushfires and a bushfire threat to Breamlea Township in Geelong. 
 
The Black Saturday bushfires case study indicated that the 2009 Victorian Bushfire 
Royal Commission Report (2009) highlighted 64 recommendations. Although a 
number of these related to land use development approvals in high-risk areas, they 
still have not been addressed. 
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 The Breamlea case study highlighted the dangerous situation the residents could face 
in the event of a bushfire. The road network would not cope with a hazardous 
situation such as a fast-moving bushfire. 
 
Major issues that should have been addressed in strategic transport planning for the 
Breamlea area include: 
• road capacities, vegetation along roads, emergency vehicle access difficulties, 
road alignment, unsealed roadways and congestion during summer fire 
danger periods because of tourism 
• water availability for fire control; poor access to hydrants 
• the time for a bushfire to reach the safety line was estimated at 194.11 sec at a 
wind speed of 50 km/h wind speed and 96.88 sec at a wind speed of 100 
km/h; the time for people to evacuate the area was estimated at 164 sec at a 
rate of 50 km/h—this is without any obstructions or delays on the road, 
which has not been considered in development approvals 
• the first fire truck to enter Breamlea from the Connewarre CFA Brigade 
would take approximately 12–20 minutes; it is expected that bushfires would 
generate or travel from the Torquay area towards Breamlea, passing Point 
Impossible Road and because of the short time frame, residents of Breamlea 
need to be aware and ready to leave at short notice. 
 
7.3.3 Traffic Management and Corridor Planning 
 
The analysis of the case studies concluded that the analysis of road intersections and 
effects on the road network should be considered in transport corridor planning and 
traffic management to ensure that the road network has the capacity to operate well 
under evacuation scenarios. 
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7.3.4 Decision Making 
 
Considering the diversity and the need for flexibility in implementation, a decision-
making process is proposed to understand and address the gaps identified in strategic 
transport planning decision making that affect disaster resilience of communities. The 
framework is integrated with a risk quantification approach to enable ranking of the 
gaps in processes using a risk-based approach. 
 
Three possible methods of prioritising actions were proposed, based on the case 
studies analysed. The method was demonstrated in Chapter 6. 
 
7.4 Conclusions 
 
The major outcomes of the research can be summarised as: 
1. identification of gaps in decision making at the strategic planning stage of 
transport infrastructure, which can be used by practitioners as a check list 
2. establishing the major sectors in which the decisions are made and the 
responsible authorities 
3. a method for prioritising decisions considering ideal and base case scenarios. 
 
7.5 Limitations of the Research 
The research presented in the thesis has some limitations due to the fact that case 
studies analysed have differences and comparison was different. Also the number of 
case studies analysed was limited due to the availability of data. A controlled 
experiment was not possible due to the variable nature of disasters. 
The survey response rate was limited to the local government authorities and could 
have been expanded to emergency service providers as well. 
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 7.6 Recommendations for Future Research 
 
The scope of research was limited to two major sectors: transport corridor planning; 
and the related traffic management and land use development planning. Other areas to 
be addressed in future research include road design and emergency management 
processes. 
 
Further, the risk quantification method proposed in this thesis requires a significant 
amount of work to capture threat likelihoods, vulnerabilities of systems and 
consequences. This will enable quantified ranking of the gaps identified through the 
research presented here. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Objectives of the TIA Act 
Objectives of the Act for Transport Decision making principles to be applied under the Act 
Social and economic inclusion The principle of integrated decision making 
Economic prosperity The principle of triple bottom line assessment 
Environmental sustainability The principle of equity  
Integration of transport and land 
use 
The principle of the transport system user perspective 
Efficiency, coordination and 
reliability 
The precautionary principle 
Safety, health and wellbeing The principle of stakeholder engagement and community 
participation 
 The principle of transparency.  
(Source: http://www.transport.vic.gov.au/legislation) 
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Appendix 2: Victorian planning policies and processes 
A Plan for General 
Development (1929) 
Presents a planning scheme to prevent 'misuse' of land and protect 
property values. It also identified a number of issues such as traffic 
congestion and recognised the value of Melbourne's waterways as an 
open space network. 
Melbourne Metropolitan 
Planning Scheme 1954 – 
Report 
Shows the beginnings of the development corridors that we know today 
and planned for a population of 2.5 million in the 1990s, a population 
actually reached in the 1970s. 
Melbourne Metropolitan 
Planning Scheme 1954 – 
Survey and Analysis 
 
This document is a complimentary document to the Melbourne 
Metropolitan Planning Scheme Report 1954 Report. It presents a detailed 
account of the studies which formed the factual basis of the 1954 report 
and proposed planning scheme 
Planning Policies for the 
Melbourne Metropolitan 
Region (1971) 
Introduced long-term conservation and development policies through 
growth corridors and what we now call green wedge principles, and 
contained outward growth to a limited number of areas on the edge of 
the city. It looked at the physical constraints around Melbourne for the 
first time. 
Report on General 
Concept Objections (1974) 
Examines the submissions and objections to the Planning Policies for the 
Melbourne Metropolitan Region. 
Metropolitan Strategy 
Implementation (1981) 
Encouraged development in existing areas, and sought to concentrate 
housing, transport, employment and community facilities in highly 
accessible places. 
Living Suburbs (1995) 
 
 
Focuses on relationships between central city, suburban Melbourne and 
adjacent regional areas providing a framework for integrated 
metropolitan development to enhance Melbourne's environment and 
liveability, and managing infrastructure and urban development. 
Melbourne 2030 (2002) Quantified the task of urban consolidation. It also introduced an Urban 
Growth Boundary. 
A plan for Melbourne's 
growth areas (2005) 
Sets out a strategic approach for development in Melbourne's growth 
areas, including the establishment of the Growth Areas Authority. 
Planning for all of 
Melbourne (2008) 
The Government's response to the audit of Melbourne 2030. 
Melbourne 2030 audit 
report (2008) 
An independent audit of Melbourne 2030 and provided 
recommendations on the implementation of Melbourne 2030. 
Melbourne 2030 a 
planning update - 
Melbourne@ 5Million 
(2008) 
Outlined policy implications from the Victorian in Future 2008 growth 
projections. 
Delivering Melbourne's 
Newest Sustainable 
Communities (2009) 
Outlined an integrated approach to land use, transport and 
environmental initiatives, including the Urban Growth Boundary and 
Growth Areas Infrastructure Contribution.  
Plan Melbourne  
[Source: http://www.dtpli.vic.gov.au/planning/plans-and-policies/planning-for-
melbourne/melbournes-strategic-planning-history) 
(Table prepared by author) 
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Appendix 3: List of Victorian transport policy guidelines 
Victorian Transport Policy Guidelines 
18.01 
Integrated 
Transport 
 
18.01-1 
Land use 
and 
transport 
planning 
 
Activity Centres and Principal Public Transport Network Plan 
 Melbourne 2030 (Department of Sustainability and 
Environment, 2002) 
Melbourne 2030: A planning update Melbourne @ 5 million 
(DPCD, 2008) 
The Victorian Transport Plan (Department of Transport, 
 Public Transport Guidelines for Land Use and Development 
(DoT, 2008) 
Victorian Cycling Strategy (State Government of Victoria, 
 The Victorian Transport Plan (Department of Transport, 
 18.01-2 
Transport 
System 
Freight Futures: Victorian Freight Network Strategy for a 
more prosperous and liveable Victoria (DoT, 2008) 
Public Transport: Guidelines for land use and development 
(DoT, 2008) 
Any relevant highway strategy published by VicRoads 
18.02 
Movement 
networks 
18.02-1 Sustainable personal transport 
18.02-2 
Cycling 
Guide to Traffic Eng: Practice Part 14-Bicycles (Austroads, 
 Victorian Cycling Strategy (State Government of Victoria, 
 18.02-3 
Principal 
Public 
Transport 
Network 
 
Activity Centres and Principal Public Transport Network Plan 
 Public Transport Guidelines for Land Use and Dev: (DoT, 
 Melbourne 2030 (DSE, 2002) 
Melbourne 2030: A planning update Melbourne @ 5 million 
(DPCD 2008) 
The Victorian Transport Plan (Department of Transport, 
2008) Victorian Cycling Strategy (State Government of Victoria 
 18.02-4 Management of the road system 
18.02-5 
Car parking 
Public Transport Guidelines for Land Use and Development 
(DoT, 2008). 
18.03 
Ports 
 
18.03-1 
Planning 
for ports 
 
The Victorian Transport Plan (DoT, 2008) 
Melbourne 2030 (DSE, 2002) 
Victorian Ports Strategic Framework (DoT, 2004) 
Freight Futures: Victorian Freight Network Strategy for a 
more prosperous and liveable Victoria (DoT, 2008) 
Statement of Planning Policy No 1 - Western Port (1970-
varied 1976) 
Port Futures (State Government of Victoria, 2009) 
Port of Hastings Land Use and Transport Strategy (2009) 
Port of Portland - Port Land Use Strategy (2009) 
Port of Geelong- Port Land Use Strategy (2009) 
Port of Melbourne Port Development Strategy (2009) 
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18.03-2 Planning for land adjacent to ports 
18.04 
Airports 
 
18.04-1 
Melbourne 
Airport 
Melbourne Airport Master Plan (Australia Pacific Airports 
(Melbourne) Pty Ltd, September 2008) 
Melbourne Airport Strategy (Government of 
Victoria/Federal Airports Corporation, approved 1990) and 
its associated Final Environmental 
Impact Statement in relation to planning decisions 
         18.04-2 
Planning for 
airports 
Avalon Airport Strategy (Department of Business and 
Employment/Aero Space Technologies of Australia, 1993) 
and its associated Aircraft Noise Exposure Concepts. 
18.04-3 Planning for airfields 
18.05 
Freight 
18.05-1 
Develop 
freight links 
Freight Futures: Victorian Freight Network Strategy for a 
more prosperous and liveable Victoria (Department of 
Transport, 2008) 
(Source: http://www.dse.vic.gov.au/planningschemes/aavpp/18_sppf.pdf) 
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Appendix 4: City of Greater Geelong’s land use planning processes 
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Appendix 5: City of Greater Geelong’s land use zoning changes in Geelong 
 
SUBURB 
PLANNING 
REF: 
NUMBER 
FROM CHANGE OF USE TO 
 
SUBURB 
PLANNING 
REF: 
NUMBER 
FROM CHANGE OF USE TO 
ANAKIE 1 B1Z B1Z B4Z   
 MEADOW
VALE 1 
R1Z / 
PCRZ B1Z       
BATESFORD 1 RLZ TZ      
NORTH 
GEELONG 
1 SUZ R1Z RCDZ     
BELMONT 
1/2 R1Z IN1Z B1Z   2 PPRZ B4Z       
1 PPRZ PUZ6      3 R1Z IN1Z       
BARWON 
HEADS 1/2 R1Z MUZ       NEWTOW
N 
1 R1Z B1Z B4Z     
BELL PARK 1 R1Z IN1Z       2 SBZ MUZ       
CORIO 
1/2 R1Z B1Z B3Z     3 PPRZ R1Z       
3 RZ RLZ       NORLANE 1 PPRZ R1Z       
4 PPRZ SUZ6       
OCEAN 
GROVE 
2 RZ PUZ SUZ8     
CLIFTON 
SPRINGS 1 PPRZ R1Z       3 R1Z B1Z PUZ 7     
 2 RLZ R1Z       4 B1Z B4Z       
DRYSDALE 1 FZ R1Z       5 FZ R1Z B1Z B4Z IN3Z 
 2 LDRZ R1Z       6 LDRZ R1Z       
 3 R1Z B1Z       7 PPRZ 3 R1Z       
FYANSFORD 1 UFZ RLZ PCRZ    8 PUZ R1Z       
 2 IN1Z R1Z MUZ B1Z PPRZ 
POINT 
LONSDALE 1 SUZ 3 R1Z       
GEELONG 
1 R1Z MUZ B5Z     
PORTARLI
NGTON 
1 B4Z R1Z       
2 B4Z B2Z MUZ     2 LDRZ R1Z       
3 RZ R1Z PCRZ     3 RZ R1Z       
4 PCRZ IN1Z       4 R1Z B1Z       
5 
R2Z / 
B2Z PUZ3       5 RLZ R1Z       
INDENTED 
HEAD 1 RZ R1Z       ST.LEONAR
DS 
1 RZ 
SUZ 
3       
GROVEDALE 1 RZ PUZ3       2 R1Z B1Z       
 2 B4Z B1Z       3 SUZ 3 R1Z       
HIGHTON 1 R1Z B1Z       
SOUTH 
GEELONG 1 IN1Z R1Z       
LEOPOLD 
2 RZ R1Z B1Z PUZ   
WEST 
GEELONG 
1 B4Z B1Z       
3 FZ R1Z PUZ1     2 
IN1Z / 
R1Z MUZ R1Z     
4 RLZ R1Z       96 IN1Z R1Z B4Z     
5 LDRZ R1Z PPRZ     3 R1Z MUZ       
6 PUZ R1Z       WANDANA 1 
RZ / 
LDRZ R1Z PCRZ     
LARA 1 RLZ R1Z LDRZ UFZ   
WAURN 
PONDS 1 R1Z B1Z       
2 UFZ R1Z              
LOVELY 
BANKS 1 RZ RLZ RLZ     
       
MT DUNEED 1 RZ PUZ5              
MOOLAP 
1 RZ LDRZ              
2 LDRZ B4Z              
3 
B4Z / 
LDRZ MUZ 
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 Appendix 6: Land rezoning combinations 
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B1Z    B1Z Commercial 1        TZ  TZ Township  
B2Z    B2Z Commercial 1        PU Z   PU Z Public Use    
B4Z    B4Z Commercial 1           RI Z   R1 Z Residential 1      
PCRZ     PCR Z Public Conservation & Resource 
PPRZ    PPR Z Public Parks & Recreation  
MUZ    MU Z   MIXED USE        RZ   RZ Rural 
RD Z    RD Z  Road Zone        RL Z  RL Z Rural Living 
FZ    FZ   FARMING        SU Z  SU Z Special Use 
IN2 Z    IN1 Z INDUSTRIAL 1          LDRZ   Low Density Residential 
IN2 Z    IN2 Z INDUSTRIAL 2            
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Appendix 7: Accident types before development  Appendix 8: Accident types after development 
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Appendix 9: Existing traffic volumes surveys of adjoining roads—vehicles per day 
(VPD) 
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Appendix 10: Accident numbers according to distance from the development 
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Appendix 11: Existing traffic volumes surveys of adjoining roads–vehicles per day 
(VPD) 
Existing AM / PM Traffic Volumes 
 
 
 
301 
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Appendix 12: Definitions for Classifying Accidents (DCA) 
 
   
(Source: http://data.vicroads.vic.gov.au/metadata/crashstats_user_guide_and_appendices.pdf)
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Appendix 13: Questionnaire 
   
 
 
304 
  
  
 
305 
  
  
 
306 
  
  
 
307 
  
  
 
308 
  
 
  
309 
  
 
310 
Appendix 14: Level of service (LoS) during normal times 
PAKINGTON STREET CORRIDOR 1 [C1] 
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Level of Service (LOS) during Normal Times 
GEORGE STREET AND ELIZABETH STREET CORRIDOR 2 [C2]  
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Level of Service (LOS) during Normal Times 
SHANNON AVENUE CORRIDOR 3 [C3]  
   
 
   
 
   
313 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
314 
Appendix 15: Level of service (LoS) during emergency/disaster 
PAKINGTON STREET CORRIDOR 1 [C1] 
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Level of Service (LOS) - During Emergency (Disaster) 
GEORGE STREET AND ELIZABETH STREET CORRIDOR 2 [C2] 
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Level of Service (LOS) - During Emergency (Disaster) 
SHANNON AVENUE CORRIDOR 3 [C3] 
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Appendix 16: Travel speed during emergency/disaster 
PAKINGTON STREET CORRIDOR 1 [C1] 
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Travel Speed [Emergency (Disaster) 
GEORGE STREET AND ELIZABETH STREET CORRIDOR 2 [C2] 
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Travel Speed [Emergency (Disaster) Times] 
SHANNON AVENUE CORRIDOR 3 [C3] 
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Appendix 17          Appendix 18 
NETWORK SUMMARY- Corridor 1[Normal]    NETWORK SUMMARY- Corridor 1[Emergency –Disaster] 
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Appendix 19          Appendix 20 
NETWORK SUMMARY - Corridor 2 [Normal]    NETWORK SUMMARY- Corridor 2[Emergency –Disaster] 
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Appendix 21        Appendix 22 
NETWORK SUMMARY- Corridor 3 [Normal]   NETWORK SUMMARY- Corridor 3 [Emergency –Disaster] 
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implement risk reduction measures and 
undertake business continuity planning. 
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complete investigation of non-
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planning and zoning, for addressing 
transportation challenges. 
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2 Corridors provide a more direct connection 
between the movement of people and 
goods and state-significant economic 
activity. 
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2 Corridors, especially trade corridors, 
handle significant amounts of through trips 
in many states. 
 
o o o       X       4 5 4 5 4 3  
 
St
at
e 
 
  
Po
lic
y 
    
326 
SO
U
RC
E 
KEY GAPS STATED BY 
PREVIOUS RESEARCHERS 
WHEN IT 
SHOULD BE 
MONITORED 
 
[Identified by 
Author] 
CR
IT
IC
AL
 IN
FR
AS
TR
U
CT
U
RE
 
TR
AN
SP
O
RT
 IN
FR
AS
TR
U
CT
U
RE
 
RE
SI
LI
EN
CE
 A
N
D 
PL
AN
N
IN
G
 
LA
N
D 
U
SE
 D
EV
EL
O
PM
EN
T 
DE
CI
SI
O
N
S 
TR
AN
SP
O
RT
 P
LA
N
N
IN
G
 
RO
AD
 D
ES
IG
N
 
DI
SA
ST
ER
 R
ES
IL
IE
N
CE
 P
LA
N
N
IN
G
 
AN
D 
M
AN
AG
EM
EN
T 
CO
M
M
U
N
IC
AT
IO
N
 A
N
D 
CO
O
RD
IN
AT
IO
N
 
Ke
y 
Re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y 
Ra
tin
gs
 o
f 
Fe
de
ra
l[F
], 
St
at
e[
S]
 
an
d 
Lo
ca
l[L
] 
Go
ve
rn
m
en
t  
Re
qu
ire
m
en
t –
 
Po
lic
y 
[P
], 
St
ra
te
gy
[S
] o
r 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 [P
] FINAL KEY NEEDS 
& 
REQUIREMENTS 
[Identified by Author] 
Pr
e 
– 
Di
sa
st
er
 
Du
rin
g 
– 
D
is
as
te
r 
Po
st
 –
 D
is
as
te
r 
Performance Rating (5-1) [5 = 
Highest, 1 = lowest] 
[Rated by Author] 
Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
St
ra
te
gy
 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 
IMPACTED AREAS (X) F S  L P Str PL 
2 The rationale for conducting individual 
corridor analyses in the first place is to 
provide specific attention to the needs and 
issues in a particular corridor 
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Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused the 
largest number of destroyed and damaged 
platforms and pipelines, and the highest 
number of mobile offshore drilling units. 
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4 Examines the framing of crisis 
communication strategies before, during, 
and after by analyzing news releases from 
the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, Homeland Security, and U.S. 
Senators and Governors. Five categories 
emerged from the news releases analysis: 
government response, relief efforts, 
economic recovery, reports, and health 
issues. 
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5 The question whether there is a need or 
even a possibility to escape from the 
present technological lock-in seems to 
remain out of bounds for a society that 
imagines flood protection to be absolute. 
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The need for similar absolute protection 
was demanded in New Orleans shortly 
after Hurricane Katrina caused extensive 
flooding there.  
6  Hurricane Katrina generated commercial 
structure damages of $21 Billion, 
commercial equipment damages of $36 
Billion, residential structure and content 
damages of almost $75 Billion, electric 
utility damages of $231 Million, highway 
damages of $3 Billion, sewer system 
damages of $1.2 Billion and commercial 
revenue losses of $4.6 Billion. 
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6 The effect of the long-term failures at every 
level of government to plan and prepare 
adequately for a catastrophic hurricane in 
the Gulf of Mexico was evident in the 
inadequate preparations before Katrina’s 
landfall and then again in the initial 
response to the storm. 
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6 Vulnerability is defined as a function of 
exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive 
capacity. Physical vulnerability results from 
exposure, and social vulnerability emanates 
from social factors that place people in 
highly exposed areas, affect the sensitivity 
of people to that exposure, and influence 
their capacity to respond and adapt. 
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7 Illustrated the importance of hazard 
mitigation for complex urban 
environments dependent upon a 
sophisticated array of transportation, 
communication, and infrastructure 
systems. 
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8 In the United States, the Robert T. Stafford 
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act establishes a framework for 
government response in situations 
involving hurricanes or other major 
disasters. The Stafford Act has come under 
criticism from state and local officials in the 
Gulf Coast for failing to adequately address 
catastrophic disasters. 
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9 Overall vulnerability to hurricanes has 
grown. Accelerating subsidence, rising sea 
level, storm surges, and possible increased 
frequency of larger hurricanes. 
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9 These partly natural phenomena have been 
enhanced by human location decisions, 
Argues that society’s understandings of 
environmental and public health threats 
are dangerously compromised by expert 
systems that create and legitimate those 
understandings.  
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10 The relationship between land use, 
transport demand and supply is dynamic 
and very complicated. The outcome rests 
partly on assumptions and policies that 
transport planning has little chance of 
validating. 
o   o       X       4 3 3 5 3 2 
Fe
de
ra
l 
    
Po
lic
y 
    
10 As a consequence of both the private and 
social impacts of transport and the 
particular solution given to the 
organizational issue, transport policy has 
become a political and ideological issue. 
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10 Transport management and transport 
infrastructure planning require skill, and 
transport flow modelling has rapidly 
increased in complexity. 
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11 While contra flow is widely viewed as the 
best way to increase outbound flow during 
evacuations, it is not universally considered 
to be the cure to evacuation problems 
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12 The extent of the damage to the highway 
and rail transportation systems and the 
volume of debris in the streets created 
major traffic congestion and blocked 
emergency vehicle access. 
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13 A general question for the engineering and 
political communities is how to identify 
areas of extreme vulnerability and address 
these vulnerabilities before disasters occur. 
It was well known that New Orleans was 
vulnerable to hurricanes of magnitudes 
that had occurred in the past and would 
recur in the future. 
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14 Addresses the overall design of the 
engineering works. The paper concludes 
that the ‘‘design storm’’ specified by 
congressionally authorized projects 
deserves reconsideration, and that 
engineering design reviews should be 
reorganized and implemented.  
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15 Our current system for homeland security 
does not provide the necessary framework 
to manage the challenges posed by 21st 
Century catastrophic threats. The system 
clearly has structural flaws for addressing 
catastrophic events. 
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15 Why the response to Katrina did not go as 
planned is that key decision-makers at all 
levels simply were not familiar with the 
plans. This lack of understanding of the 
“National” plan not surprisingly resulted in 
ineffective coordination of the Federal, 
State, and local response. 
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15 The Federal response suffered from 
significant organization and coordination 
problems during this week of crisis. 
o               X X 5 3 2 4 3 2 
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15 Federal departments and agencies 
continued to have difficulty adapting their 
standard procedures to this catastrophic 
incident. 
o               X   5 4 3 4 2 2 
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15 The Federal government’s problems 
responding to Hurricane Katrina illustrate 
greater systemic weaknesses inherent in 
our current national preparedness system: 
the lack of expertise in the areas of 
response, recovery, and reconstruction.  
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15 
 
The methods that had been employed 
successfully for the 243 previous major 
disaster declarations since January 2001 
proved inadequate for Hurricane Katrina’s 
magnitude. 
o   o X X       X   5 4 3 5 3 3 
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15 During the Federal response to Katrina, 
four critical flaws in our national 
preparedness became evident: Our 
processes for unified management of the 
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national response; command and control 
structures within the Federal government; 
knowledge of our preparedness plans; and 
regional planning and coordination.  
15 
 
The lack of communications and 
situational awareness had a debilitating 
effect on the Federal response.  
o                 X 4 3 3 5 3 3 
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15 
 
FEMA’s lack of a real-time asset-tracking 
system – a necessity for successful 21st 
Century businesses – left Federal managers 
in the dark regarding the status of 
resources once they were shipped. 
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15 Critical Challenge: Critical Infrastructure 
and Impact Assessment Lesson Learned: 
should revise the National Response Plan 
and finalize the Interim National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan to be able to 
rapidly assess the impact of a disaster on 
critical infrastructure. 
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15 
 
Use knowledge to inform Federal response 
and prioritization decisions and to support 
infrastructure restoration in order to save 
lives and mitigate the impact of the 
disaster on the Nation. 
o               X   5 4 4 4 3 4 
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15 
 
The final structural flaw in our current 
system for national preparedness is the 
weakness of our regional planning and 
coordination structures 
o           X   X X 4 5 4 4 2 5  
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15 
 
Federal, State, and local officials responded 
to Hurricane Katrina without a 
comprehensive understanding of the 
interdependencies of the critical 
infrastructure sectors. 
o     X X       X   4 4 5 5 2 1  
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15 The highly bureaucratic supply processes 
of the Federal government were not 
sufficiently flexible and efficient, and failed 
to leverage the private sector and 21st 
Century advances in supply chain 
management. 
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15 The coordination of Federal assets within 
and across agencies was poor.  O O O           X   4 5 5 4 2 4  
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15 
 
Logistics and Evacuation: in coordination 
with State and local governments and the 
private sector, should develop a modern, 
flexible and transparent logistics system. 
 
O O O       X   X   4 5 5 4 3 3 
Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
 
Lo
ca
l 
 
Po
lic
y 
    
15 The storm demonstrated the need for 
greater integration and synchronization of 
preparedness efforts, not only throughout 
the Federal government, but also with the 
State and local governments and the 
private and non-profit sectors as well. 
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16 The failure of the levees caught. officials 
and emergency responders off-guard, and 
it appears that police, medical, and other 
means of assistance were inadequate to 
cope with the scale of the disaster Some of 
the evacuation plans failed. 
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17 Hurricane Katrina was the costliest and one 
of the five deadliest hurricanes to ever 
strike the United States. The total number 
of fatalities directly related to the forces of 
Katrina exceeded 1000 in Louisiana and 
200 in Mississippi. 
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18  The lack of interest in insurance 
protection and mitigation by property 
owners and by public sector agencies prior 
to a disaster often creates major problems 
following a catastrophic event for victims 
and the government. 
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19 Government officials took insufficient 
actions or made poor decisions in the days 
immediately before and after landfall; 
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19 Systems on which officials relied on to 
support their response efforts failed. 
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19 Long-term warnings went unheeded and 
government officials neglected their duties 
to prepare for a forewarned catastrophe O               X X 4 4 5 5 5 3 
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19 Government officials at all levels failed to 
provide effective leadership. 
 
O O O           X   4 4 5 5 2 5  
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19 These individual failures, moreover, 
occurred against a backdrop of failure, over 
time, to develop the capacity for a 
coordinated, national response to a truly 
catastrophic event, whether caused by 
nature or man-made. 
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19 Response at all Levels of Government was 
Unacceptable. 
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20 In recent years, transportation resiliency 
has become a key concept in disaster 
planning and post-disaster recovery. 
It is an ongoing and incremental process. 
The concept can be applied to all levels of a 
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project; planning and programming, design, 
construction and systems operations. 
System wide, achieving transportation 
resiliency requires continual refinements to 
strategic plans and policies in light of 
changing post-disaster conditions. 
20 Transportation systems play a crucial role 
in responding to a region’s pre-disaster 
evacuation and post-disaster recovery. 
Their ability to perform under adverse 
conditions in times of disaster depends 
upon the resiliency of their fixed and 
moveable assets as well as their 
operational procedures before, during and 
after the event. 
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21 Results reveal strong racial and class 
differences, indicating that neither of these 
dimensions can be reduced to the other 
when seeking to understand responses by 
survivors themselves.  
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22 Encouraging adaptive and avoidance 
measures through market signals and 
government policies, and protecting areas 
such as wetlands which mitigate storm 
damage will help limit damage from 
hurricanes. 
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22 Discusses current public and private sector 
actions that impact damage costs and 
consider ways to mitigate future damage 
costs and government financial exposure.  
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23 We calculated age-,race-, and sex-specific 
mortality rates for Orleans, St Bernard, and 
Jefferson Parishes, where 95% of Katrina 
victims resided and conducted stratified 
analyses by parish of residence to compare 
differences between observed proportions 
of victim demographic characteristics and 
expected values based on 2000 US Census 
data, using Pearson chi square and Fisher 
exact tests. 
o   o           X X 3 3 4 4 1 1  
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24 Greater engagement in planning by local 
officials and other stakeholders because of 
their ability to better relate to the issues 
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being faced. 
24 A focus of multi-state efforts at improving 
transportation capabilities across 
boundaries; 
    o       X       4 5 4 4 3 3  
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24 Familiarity to planning agency partners 
since corridor planning is already used     o X X   X   X   4 5 4 0 0 4  
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ng
 
24 The ability to more closely examine the 
trade-offs among different modes;     o       X       3 3 5 4 0 3  
   
Lo
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24 A more complete investigation of non-
transportation strategies for addressing 
transportation challenges;     o       X       3 3 4 4 3 4 
    
Lo
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24 A higher precision in monitoring the 
performance of transportation facilities 
and services; 
O   O X X       X   3 4 5 4 3 4  
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24 A more direct connection between the 
movement of people and goods and state-
significant economic activity; 
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25 Planning for recovery and sustainable 
growth speaks to the need to upgrade our 
land planning conventions.      o     X     X   5 4 3 5 2 2 Fe
de
ra
l 
    
Po
lic
y 
    
25 Regional landscape sustainability addresses 
the need to reorganize the scale and 
emphasis of future development plans. 
o         X     X   5 4 3 3 2 2 
Fe
de
ra
l 
    
Po
lic
y 
    
25 Spatial solutions concepts are reviewed as 
a possible means to integrate landscape 
ecology theory in future planning for the 
natural landscape and the people who will 
live in this region. 
o         X     X   4 5 3 4 2 2  
 
St
at
e 
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y 
    
25 The land planning aspects of both the 
recovery and continued development of 
the region need to be reconsidered. 
    O       X   X   5 5 3 4 2 3 
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26 The most extensive and obvious damage to 
bridges was caused by storm surge which 
led to the uplift and lateral displacement of 
superstructure spans. . The bridge 
construction technique that was most 
susceptible to this type of damage. 
o     X X   X       4 5 4 5 3 3  
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27 Lessons For Urban Scholars And 
Practitioners, The Katrina disaster could 
have triggered a bold social experiment. In 
its wake, policy makers could have applied 
the lessons, learning from both successes 
and failures, of past urban policy to help 
rebuild New Orleans and the Gulf Coast 
region. 
O               X   5 5 4 5 0 4 
Fe
de
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l 
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28 Describes a disaster responder’s 
experiences of working with displaced 
survivors of Hurricane Katrina, providing 
crisis and mental health support in the 
acute phase of the disaster. 
o               X   4 4 5 4 2 2  
   
Lo
ca
l 
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29 Decisions taken over its 288-year history 
that have made New Orleans so vulnerable 
to Katrina reflect a long-term pattern of 
societal response to hazard events-
reducing consequences to relatively 
frequent events, and increasing 
vulnerability to very large and rare events. 
For three centuries, New Orleans sought to 
lessen the impacts of its recurrent floods 
and hurricanes by providing marginal 
o   o     X     X   5 3 3 4 3 3 
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increases in safety. 
30 Further, the findings of this analysis 
suggest that storm specific facts were the 
most important consideration in the 
evacuation decision-making process. Thus, 
public officials and the media should be 
more cognizant of the information they are 
giving residents and should coordinate 
their efforts better to ensure residents are 
receiving clear and accurate information 
regardless of who or what they perceive as 
the most important information source. 
o               X X 4 5 4 4 1 1  
 
St
at
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Po
lic
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31 Evacuating Groups with Various Special 
Needs (Special Needs): A significant 
majority of the evacuation plans were 
judged to be either marginally or partially 
effective regarding provisions for 
evacuating persons with various special 
needs. 
O               X   4 4 5 4 3 3 
Fe
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31 A catastrophic event could result in 
sustained national impacts over a 
prolonged period of time; almost 
O               X   5 4 3 5 4 4 
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immediately exceeds resources normally 
available to State, local, tribal, and private-
sector authorities in the impacted area; 
and significantly interrupts governmental 
operations and emergency services to such 
an extent that national security could be 
threatened. All catastrophic events are 
Incidents of National Significance.” 
31 Responsible State and local agencies should 
develop and deploy systems to provide 
information to evacuees and emergency 
managers during the course of evacuations 
on the status of traffic, shelters, fuel, and 
other services along evacuation routes. 
O       X       X X 3 4 5 5 3 3  
   
Lo
ca
l 
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31 Care and Protection of Animals 
(Sheltering): Almost three-quarters of the 
evacuation plans were judged to be either 
marginally or partially effective regarding 
provisions to care for and protect animals. 
O               X   3 3 4 4 0 4  
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l 
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31 Returning Evacuees to their homes 
(Planning): A significant majority of the 
evacuation plans were judged to be either 
marginally or partially effective regarding 
O               X   4 5 4 4 3 3  
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provisions for returning evacuees to their 
homes. 
31 A challenge was faced with staging 
evacuees for passenger rail services offered 
by Amtrak, due to the lack of 
communication, coordination, and prior 
planning among local, State, and Federal 
officials.Assistance offered by Amtrak prior 
to the landfall of Hurricane Katrina was not 
accepted and resulted in a train with 900 
seats (7 locomotives and 20 cars) leaving 
prior to the storm. 
O               X X 4 4 5 5 2 2  
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31 Contra flow (Operations): More than three-
quarters of the evacuation plans were 
judged to be only marginally or partially 
effective regarding the use of contra flow 
operations.  
O           X X X   4 5 5 5 0 5  
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31 Understanding the time required for 
evacuations is essential for all those who 
must evacuate to do so safely. O           X   X   4 5 5 4 4 4 
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31 Sheltering requirements for all segments of 
the population and evacuees by all modes O               X   3 4 4 4 3 4 
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of transportation should be more directly 
integrated into the evacuation planning 
process. 
31 Information during Evacuations (Public 
Communications): Nearly two-thirds of the 
evacuation plans reviewed were judged to 
be either marginally or partially effective 
regarding measures to keep evacuees 
informed during evacuation. 
O               X X 3 4 4 4 3 3  
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31 State and local agencies should work with 
the special needs communities to develop 
systems whereby those requiring 
specialized transportation or sheltering 
services during evacuations can make 
those needs known to emergency 
managers and operators of transportation 
and sheltering services before evacuations. 
O               X   3 5 5 4 3 4  
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32 Post-disaster recovery is all about urban 
planning. This is not an area that we can 
leave to emergency managers, engineers, 
architects, the military, insurers, or 
bankers. Recovery, like planning, is all 
about creating liveable, sustainable places 
O   O           X   4 3 3 5 3 3 
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for people to live and work. The fact that it 
takes place under extreme circumstances, 
and demands rapid action with severely 
constrained resources, requires the 
expertise that planners have to offer. This 
is the greatest planning problem most of us 
have ever seen, and it warrants a 
correspondingly large response. 
33 The storm devastated a 90,000-squaremile 
area, which is roughly the size of Great 
Britain. The storm also resulted in the 
largest displacement of Americans in our 
nation’s history, forcing more than 270,000 
into shelters after landfall. 
o     X X       X   4 4 5 5 4 4  
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33 And if severe infrastructure damage 
prevents getting additional fuel, then the 
standby power system will eventually fail 
when the fuel runs out. 
o     X X       X   4 4 5 3 3 5  
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34 Strategic planning (SP) is taking up an 
increasing part of transport planning 
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35 Katrina as a Critical Infrastructure Collapse 
:Katrina offers lessons in another sense as 
well. One way to think about Katrina is to 
see it as a comprehensive critical 
infrastructure collapse—perhaps the most 
widespread critical infrastructure collapse 
that any advanced country has experienced 
since World War II. Virtually all of the 
critical infrastructure sectors in the region 
were put out of commission at the same 
time. Failures in one sector had cascading 
effects on others. These simultaneous 
failures far exceeded the experience base 
and available resources of public officials, 
and led to a partial or complete breakdown 
in command and control and in public 
order. Widespread critical infrastructure 
collapse is one of the marker elements that 
helps differentiate “catastrophes” from 
“disasters.” 
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36 Analyse three aspects of media depictions 
of Hurricane Katrina, focusing on the 
relationship between race and coverage of 
the crisis. 
o               X X 3 3 4 5 1 1  
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37 Principal among those expert systems, 
scientific disciplines and regulatory 
agencies reinforce expectations and 
practices for producing knowledge in ways 
that minimize the ecological and socio-
historical contexts in which that knowledge 
is created. The result, in effect, is organized 
ignorance—a system of knowledge 
production that articulates risk in ways that 
leave much potential knowledge 
‘‘undone.’’ We use the organization of 
environmental testing in Orleans Parish 
following Hurricane Katrina to illustrate 
these claims. 
o               X   3 3 4 4 2 3  
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37 We need to develop and adequately fund 
new knowledge institutions—for example, 
a National Institutes of Environment—
whose primary mission at both the basic 
and applied ends of the research stream is 
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to tackle real-world environmental and 
public health problems, doing so in ways 
that seek to embrace, rather than deny, 
the complexity of ecological and social 
systems in interaction. 
38 The evacuation of a hospital is a daunting 
logistical task with potentially unforeseen 
safety, financial, and publicity risks. 
o               X   3 4 5 3 3 4  
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39 The Great Hanshin earthquake exposed 
serious flaws in the Japanese emergency 
services. A worldwide strategy for 
earthquakes needs to be drawn up for 
disaster relief efforts to be effectively 
carried out. 
o o o           X   5 3 2 2 2 5 
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40 CRS estimates that 700,000 or more people 
may have been acutely impacted by 
Hurricane Katrina, as a result of residing in 
areas that flooded or sustained significant 
structural damage. 
O     X X           5 3 3 5 3 2 
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41 Federal emergency officials also failed to 
deploy buses for evacuation as planned. A 
top FEMA staff described his surprise and 
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frustration at the agency’s inadequate 
preparation before Katrina struck, despite 
his urgent warnings to agency executives 
(Bosner, 2005).Federal emergency officials 
also failed to deploy buses for evacuation 
as planned. 
41 Transit dependent people were directed to 
the Superdome, although it had insufficient 
water, food, medical care and security. This 
lead to a medical and humanitarian crisis. 
o     X         X X 4 4 5 0 0 5  
   
Lo
ca
l 
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ng
 
41 There was no effective plan to evacuate 
transit dependent residents 
 o               X   3 4 5 3 3 5 
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l 
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ng
 
41 Not planning for proper evacuation of 
motorists, transit dependent persons and 
elderly. And directing evacuees to the 
Superdome, although it had insufficient 
water, food, medical care and security. This 
lead to a medical and humanitarian crisis. 
    o       X   X   3 4 5 3 0 4  
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41 Disaster Transportation Issues Evacuations 
before, during or after an event, and O O O X     X   X   4 5 5 5 3 2 
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adequate accommodation of evacuees at 
refuge destinations. / Delivery of 
emergency supplies and services, including 
water, food, medical care, utility 
maintenance, law enforcement, / Search 
and rescue operations / Quarantine/ 
Transportation infrastructure repair. 
41 Not planning for proper evacuation of 
motorists, transit dependent persons and 
elderly. And directing evacuees to the 
Superdome, although it had insufficient 
water, food, medical care and security. This 
lead to a medical and humanitarian crisis. 
O               X   3 4 4 4 0 4  
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41 Gaps in Decision Making, However, there 
was no effective plan to evacuate transit 
dependent residents. O   O           X   3 4 4 0 3 3 
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42 Infrastructure refers to physical systems or 
facilities that provide essential public 
services, such as transportation, utilities 
(water, gas, and electricity), energy, 
telecommunications, waste disposal, park 
lands, sports, recreational buildings, and 
o     X X     X     4 5 4 4 0 0  
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housing facilities. 
43 The effectiveness of an evacuation is also 
greatly affected by human behaviour and 
socioeconomics. 
O               X   4 5 3 0 4 3  
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43 The lack of real-time, accurate traffic 
information.   O O X     X     X 3 3 5 4 3 3  
   
Lo
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l 
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43 One complicating factor is that 
transportation infrastructure is neither 
planned nor designed to accommodate 
evacuation-level demand; building enough 
capacity to move the population of an 
entire city in a matter of hours is simply not 
economically, environmentally, or socially 
feasible. 
O     X X   X X X   3 4 5 4 3 0  
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l 
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43 Although little can be done to alter the 
weather, we can prepare for the 
eventuality of hurricanes and other natural 
and man-made hazards. 
O               X   3 3 4 4 3 3  
   
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
    
354 
SO
U
RC
E 
KEY GAPS STATED BY 
PREVIOUS RESEARCHERS 
WHEN IT 
SHOULD BE 
MONITORED 
 
[Identified by 
Author] 
CR
IT
IC
AL
 IN
FR
AS
TR
U
CT
U
RE
 
TR
AN
SP
O
RT
 IN
FR
AS
TR
U
CT
U
RE
 
RE
SI
LI
EN
CE
 A
N
D 
PL
AN
N
IN
G
 
LA
N
D 
U
SE
 D
EV
EL
O
PM
EN
T 
DE
CI
SI
O
N
S 
TR
AN
SP
O
RT
 P
LA
N
N
IN
G
 
RO
AD
 D
ES
IG
N
 
DI
SA
ST
ER
 R
ES
IL
IE
N
CE
 P
LA
N
N
IN
G
 
AN
D 
M
AN
AG
EM
EN
T 
CO
M
M
U
N
IC
AT
IO
N
 A
N
D 
CO
O
RD
IN
AT
IO
N
 
Ke
y 
Re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y 
Ra
tin
gs
 o
f 
Fe
de
ra
l[F
], 
St
at
e[
S]
 
an
d 
Lo
ca
l[L
] 
Go
ve
rn
m
en
t  
Re
qu
ire
m
en
t –
 
Po
lic
y 
[P
], 
St
ra
te
gy
[S
] o
r 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 [P
] FINAL KEY NEEDS 
& 
REQUIREMENTS 
[Identified by Author] 
Pr
e 
– 
Di
sa
st
er
 
Du
rin
g 
– 
D
is
as
te
r 
Po
st
 –
 D
is
as
te
r 
Performance Rating (5-1) [5 = 
Highest, 1 = lowest] 
[Rated by Author] 
Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
St
ra
te
gy
 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 
IMPACTED AREAS (X) F S  L P Str PL 
 
43 Over-reliance on westward traffic 
movement; 
 o o o       x   X   4 4 5 0 4 3 
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43 Inefficient loading of the contra flow 
freeway segment out of New Orleans; 
 
  O   X     X   X   4 4 5 0 4 3  
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l 
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y   
43 The analysis after Hurricane Ivan showed 
that the movement of traffic was further 
hindered by the configuration of the contra 
flow initiation point. 
 
  O O   X   X X X   4 4 5 0 4 0  
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43 Roadways are not even designed to be 
delay-free under routine peak-period 
conditions. 
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43 Extreme congestion resulting from the 
confluence of multiple regional evacuation 
routes. 
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43 The only way to protect people, however, 
is to evacuate them when threats arise, but 
this is often easier said than done. 
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43 Evacuations are life-and-death scenarios, 
and planning decisions must be made with 
preserving lives in mind. 
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43 The evacuation that it precipitated, 
however, revealed numerous deficiencies 
in the plan that resulted in monumental 
congestion and delays on several key 
evacuation routes. 
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43 The traffic control strategy at this location 
resulted in a capacity restriction that 
effectively regulated flow into the 
downstream section thereby preventing 
full use of the contra flow lanes. 
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43 In reality, evacuations, particularly 
evacuations on a mass scale, are complex 
undertakings. 
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44 ‘The level of interest in evacuation, as a 
behavioral-, geographic-, research-, 
planning-, and engineering-related topic 
has ebbed and flowed with the needs and 
conditions of the day, and the number and 
types of hazard conditions for which an 
evacuation could become necessary is also 
growing’. 
O           X       4 4 5 4 3 3  
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44 ‘it is difficult to identify gaps in practice, 
“best” practices, or even “effective” 
practice because the types, scales, and 
characteristics of the hazards, populations, 
and transportation networks and resources 
are so variable across the country. No 
single type of practice or even group of 
practices is necessarily appropriate in all 
locations’. 
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44 ‘Modelling and Simulation, An emerging 
area that has seen significant and rapid 
improvements in both theory and practice 
has been in modeling and simulation of 
evacuation traffic’. 
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44 ‘Evacuation is a complex topic that can be 
influenced by an enormous number of 
interacting factors.’ 
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44 ‘The low-level of involvement and lack of 
experience within the transportation 
community has meant that some of the 
nation’s most knowledgeable and useful 
sources of information on the planning and 
utilization of transportation resources for 
emergency conditions have gone 
underutilized’. 
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44 ‘Although the role of transportation in 
evacuation has been somewhat limited, 
the general topic of evacuation is quite 
large’ 
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44 Wolshon,B, 2009, stated that ‘Evacuations 
are anything but conventional—they are a 
matter of life and death with a ticking 
clock. Transportation agencies need to be 
better informed and find creative and 
innovative solutions to the problems they 
face’ 
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45 The primary dilemma faced by New 
Orleans is that it is situated on land that is 
predominantly below sea level. 
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45 An evacuation is an extreme response to an 
extreme threat where the potential for 
mass loss of life exists. 
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45 The primary hindrance to the evacuation is 
the limited number of routes leading out 
of the city. 
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45 ‘To meet the need for faster and more 
efficient evacuations, disaster-planning 
agencies are presently seeking to more 
activity involve transportation 
professionals in the evacuation planning 
and preparedness process to develop 
strategies to effectively use and manage 
the transportation infrastructure when the 
need arises’. 
O               X   4 4 5 4 5 4  
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45 Primary reason is lack of access to 
transport. 
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45 Research must also continue to identify 
better ways to address issues of safety, 
efficiency, information exchange and post-
storm re-entry during evacuations. 
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CASE STUDY – 2009 VICTORIAN BUSHFIRES 
46 ‘The reports highlight the critical need for an 
all hazards, comprehensive and national 
approach to disaster research. Currently, 
arrangements do not support this approach. 
Consequently, the lessons from previous 
disasters have not been fully incorporated 
into current practice.’ 
o   o           X   5 4 3 0 3 4 
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46 ‘critical infrastructure forms part of “risks in 
the built environment” o o o X X X X X X   5  5   
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e  
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46 The VBRC report notes that there are a 
number of deficiencies in current risk 
assessment practices. For example, there 
are deficiencies in the mapping of bushfire 
risk throughout Victoria and there is concern 
that “Vic Roads does not carry out any 
systematic roadside bushfire risk 
assessment” (p.310 Vol. 2). 
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46 One of the key issues - risk assessments 
should assess vulnerabilities and 
capabilities across the social, economic, 
built and natural environments. 
o o o      X   5  5   
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46 Consistent with this argument, the COAG 
2002 and COAG 2004 reports highlight the 
need for consistent risk assessment 
frameworks to be applied. For example, in 
the COAG 2002 report it is noted that “...not 
all disaster risk assessments undertaken use 
the Australian and New Zealand Risk 
Management Standard 4360 methodology” 
and that “...inconsistent results from 
disaster assessments using unproven risk 
assessment methodologies could threaten 
the credibility of disaster management 
generally” (p. 126). The COAG 2004 report 
recommends that “a structured risk-
management process based on the 
Australian Standard for Risk Management be 
further developed and applied in all aspects 
of bushfire mitigation and management” 
(4.1). 
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46 Insufficient attention to risk is an important 
consideration for individuals, and also for 
State and local governments. The reports 
indicate that there is a lack of 
standardisation in risk assessments, it is 
unclear whether the risk assessments that 
are used are appropriate or comprehensive, 
and there is a lack of information sharing in 
relation to risks, both between emergency 
management agencies and with the public. 
o o o      X   5  5   
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46 No systematic process for post-disaster 
assessments in the Australian setting o o o X X X X X X   5  5   
 
St
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e  
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y 
  
46 There is a chain of activities that must be 
undertaken by multiple stakeholders to 
appropriately asses and communicate 
“risks”. The primary responsibility for each 
activity in this chain is often unclear; 
o o o X X X X X X X  5 5 5   
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46 Unfortunately, there is not a lot of 
understanding between these silos of 
knowledge. When it comes to coordinating 
this knowledge, this is an issue that requires 
more analysis and training. 
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46 The emergency management sector is not 
well placed to communicate risks to the 
community, because they are primarily 
responsible for managing disaster once they 
occur. The capacity is not available to 
adequately address both needs 
o o o      X   5 5 5   
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46 Poor understanding of risk assessment and 
management processes in the disaster 
setting 
o o o      X   5 5 5   
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46 Knowledge about risks is held in different 
parts of the community, and there is no 
system in place to bring this knowledge 
together. 
  o      X  5 4  5   Fe
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46 There is little evidence-base in either the 
Australian or the international literature to 
support the efficacy of a disaster resilience 
approach 
o o o X        5  5   Fe
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46 Emphasises that shared responsibility for 
disaster resilience can only emerge out of a 
shared understanding of risks and hazards 
o  o X         5 5   
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46 Risks assessments strategies may be 
insufficient and not enough risk assessments 
are undertaken to address all potential 
hazards in the community. 
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47 Timely warnings save lives. The community 
expects and depends on detailed and high 
quality information prior to, during, and 
after bushfires. The community is also 
entitled to receive timely and 
accurate bushfire warnings whenever 
possible, based on the intelligence available 
to the control agencies. 
o o o      X X   5 5   
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47 The effectiveness of any campaign depends 
on the quality of information, the modes of 
dissemination and the willingness and 
capacity of people to hear, understand and 
act on the message. This is a shared 
responsibility between government and the 
people. 
o o o      X X   5 5   
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47 However, there were a number of 
weaknesses and failures with Victoria’s 
information and warning systems on 7 
February. Warnings were often delayed 
which meant that many people were not 
o o o      X X   5 5   
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warned at all or the amount of time they had 
to respond to the warnings was much less 
than it should have been. The warnings that 
were issued often did not give people a clear 
understanding of the location and severity of 
the fire and how they should respond. 
47 The methods of delivery of the warnings 
were also inadequate. o o o      X X   5 5   
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47 People had difficulty getting onto the 
relevant websites and about 80 per cent of 
the calls to the Victorian Bushfire 
Information Line were unanswered. Often 
the information available through these 
sources was incomplete or out of date. 
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47 Finally, the sources of information and 
warnings that were available during the fire 
did not cope well with the level of demand. 
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47 During the afternoon of 7 February the 
emergency telephone call services (Telstra’s 
Triple Zero service and the Emergency 
Services Telecommunications Authority) 
experienced unprecedented demand which 
o o o      X X   5 5   
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resulted in serious failures. 
47 Large numbers of calls were not answered 
and many callers could not be connected to 
the relevant authorities, leading to a 
significant number of abandoned calls. The 
collapse of the system caused extreme stress 
to both the callers and the operators. 
o o o      X X   5 5   
 
St
at
e 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
  
47 There are opportunities to improve the 
content, sources and means of 
disseminating bushfire information and 
warnings to the public. The Commission’s 
recommendations cover the following: 
*Improving the quality of bushfire 
information and warning messages 
o o o      X X   5 5   
 
St
at
e 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
  
47 Stay or Go- An analysis of this policy 
approach against the background of the 
recent fires has led the Commission to 
conclude that there has been insufficient 
emphasis on the risks of staying and 
defending. 
 
o o o      X X  5 5 5   
 
St
at
e 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
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47 Bushfire policies for schools in Victoria, as at 
7 February, were less than ideal. o o o      X X  5 5 5   
 
St
at
e 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
  
47 There was no state-wide policy requiring 
government schools to evacuate, close or 
use a fire refuge in event of fire. 
o o o      X X  5 5 5   
 
St
at
e  
Po
lic
y 
  
47 Local government is a significant player, 
They are being asked specifically to review 
their Municipal Emergency Management 
Plans to ensure that they include 
appropriate provision for refuges and 
relocations that may occur during bushfires. 
o o o      X X   5 5   
  
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
  
47 Commission has recommended that Victoria 
Police review its guidelines on the 
operation of roadblocks with the aim of 
creating a more flexible set of procedures 
 
o o o    X  X    5 5   
  
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
  
47 Areas of Victoria at risk of bushfire are 
identified in several different ways. The 
evidence to date has revealed different 
processes for identifying areas at risk for the 
purposes of emergency management 
planning, land use planning and building 
o o o      X    5   5 
  
Lo
ca
l 
  
Pl
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ng
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regulation. 
The Commission notes that fragmented 
planning, including risk identification, was 
one of the factors that led to the 
development of the Integrated Fire 
Management Planning Framework endorsed 
in principle by the State in September 2006, 
but not yet implemented. 
47 The Commission endorses the concept of 
integrated, whole of government fire 
management planning. This has the 
potential to lead to the introduction of 
planning processes that make communities 
safer and are easier to use. This project 
should be given higher priority. 
o o o      X  5   5   Fe
de
ra
l 
  
Po
lic
y 
  
47 Unreliable and inadequate power supply 
and phone coverage (mobile and landline) 
had been a longstanding grievance. 
o o o X     X  5   5   Fe
de
ra
l 
  
Po
lic
y 
  
47 That information about their area was not 
aired until well after the fire front had 
passed as exacerbating misinformation and 
confusion. 
o o o      X X 5   5   Fe
de
ra
l 
  
Po
lic
y 
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47 ABC did not provide ‘real-time’ information 
about the location or direction of the fires, 
with the time lag for some communities 
being up to three hours. 
o o o      X X 5   5   Fe
de
ra
l 
  
Po
lic
y 
  
47 Specific concerns were raised about the 
buildup of fuel loads on public lands and 
along roadsides. 
o  o   X     5   5   Fe
de
ra
l 
  
Po
lic
y 
  
47 The Commission heard repeated criticism of 
the decline in fuel reduction and fuel 
management programs 
o  o      X  5   5   Fe
de
ra
l 
  
Po
lic
y 
  
47 The buffer zones and fire trail networks on 
crown land were insufficient and poorly 
maintained. These impediments 
compromised the safety of fire fighters and 
severely limited their fire suppression 
efforts. 
o  o      X  5   5   Fe
de
ra
l 
  
Po
lic
y 
  
47 maintained that tree preservation orders 
were too prohibitive o  o      X  5   5   Fe
de
ra
l 
  
Po
lic
y 
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47 Roadblocks represented the most frequently 
mentioned grievance for the majority of 
communities. The roadblock protocols and 
regulations were too prohibitive and lacked 
understanding of some of the fundamental 
needs of locals to access fresh food, medical 
assistance, and feed and veterinary care for 
their livestock 
o o o    X  X  5   5   Fe
de
ra
l 
  
Po
lic
y 
  
47 Requests for coordinated evacuation plans 
for people who cannot self-evacuate — in 
particular elderly people, those without cars 
and people with a disability. 
o o o    X  X  5   5   Fe
de
ra
l 
  
Po
lic
y 
  
47 The existence of local council emergency 
management plans and argued that more 
was needed to educate residents about such 
plans. 
o o o    X  X  5   5   Fe
de
ra
l 
  
Po
lic
y 
  
47 Roads that changed names multiple times 
and of the lack of accurate, up-to-date maps 
that indicated the types of road 
o o o    X  X  5   5   Fe
de
ra
l 
  
Po
lic
y 
  
47 Failure of many maps to indicate access 
areas, trails and firebreaks in parks and 
forests This was perceived as a significant 
impediment for fire units and emergency 
o o o    X  X  5   5   Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e  
Po
lic
y 
  
371 
SO
U
RC
E 
KEY GAPS STATED BY PREVIOUS 
RESEARCHERS 
WHEN IT 
SHOULD BE 
MONITORED 
CR
IT
IC
AL
 IN
FR
AS
TR
U
CT
U
RE
 
TR
AN
SP
O
RT
 IN
FR
AS
TR
U
CT
U
RE
 
RE
SI
LI
EN
CE
 A
N
D 
PL
AN
N
IN
G
 
LA
N
D 
U
SE
 D
EV
EL
O
PM
EN
T 
DE
CI
SI
O
N
S 
TR
AN
SP
O
RT
 P
LA
N
N
IN
G
 
RO
AD
 D
ES
IG
N
 
DI
SA
ST
ER
 R
ES
IL
IE
N
CE
 P
LA
N
N
IN
G
 
AN
D 
M
AN
AG
EM
EN
T 
CO
M
M
U
N
IC
AT
IO
N
 A
N
D 
CO
O
RD
IN
AT
IO
N
 
Ke
y 
Re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y 
Ra
tin
gs
 o
f F
ed
er
al
[F
], 
St
at
e[
S]
 a
nd
 L
oc
al
[L
] 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t  
Re
qu
ire
m
en
t –
 
Po
lic
y[
P]
, S
tr
at
eg
y[
S]
 
or
 P
la
nn
in
g 
[P
] 
FINAL KEY NEEDS 
& 
REQUIREMENTS 
Pr
e 
– 
Di
sa
st
er
 
Du
rin
g 
– 
Di
sa
st
er
 
Po
st
 –
 D
is
as
te
r 
Performance Rating (5-1) [5 = 
Highest, 1 = lowest]  Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
St
ra
te
gy
 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 
IMPACTED AREA F S  L P Str PL       
service personnel deployed from outside the 
local area. 
47 Sound local knowledge should accompany 
outside units deployed to the area o o o    X  X    5 5   
  
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
  
47 Grievances about poor coordination of 
recovery services 
 
o o o      X   5 4 5   
 
St
at
e 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
  
47 lack of clarity about the role of different 
agencies 
 
o o o    X  X   5 5 5   
 
St
at
e 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
  
47 The need for a single, up-to-date, electronic 
and centralised database of residents’ 
details that could be shared among service 
providers to track locals, synchronise lists of 
missing persons and monitor access to 
services and grants. 
o o o      X    5 5   
  
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
  
47 Disputed that building standards for fire 
protection would need serious review and 
upgrading .A repeated caveat, however, was 
that one size does not fit all; fire-prone areas 
can vary greatly in topography, as can the 
o  o X     X   5  5   
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at
e  
Po
lic
y 
  
372 
SO
U
RC
E 
KEY GAPS STATED BY PREVIOUS 
RESEARCHERS 
WHEN IT 
SHOULD BE 
MONITORED 
CR
IT
IC
AL
 IN
FR
AS
TR
U
CT
U
RE
 
TR
AN
SP
O
RT
 IN
FR
AS
TR
U
CT
U
RE
 
RE
SI
LI
EN
CE
 A
N
D 
PL
AN
N
IN
G
 
LA
N
D 
U
SE
 D
EV
EL
O
PM
EN
T 
DE
CI
SI
O
N
S 
TR
AN
SP
O
RT
 P
LA
N
N
IN
G
 
RO
AD
 D
ES
IG
N
 
DI
SA
ST
ER
 R
ES
IL
IE
N
CE
 P
LA
N
N
IN
G
 
AN
D 
M
AN
AG
EM
EN
T 
CO
M
M
U
N
IC
AT
IO
N
 A
N
D 
CO
O
RD
IN
AT
IO
N
 
Ke
y 
Re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y 
Ra
tin
gs
 o
f F
ed
er
al
[F
], 
St
at
e[
S]
 a
nd
 L
oc
al
[L
] 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t  
Re
qu
ire
m
en
t –
 
Po
lic
y[
P]
, S
tr
at
eg
y[
S]
 
or
 P
la
nn
in
g 
[P
] 
FINAL KEY NEEDS 
& 
REQUIREMENTS 
Pr
e 
– 
Di
sa
st
er
 
Du
rin
g 
– 
Di
sa
st
er
 
Po
st
 –
 D
is
as
te
r 
Performance Rating (5-1) [5 = 
Highest, 1 = lowest]  Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
St
ra
te
gy
 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 
IMPACTED AREA F S  L P Str PL       
bushfire risk. The standards need to 
accommodate these variations. 
47 That power poles should be built from 
concrete or other fireproof materials. Others 
argued that power lines should be relocated 
underground. 
o  o X X    X   5  5   
 
St
at
e  
Po
lic
y 
  
47 Reflected dissatisfaction with local council 
policies about the need for permits to 
remove trees, the restrictions on vegetation 
clearing, 
o  o   X   X    5 5   
  
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
  
47 Provide very important links or habitat 
corridors between areas of native vegetation 
in parks and reserves 
o o o  X X  X X    5 5   
  
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
  
47 road reservations are increasingly becoming 
fire-wicks with the propensity to join rather 
than separate fire activity 
o o o  X X  X X    5 5   
  
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
  
47 Lack of information regarding materials, 
designs and recommendations for building 
fireproof or fire-resistant housing and 
bunkers. 
o o o  X    X X   5 5   
  
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
  
373 
SO
U
RC
E 
KEY GAPS STATED BY PREVIOUS 
RESEARCHERS 
WHEN IT 
SHOULD BE 
MONITORED 
CR
IT
IC
AL
 IN
FR
AS
TR
U
CT
U
RE
 
TR
AN
SP
O
RT
 IN
FR
AS
TR
U
CT
U
RE
 
RE
SI
LI
EN
CE
 A
N
D 
PL
AN
N
IN
G
 
LA
N
D 
U
SE
 D
EV
EL
O
PM
EN
T 
DE
CI
SI
O
N
S 
TR
AN
SP
O
RT
 P
LA
N
N
IN
G
 
RO
AD
 D
ES
IG
N
 
DI
SA
ST
ER
 R
ES
IL
IE
N
CE
 P
LA
N
N
IN
G
 
AN
D 
M
AN
AG
EM
EN
T 
CO
M
M
U
N
IC
AT
IO
N
 A
N
D 
CO
O
RD
IN
AT
IO
N
 
Ke
y 
Re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y 
Ra
tin
gs
 o
f F
ed
er
al
[F
], 
St
at
e[
S]
 a
nd
 L
oc
al
[L
] 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t  
Re
qu
ire
m
en
t –
 
Po
lic
y[
P]
, S
tr
at
eg
y[
S]
 
or
 P
la
nn
in
g 
[P
] 
FINAL KEY NEEDS 
& 
REQUIREMENTS 
Pr
e 
– 
Di
sa
st
er
 
Du
rin
g 
– 
Di
sa
st
er
 
Po
st
 –
 D
is
as
te
r 
Performance Rating (5-1) [5 = 
Highest, 1 = lowest]  Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
St
ra
te
gy
 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 
IMPACTED AREA F S  L P Str PL       
47 not only is the prevention of ember ingress 
and the use of non-combustible building 
materials important in the dwelling design, 
but also other aspects such as ensuring 
radiation barriers and separation from other 
ignition sources within the dwelling 
landscape. 
o o o X  X   X    5 5   
  
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
  
47 problems with Triple Zero calls 
 
 
o o o      X X   5 5   
  
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
  
47 Problems with radio transmissions, 
particularly in the mountain areas o o o  X    X X  5 4 5   
 
St
at
e 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
  
47 The loss of power, water and phones, and 
delays in reconnecting these services o o o X     X   5 4 5   
 
St
at
e 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
  
47 Delays in reconnecting essential services had 
an adverse impact on those who stayed to 
protect their homes and their ability to 
defend them. 
o o o X     X X  5 4 5   
 
St
at
e 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
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47 Dissatisfaction with roadblocks, the state of 
roads and roadside vegetation. o o o  X    X X  5 4 5   
 
St
at
e 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
  
47 Roadblocks also prevented supplies and 
services getting through to some residents in 
fire-affected areas. 
o o o  X X  X X X  5 4 5   
 
St
at
e 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
  
47 Limited access along roads caused by trees 
falling on the roads, dead-end streets and 
single-lane streets. 
o o o  X X  X X X  5 4 5   
 
St
at
e 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
  
47 significant vegetation along the verges of 
roads, creating fuel for fire, o o o  X   X X   5 4 5   
 
St
at
e 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
  
47 detailed and high-quality information prior 
to, during and after bushfires o o o      X X  5 4 5   
 
St
at
e 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
  
48 The report contained a number of 
recommendations, three of which are 
summarised below: 
* there should be legislative obligations on 
all broadcasters to broadcast natural 
disaster warnings to the public via radio and 
o o o  X X  X X X  5 4 5   
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television (Recommendation 26) 
* guidelines should be prepared for best 
practice in the development of local area 
emergency warning systems 
(Recommendation 27) 
* post disaster assessments should routinely 
review the effectiveness of warning systems 
(Recommendation 28). 
49 a) A warning system should involve use of ‘a 
consistent warning signal’ at the beginning 
of the advice in circumstances where lives 
are at risk or there is a major threat to 
property to attract the attention of those 
who should be alerted to the warning that 
follows. 
b) A bushfire warning should provide 
information about the location, size and 
intensity of a bushfire threat. 
c) A warning should inform the listener as to 
the expected movement of the fire front and 
should identify the communities at threat. 
d) A good warning advises communities on 
the appropriate action to take. 
o o o  X X  X X X  5 4 5   
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50 It found that ‘whilst existing State/Territory 
and national emergency management 
arrangements are robust … Australia is 
currently not as prepared as it should be to 
manage the consequences of a catastrophic 
disaster impacting the country’. 
o o o x x x x x X x 5 5 4 5   Fe
de
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l 
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at
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50 The Working Group modelled four 
hypothetical scenarios to assist in 
identifying the likely impact of catastrophic 
events: a cyclone impacting on Cairns, a 
major earthquake impacting the wheat-belt 
of Western Australia and the City of Perth, a 
tsunami impacting on the mid New South 
Wales coast and an influenza pandemic.24 
The report found that ‘there is an 
overwhelming national need for the 
development of appropriate, effective and 
timely community information and warning 
systems’ 
o o o x x x x x X x 5 5 4 5   
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50 It is disappointing that what was identified 
in October 2005 as an ‘overwhelming 
national need’ for a national warning 
system, was not the subject of agreement 
by the states and territories until April 
o o o x x x x x X x 5 5 4 5   Fe
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2009. 
51 
 
Between 1967 and 1999 bushfires, tropical 
cyclones, floods, severe storms, landslides 
and earthquakes killed 565 people and 
injured 7296. These deaths and injuries cost 
an estimated $1.346 billion4. The most 
common, and the most costly, events are 
floods, severe storms and cyclones (80% of 
total costs and 89% of the total number of 
events between 1967 and 1999) but 
bushfires kill and injure the most people. 
o o o x x x x x X x 5 5 4 5   Fe
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52 During the bushfires of January and February 
2009 individuals and fire agencies made 
crucial decisions that affected many lives. 
These decisions were made in the context of 
a broad policy relating to bushfire safety, 
known colloquially as ‘stay or go’ but more 
accurately described as ‘prepare, stay and 
defend or leave early’. First, the policy did 
not adequately account for differences 
between fires and the fact that fires can 
o o o x x x x x X x 5 5 4 5   Fe
de
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have widely diverging characteristics 
depending on topography and other factors. 
52 Second, the focus of the warnings issued 
was far too narrow. o o o      X x 5 5 4 5   Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
Lo
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y 
  
52 Third, the approach and the accompanying 
educational materials and advice were 
deficient in important areas. 
o o o      X  5 5 4 5   Fe
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52 Inadequate information was provided about 
fire behaviour, the difficulty of making a 
property defendable, and the risks inherent 
in defending a house. 
o o o      X x 5 5 4 5   Fe
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l 
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52 The policy should, be extended beyond 
these elements to cover the full range of fire 
types 
o o o x x x x x X x 5 5 4 5   Fe
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52 Road access must be carefully managed 
during fire events 
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53 ‘the prepare, stay and defend option may be 
challenged by extreme bushfire events’/ the 
need to define when it is not safe to stay / 
the need to define how early is early enough 
to leave / the role of warnings in 
implementing the policy / 
lack of community understanding of the stay 
or go message physical, social and economic 
barriers to adopting the options offered by 
the policy / differences between rural 
communities and urban interface 
communities ‘macro’ social trends and their 
impact on the stay or go policy—in 
particular, people’s growing expectation  
o o o      X x 5 5 4 5   Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
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y 
  
54 The collective data suggest that the 
probability of home destruction at the forest 
edge is around 60%. 
 
o o o x  x   X  5 5 4 5   Fe
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55 The State revise its bushfire safety policy.  
o o o x     X x  5  5   
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55 The State revises the approach to 
community bushfire safety education. o o o      X   5  5   
 
St
at
e  
Po
lic
y 
  
380 
SO
U
RC
E 
KEY GAPS STATED BY PREVIOUS 
RESEARCHERS 
WHEN IT 
SHOULD BE 
MONITORED 
CR
IT
IC
AL
 IN
FR
AS
TR
U
CT
U
RE
 
TR
AN
SP
O
RT
 IN
FR
AS
TR
U
CT
U
RE
 
RE
SI
LI
EN
CE
 A
N
D 
PL
AN
N
IN
G
 
LA
N
D 
U
SE
 D
EV
EL
O
PM
EN
T 
DE
CI
SI
O
N
S 
TR
AN
SP
O
RT
 P
LA
N
N
IN
G
 
RO
AD
 D
ES
IG
N
 
DI
SA
ST
ER
 R
ES
IL
IE
N
CE
 P
LA
N
N
IN
G
 
AN
D 
M
AN
AG
EM
EN
T 
CO
M
M
U
N
IC
AT
IO
N
 A
N
D 
CO
O
RD
IN
AT
IO
N
 
Ke
y 
Re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y 
Ra
tin
gs
 o
f F
ed
er
al
[F
], 
St
at
e[
S]
 a
nd
 L
oc
al
[L
] 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t  
Re
qu
ire
m
en
t –
 
Po
lic
y[
P]
, S
tr
at
eg
y[
S]
 
or
 P
la
nn
in
g 
[P
] 
FINAL KEY NEEDS 
& 
REQUIREMENTS 
Pr
e 
– 
Di
sa
st
er
 
Du
rin
g 
– 
Di
sa
st
er
 
Po
st
 –
 D
is
as
te
r 
Performance Rating (5-1) [5 = 
Highest, 1 = lowest]  Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
St
ra
te
gy
 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 
IMPACTED AREA F S  L P Str PL       
55 The State establishes mechanisms for 
helping municipal councils to undertake local 
planning that tailors bushfire safety. 
o o o      X   5  5   
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55 The State introduces a comprehensive 
approach to shelter options. o o o      X   5  5   
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55 The State introduces a comprehensive 
approach to evacuation. o o o X X X X X X X 5 5 5 5   Fe
de
ra
l 
St
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e 
Lo
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55 The Commonwealth lead an initiative 
through the Ministerial Council for Police 
and Emergency Management, facilitated by 
Emergency Management Australia, to 
develop a national bushfire awareness 
campaign. 
o o o      X  5   5   Fe
de
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l 
  
Po
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y 
  
55 Emergency and incident management. The 
Country Fire Authority and the Department 
of Sustainability and Environment amend 
their procedures. Joint training exercises in 
which incident management team staffs 
(including volunteers) are required to 
participate. 
o o o      X  5   5   Fe
de
ra
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55 The State consider amending the Emergency 
Management Act 1986 and the Emergency 
Management Manual Victoria Fireground 
response. The Country Fire Authority and 
the Department of Sustainability and 
Environment amend their policies on aerial 
preparedness and standby arrangements. 
o o o      X x  5  5   
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55 Planning and building 
*The State identify a central point of 
responsibility for and expertise in mapping 
bushfire risk. 
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55 Planning and building 
*The State implement a regional settlement 
policy. 
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55 Planning and building 
*The State amend the Victoria Planning 
Provisions relating to bushfire to ensure that 
the provisions give priority to the protection 
of human life, adopt a clear objective of 
substantially restricting development in the 
areas of highest bushfire risk—giving due 
consideration to biodiversity conservation—
and provide clear guidance for decision 
makers. 
o        X   5 5 5   
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55 Planning and building 
*The Country Fire Authority amends its 
guidelines for assessing permit applications 
for dwellings, non-dwellings and 
subdivisions in the Bushfire-prone. 
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55 Planning and building 
*The State: amend the Victoria Planning 
Provisions to require that, when assessing a 
permit to remove native vegetation around 
an existing dwelling, the responsible 
authority and the Department of 
Sustainability and Environment, as referral 
o        X  5 5 5 5   Fe
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authority, take into account fire hazard and 
give weight to fire protection purposes 
develop guidelines for determining the 
maximum level of native vegetation removal 
for bushfire risk mitigation, beyond which 
level the application would be rejected. 
55 Planning and building 
* The Department of Sustainability and 
Environment develop and administer a 
collective offset solution for individual 
landholders who are permitted to remove 
native vegetation for the purpose of fire 
protection. 
o o o   X   X   5 5 5   
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55 Planning and building 
*The State press municipal councils—in 
particular, Murrindindi Shire Council—to 
urgently adopt a bushfire policy in their 
Local Planning Policy Framework and 
incorporate bushfire risk management in 
their planning policies and strategies for 
rebuilding communities such as Marysville, 
Kinglake and others affected by the 
January–February 2009 fires. 
o     X   X   5 5 5   
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55 Planning and building 
* Standards Australia do the following: 
amend the objective of AS 3959-2009, 
Construction of Buildings in Bushfire-prone 
Areas. 
*The Australian Building Codes Board do 
the following: amend the performance 
requirements in the Building Code of 
Australia to ensure that they incorporate 
reducing the risk of ignition from ember 
attack work with Standards Australia to 
effect expeditious continuing review and 
development of AS 3959 
o o o X    X X   5  5   
 
St
at
e 
 
Po
lic
y 
  
55 Planning and building 
*The State modify its adoption of the 
Building Code of Australia 
* The State develop and implement, in 
consultation with local government, a 
mechanism for sign-off by municipal councils 
of any permit conditions imposed under the 
Bushfire-prone Overlay and the regular 
assessment of landowners’ compliance with 
conditions. 
o o o   X X X X X 5 5  5   
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55 Planning and building 
*The State initiate the development of 
education and training options to improve 
understanding of bushfire risk management 
in the building and planning regimes Land 
and fuel management 
o o o      X   5  5   
 
St
at
e  
Po
lic
y 
  
55 Planning and building 
*The State amend the exemptions in clause 
52.17-6 of the Victoria Planning Provisions to 
ensure that the provisions allow for a broad 
range of roadside works capable of 
reducing fire risk and provide specifically 
for a new exemption where the purpose of 
the works is to reduce bushfire risk. 
o o o X X X X X X  5 5  5   
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e  
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55 Planning and building 
*The State and Commonwealth provide for 
municipal councils adequate guidance on 
resolving the competing tensions arising 
from the legislation affecting roadside 
clearing and, where necessary, amend 
environment protection legislation to 
facilitate annual bushfire-prevention 
activities by the appropriate agencies. 
o o o X X X X X X X  5 5 5   
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55 Planning and building 
*VicRoads implement a systematic 
statewide program of bushfire risk 
assessment for all roads for which it is 
responsible, to ensure conformity with the 
obligations in s. 43 of the Country Fire 
Authority Act 1958 and with the objectives 
expressed in the VicRoads 1985 Code of 
Practice. 
o o o X X X X X X X  5 5 5   
 
St
at
e 
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l 
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55 Research and evaluation 
The Commonwealth establish a national 
centre for bushfire research in collaboration 
with other Australian jurisdictions to support 
pure, applied and long-term research in the 
physical, biological and social sciences 
relevant to bushfires and to promote 
continuing research and scholarship in 
related disciplines. 
o o o X X X X X X X 5   5   
Fe
de
ra
l   
Po
lic
y  
 
55 Monitoring implementation 
The State appoint an independent monitor 
or the Victorian Auditor-General to assess 
progress with implementing the 
Commission’s recommendations and report 
to the Parliament and the people of Victoria 
o o o X X X X X X X  5  5   
 
St
at
e  
Po
lic
y 
  
387 
SO
U
RC
E 
KEY GAPS STATED BY PREVIOUS 
RESEARCHERS 
WHEN IT 
SHOULD BE 
MONITORED 
CR
IT
IC
AL
 IN
FR
AS
TR
U
CT
U
RE
 
TR
AN
SP
O
RT
 IN
FR
AS
TR
U
CT
U
RE
 
RE
SI
LI
EN
CE
 A
N
D 
PL
AN
N
IN
G
 
LA
N
D 
U
SE
 D
EV
EL
O
PM
EN
T 
DE
CI
SI
O
N
S 
TR
AN
SP
O
RT
 P
LA
N
N
IN
G
 
RO
AD
 D
ES
IG
N
 
DI
SA
ST
ER
 R
ES
IL
IE
N
CE
 P
LA
N
N
IN
G
 
AN
D 
M
AN
AG
EM
EN
T 
CO
M
M
U
N
IC
AT
IO
N
 A
N
D 
CO
O
RD
IN
AT
IO
N
 
Ke
y 
Re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y 
Ra
tin
gs
 o
f F
ed
er
al
[F
], 
St
at
e[
S]
 a
nd
 L
oc
al
[L
] 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t  
Re
qu
ire
m
en
t –
 
Po
lic
y[
P]
, S
tr
at
eg
y[
S]
 
or
 P
la
nn
in
g 
[P
] 
FINAL KEY NEEDS 
& 
REQUIREMENTS 
Pr
e 
– 
Di
sa
st
er
 
Du
rin
g 
– 
Di
sa
st
er
 
Po
st
 –
 D
is
as
te
r 
Performance Rating (5-1) [5 = 
Highest, 1 = lowest]  Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
St
ra
te
gy
 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 
IMPACTED AREA F S  L P Str PL       
by 31 July 2012. 
56 At their worst, fires at the rural–urban or 
wild land–urban interface cause tragic loss 
of human lives and homes, but mitigating 
these fire effects through management 
elicits many social and scientific challenges. 
 
o o o X X X X X X X  5 5 5   
 
St
at
e 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
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y 
  
57 Alternative policies and/or regulatory 
approaches aimed at reducing the 
inconsistencies in local land-use planning 
should be implemented. 
o o o   X   X   5  5   
 
St
at
e  
Po
lic
y 
  
58 Policy implications -we have no data for 
those who left early, but assume that none 
in that category died, although people 
evacuating early are subject to normal traffic 
risks to their lives.  
o o o X X X X X X    5 5   
  
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
  
59 The community owes them a special duty of 
care. Active screening programs linked to 
occupational health services that are expert 
in managing traumatic reactions and grief 
should be instituted, as currently occurs in 
o o o      X  5 5  5   Fe
de
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l 
St
at
e  
Po
lic
y 
  
388 
SO
U
RC
E 
KEY GAPS STATED BY PREVIOUS 
RESEARCHERS 
WHEN IT 
SHOULD BE 
MONITORED 
CR
IT
IC
AL
 IN
FR
AS
TR
U
CT
U
RE
 
TR
AN
SP
O
RT
 IN
FR
AS
TR
U
CT
U
RE
 
RE
SI
LI
EN
CE
 A
N
D 
PL
AN
N
IN
G
 
LA
N
D 
U
SE
 D
EV
EL
O
PM
EN
T 
DE
CI
SI
O
N
S 
TR
AN
SP
O
RT
 P
LA
N
N
IN
G
 
RO
AD
 D
ES
IG
N
 
DI
SA
ST
ER
 R
ES
IL
IE
N
CE
 P
LA
N
N
IN
G
 
AN
D 
M
AN
AG
EM
EN
T 
CO
M
M
U
N
IC
AT
IO
N
 A
N
D 
CO
O
RD
IN
AT
IO
N
 
Ke
y 
Re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y 
Ra
tin
gs
 o
f F
ed
er
al
[F
], 
St
at
e[
S]
 a
nd
 L
oc
al
[L
] 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t  
Re
qu
ire
m
en
t –
 
Po
lic
y[
P]
, S
tr
at
eg
y[
S]
 
or
 P
la
nn
in
g 
[P
] 
FINAL KEY NEEDS 
& 
REQUIREMENTS 
Pr
e 
– 
Di
sa
st
er
 
Du
rin
g 
– 
Di
sa
st
er
 
Po
st
 –
 D
is
as
te
r 
Performance Rating (5-1) [5 = 
Highest, 1 = lowest]  Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
St
ra
te
gy
 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 
IMPACTED AREA F S  L P Str PL       
the Australian Defence Force. 
60 *Australia needs a nationwide program of 
school and community education about 
bushfires—the fire history of the continent, 
the role of bushfire in the Australian 
environment, and how to prepare for 
bushfires and survive them. 
o o o      X   5  5   
 
St
at
e  
Po
lic
y 
  
60 *Land use planning, development controls 
and building standards have a central role 
in reducing the risk to people and property 
from bushfire. The Inquiry endorses the 
recommendation of the Natural Disasters in 
Australia report to the Council of Australian 
Governments in relation to land use 
planning, development controls and building 
standards. 
o o o      X   5  5   
 
St
at
e 
 
Po
lic
y 
  
60 *Comprehensive expenditure data for 
bushfire-related research and development 
are not available for Australia. 
o o o      X   5 5 5   
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60 *The Inquiry is the need for connectivity 
between the planning profession, planning 
policy, local government, town planning, the 
construction industry, land management, 
hazard abatement, fire response, and 
community education. 
o o o  X X X X X  5 5 5 5   Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
  
60  Ensure that land use planning for natural 
disaster mitigation is incorporated in all 
tertiary courses on planning. 
o o o      X   5 5 5   
 
St
at
e 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
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y 
  
60  Implement and actively promote best-
practice planning, taking into account 
natural disaster risk-reduction measures. 
o o o X X X X X X X 5 5 5 5   Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
  
61 * There was significant unawareness of the 
general fire risk. 
o o o      X  5 5 5 5   Fe
de
ra
l 
St
at
e 
Lo
ca
l 
Po
lic
y 
  
61 *A significant proportion of fatalities were 
taken by surprise by the fires. Others 
appeared to be waiting for an official 
warning before activating their plans. 
o o o      X  5 5 5 5   Fe
de
ra
l 
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61 * Even apparently high levels of planning 
and preparedness usually contained weak 
points, or *aspects that meant that the 
plans were not fully implemented. 
o o o      X  5 5 5   5 Fe
de
ra
l 
St
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Note: When it should be monitored, the type of impacted area, the ratings from 1 to 5 and the recommendations were given by the author. 
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